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THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF HYBRID JUSTICE
BETH VAN SCHAACK*
I. INTRODUCTION
The commission of mass atrocities-genocide, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes-inevitably generates clarion calls for accountability from a range of
international actors, including civil society organizations, governments, and United
Nations bodies. These demands often center on an appeal that the situation be
taken up by the International Criminal Court ("ICC") via a Security Council
referral or action by the Prosecutor herself. Although the ICC is now fully
operational, its jurisdiction remains incomplete and its resources limited.
Furthermore, the ICC is plagued by challenges to its legitimacy, erratic state
cooperation, and persistent perceptions of inefficacy and inefficiency. Originally
envisioned as a standing institution that would obviate the need for new ad hoc
courts, it is now clear that the ICC cannot handle all the atrocity situations
ravaging our planet. As such, there is an enduring need for the international
community to create, enable, and support additional accountability mechanisms to
respond to the commission of international crimes when the political will for an
ICC referral is lacking, the ICC is inappropriate or foreclosed for whatever reason,
or only a fraction of the abuses or perpetrators in question are before the ICC.
This paper analyzes the accumulated experience with international, hybrid,
and internationalized judicial institutions prior to and since the establishment of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") in 19931 and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR") in 1994.2 This paper
assumes the continuing utility of such mechanisms as tools to provide
accountability for mass violence amounting to international crimes, particularly in
situations requiring an alternative or supplement to the ICC.3 It thus focuses on
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1. S.C. Res. 808 (Feb. 22, 1993) [hereinafter Establishment of ICTY].
2. S.C. Res. 995 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
3. For a discussion of the value of internationalized mechanisms in general, see OFFICE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, RULE-OF-LAW TOOLS FOR POST-CONFLICr
STATES: MAXIMIZING THE LEGACY OF HYBRID COURTS, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/08/2, U.N. Sales No.
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
practical elements of institutional design, with particular attention to the origins,
structure, jurisdictional limitations, financing, and procedures of the hybrid courts,
dedicated chambers, specialized prosecutorial cells, and other accountability
innovations established to prosecute atrocity crimes at the domestic level with
some measure of international support, expertise, and personnel. From this
historical and comparative analysis, the paper develops a taxonomy of models and
a "menu" of elements that can be mixed and matched as new accountability
mechanisms are under consideration for historical, current, and emerging atrocity
situations, such as Syria,4 the Central African Republic,5 the Democratic Republic
of Congo,6 Colombia,7 North Korea,8 South Sudan,9 Sri Lanka, 10 Libya,"
Burundi, 12 and even the July 2014 downing of Malaysian Air Flight 17 ("MH-17")
over rebel-controlled Ukraine.' 
3
E.08.XIV.2 (2008); Alberto Costi, Hybrid Tribunals as a Valid Alternative to International Tribunals
for the Prosecution of International Crimes, HUMAN RIGHTS RESEARCH, 2005.
4. See Beth Van Schaack, Alternative Jurisdictional Bases for a Hybrid Tribunal for Syria, JUST
SECURITY (May 29, 2014, 12:44 AM), http://justsecurity.org/10968/alternative-jurisdictional-bases-
hybrid-tribunal-syria/.
5. See Mark Kersten, Why Central African Republic's Hybrid Tribunal Could be a Game-
Changer, JUST. CONFLICT (May 14, 2015), http://justiceinconflict.org/2015/05/14/why-central-african-
republics-hybrid-tribunal-could-be-a-game-changer/.
6. See Democratic Republic of Congo: No More Delays for Justice, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/01/democratic-republic-congo-no-more-delays-
justice.
7. See The Last Lap in Colombia: Clinching Peace Depends on Persuading the FARC to do Jail
Time, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 31, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21641293-clinching-
peace-depends-persuading-farc-do-jail-time-last-lap-colombia; Time to Call the FARC 's Bluff:
Colombia's Peace Process Risks Drifting to Collapse, THE ECONOMIST (July 4, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21656694-colombias-peace-process-risks-drifting-collapse-
time-call-fares-bluff.
8. See Morse H. Tan, Finding a Forumfor North Korea, 65 SMU L. REV. 765 (2012).
9. See William Eagle, Hybrid Court Suggested for South Sudan, VOICE AM. (Mar. 31, 2014),
http://www.voanews.com/content/hybrid-court-suggested-for-south-sudan/1883130.html/; Ending the
Era of Injustice: Advancing Prosecutions for Serious Crimes Committed in South Sudan 's War, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 10, 2014),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/12/1 0/ending-era-injustice/advancing-prosecutions-serious-crimes-
committed-south-sudans? ga=1.227964440.429423661.1399935943/ (arguing that South Sudan's
judicial system is too weak and lacking in political will to support an embedded hybrid mechanism)
[hereinafter ENDING THE ERA OF INJUSTICE].
10. See Parasaran Rangarajan, Alternative Routes to Justice for War Crimes in Sri Lanka, S. ASIA
ANALYSIS GROUP (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1 710.
11. See Alison Cole, A Hybrid Court Could Secure Justice in Libya: Gaddafi's Son and Spy Chief
Might End Up Before the ICC, but What about Everyone Else?, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2011, 1:04
PM), http://www.theguardian.com/law/201 1/oct!27/hybid-court-justice-libya.
12. See U.N. Security-General, Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doe. S/2005/158 (March 11, 2005) (advocating for a truth commission and a specialized
chamber); see also S.C. Res. 1606, 1 1 (June 20, 2005) (directing the Secretary-General to initiate
negotiations with Burundi to implement his recommendation).
13. S.C. Res. 2166 (July 21, 2014). Ukraine's original Article 12(3) declaration to the ICC was
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While past proposals advocating additional ad hoc mechanisms may have
reflected skepticism about-or even hostility toward-the ICC, contemporary
submissions1 4 are more often premised on a pragmatic recognition of the limits of
the ICC coupled with a firm fealty to the principle, and benefits, of positive
complementarity. Rather than threatening to undermine the ICC, many proposals,
if pursued, have the potential to contribute to a more integrated, differentiated, and
impactful international justice system that will mount a stronger challenge to
impunity by reaching more victims and perpetrators. At the same time, although
this paper is dedicated to exploring the promises and drawbacks of hybridity, it
cannot be gainsaid that there may remain a role for fully international tribunals to
prosecute truly international crimes, i.e., massive crimes that transcend national
borders and overwhelm national judiciaries.
Although there have been important antecedents, the institutions of interest
are part of a global trend of recent vintage toward international institution building
and the judicialization of international relations. By way of background, the
1990's witnessed a sharp rise in the number of international, quasi-international,
and regional tribunals established for the purpose of adjudicating a whole range of
transnational disputes, including those involving international trade and
investment, the law of the sea and piracy, human rights, the law of armed conflict,
and property and restitution claims.' 5 The revitalization of the Nuremberg promise
that international crimes would not go unaddressed first found expression in the
formation by the U.N. Security Council of two ad hoc criminal tribunals to address
crimes committed during the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and the
genocide in Rwanda. 16  These events also occasioned a revival of post-WWII
proposals for a permanent international criminal court. The establishment of the
ICC in 1998, and its operationalization in 2002, seemed to mark the apex of this
movement toward ensuring accountability for international crimes, although penal
proceedings before ad hoc tribunals dedicated to particular conflict situations
continued apace. 17 With the establishment of the ICC, it was largely assumed that
narrowly drawn and did not cover MH-17; with the most recent submission, Ukraine accepted the
ICC's jurisdiction over crimes committed until early 2014, so there is potential jurisdiction over the
Maidan protests as well as crimes committed in connection with the Russian annexation of Crimea.
Declaration by Ukraine Lodged under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Ukraine, INT'L CRIM. CT. (Sept. 8, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/other/UkraineArt 12-
3_declaration_08092015.pdf.
14. Including submissions by this author. See Beth Van Schaack, Options for Accountability in
Syria, JUST SECURITY (May 22, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/10736/options-accountability-
syria/.
15. See Roger P. Alford, The Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: International
Adjudication in Ascendance, 94 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 160 (2000); Cesare P.R. Romano, The
Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
709 (1999).
16. Charles Garraway, Courts and Tribunals, in CRIMES OF WAR 2.0: WHAT THE PUBLIC SHOULD
KNOW 132 (Anthony Dworkin et al. eds., 2007), http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/courts-and-
tribunals/.
17. Establishment of the Court, INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en-menus/ic/abut%2the%2court/icc%2at%/o2a%2glane/Pages/estabishment/ 0 2Oof/2t
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there would be no more need for additional ad hoc institutions.18
This assumption proved premature as it became clear that the ICC-given
resource and jurisdictional constraints-would only be able to handle a fraction of
the situations demanding justice around the globe. 19 As such, the international
community has over the years constructed a network of additional international
and internationalized tribunals dedicated to prosecuting violations of transnational
and international criminal law committed by individuals who have participated in
some of the most brutal conflicts waged by humankind. Attesting to the creativity
of international actors committed to advancing the accountability norm, several
varieties of ad hoc tribunal have emerged, often in response to perceived
shortcomings of previous attempts. These new models, it was hoped, would cloak
the proceedings with international legitimacy without requiring the construction
from scratch of another expensive international institution. These next generation
institutions have been called "hybrid" tribunals, because they possess qualities of
both domestic and international courts. 20 For example, they were usually situated
within the target state; were staffed by international and domestic personnel
(judges, prosecutors, investigators, defense counsel, administrators, and support
staff) working in tandem; and applied a mixture of international and domestic
criminal law and procedures. 2'
While some of these second generation institutions have enjoyed an
independent legal personality, others are completely integrated into, or grafted
onto, the national court system. Included within this continuum of hybridized
institutions are purely domestic endeavors that are positioned, or attempt to
position themselves, within the tradition of international justice by accepting
international staff and technical assistance or by adjudicating norms drawn from
international law. It is hoped that the infusion of international experience and
expertise into domestic penal processes by way of mixed panels and prosecutorial
units will offer capacity-building opportunities for national personnel, exert a
"demonstration effect" for how justice should be administered, create binding
precedent and opportunities for norm penetration that will guide future
accountability efforts, magnify the expressive and constitutive function of the law,
and counter corrupt tendencies in societies in which the rule of law is frail or has
broken down.22 Mixed tribunals are also meant to address some of the shortfalls of
ad hoc stand-alone tribunals, including high start-up and maintenance expenses,
he%20court.aspx.
18. See Milena Sterio, The Future of Ad Hoc Tribunals: An Assessment of their Utility Post-ICC,
19 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 237 (2013).
19. Id. at239-40.
20. Hybrid Courts, PROJECT ON INT'L CTS. AND TRIBS., http://www.pict-
pcti.org/courts/hybfid.html.
21. id.
22. Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 295, 306-08 (2003);
cf Elena Baylis, Reassessing the Role of International Criminal Law: Rebuilding National Courts
through Transnational Networks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009) (arguing that the goal of international
criminal law should be to empower national courts to be the primary venue for atrocity trials).
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their physical and symbolic distance from the events in question, the absence of
local "ownership" within the constituencies they were designed to serve, and their
lack of "technology transfer" to help rebuild or strengthen national judicial
systems. 23 As compared to their predecessors, some of these more recent hybrid
institutions have proven to be more agile in operation, better anchored in local and
even regional norms, more representative of the local legal culture and community,
and more attuned to "the complex domestic and social causes that led to the
crimes.''24 As such, they enjoy greater cultural and procedural legitimacy.
Despite their advantages over earlier models of international justice, these
newer hybrid and internationalized institutions raise questions of their own when it
comes to the imperatives of legitimacy, competency, and fairness-particularly
when local personnel may be susceptible to political manipulation-where the rule
of law is not fully established, or when domestic actors insist on certain
concessions, such as the availability of in absentia proceedings or the death
penalty. Moreover, as they become more idiosyncratic, these institutions risk
reifying the more problematic manifestations of state sovereignty, contributing to
the fragmentation of the law, and undermining the universalist ethos that
undergirds the entire human rights edifice. Leaving the prosecution of
international crimes to domestic systems, even with some international
involvement, can enable parochial forms of victor's justice and give expression to
illiberal impulses that the international community should not endorse through the
provision of financial, technical, diplomatic, or other forms of support. As the
international community and states embark upon new efforts at institution
building, they should not lose sight of these potential pitfalls. This paper thus also
recounts some cautionary tales from the many object lessons of international
justice that should be borne in mind as new hybrid and ad hoc institutions are
under contemplation.
As this summary reveals, there is a high degree of diversity amongst these
institutions. To be sure, some of this variation reflects considerations that are
endogenous to the particular atrocity situations at issue. At the same time,
different crises inevitably present a unique mix of competing equities within the
international community and the domestic political realm as far as the pursuit of
accountability is concerned. Examining this legal and institutional history, it
becomes clear that the most important determinant of whether an effective justice
outcome is achieved is the interface of geopolitical interests with the principle of
state sovereignty. It is this mix that dictates when elements of the international
community are able and willing to impose justice on a crisis situation and when the
consent of implicated states, such as the territorial state or its protectors, is deemed
necessary for real progress to be made toward accountability. Ever since the
international community first contemplated a program for international justice in
the World War I period, justice entrepreneurs have been encumbered by the
23. Id.
24. Frdric Mgret, In Defense of Hybridity: Towards a Representational Theory of
International Criminal Justice, 38 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 725, 730 (2005).
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constraints of state sovereignty and have sought ways to transcend them.
II. ORIGINS
International and internationalized justice institutions have been created
through a number of routes. This includes action within the Security Council, as
well as by way of multilateral or bilateral treaties that may involve the implicated
state, other interested states, and components of the United Nations. They may
also be the product of a foreign occupation or a United Nations administration
exercising state sovereignty in trust in an immediate post-conflict situation. Some
of these mechanisms have been imposed on the situation in question without the
consent-genuine or coerced-of the territorial or nationality state(s). Others have
been created by way of negotiations with implicated states, which has at times
occasioned problematic compromises and concessions to state sovereignty and
domestic preferences. Institutions at the more domestic end of the hybridity
continuum are increasingly the product of domestic legislation, incorporating or
reflecting international negotiations around the justice imperative. 25  In many
respects, the origins of these bodies both enable and constrain subsequent
institutional design choices with respect to structure, staffing patterns, and
procedures.
A. "Victor's Justice"
Early international justice efforts followed situations of armed conflict and
were largely imposed on the vanquished by the victors. The 1474 trial of Peter
Von Hagenbach is often credited with being the first international criminal
26proceeding. Von Hagenbach stood accused of rape and pillage during the
occupation of Breisach, Germany.27 His conduct (deemed a "crime against the
laws of God and Man") was so egregious that it triggered unprecedented collective
action within the Holy Roman Empire, which convened a tribunal with judges
28hailing from member states. Although Von Hagenbach claimed that he was
acting on the orders of his superior, the Duke of Burgundy, this defense was
rejected, and he was ultimately drawn and quartered upon conviction. 29
The first truly world war also launched the first global effort to address
international crimes through the exercise of international and domestic criminal
jurisdiction. Peace treaties emerged as the vehicle of choice, giving the illusion of
state consent to the proceedings. World War I precipitated the commission of
abuses against combatants, prisoners of war, and civilians on an unprecedented
25. See, e.g., John D. Ciorciari & Anne Heindel, Experiments in International Criminal Justice:
Lessons from the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 35 MICH. J. INT'L L. 369, 370-73 (2014) (recounting
negotiations around the establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia).
26. 1474: The Peter Von Hagenbach Trial, The First International Criminal Tribunal,
DUHAIME'S TIMETABLE WORLD LEGAL HIST., http://www.duhaime.org/LawMuseum/LawArticle-
1563/1474-The-Peter-Von-Hagenbach-Tria-The-First-ntemationa-Crimina-Tribuna.aspx.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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scale. 30  German atrocities included unrestricted submarine warfare, brutal
occupations, the targeting of civilians and undefended towns, breaches of
neutrality, and-from the perspective of the rest of Europe-the initiation of the
war in the first place. 31 The Ottoman Empire, with the Young Turks 32 at the helm,
staged one of the first genocides of the 2 0 th century in its effort to eradicate the
Christian Armenian population of what is now Turkey. 33  In the face of these
offenses, the Allies convened a Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors
of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties to inquire into culpable conduct by the
Central Powers during the "Great War." 34 The Commission was also to consider
the propriety and feasibility of asserting penal jurisdiction over particular
individuals-"however highly placed"-accused of committing such breaches.35
The Commission's Report concluded that such crimes should be prosecuted before
an international "high tribunal" composed of representatives of the Allied and
Associated Powers or before national tribunals.
36
From this point, the potential liability of German and Turkish perpetrators
proceeded along separate tracks. The 1919 Treaty of Versailles ending the war
with Germany required Germany to accept full responsibility for causing the war
(the so called "War Guilt" clause), make substantial territorial concessions, and
pay reparations.37  Presaging a bifurcated model that would continue to be
employed decades later, Article 227 envisioned the establishment of an
international tribunal composed of representatives of the United States, Great
Britain, France, Italy, and Japan to try the former German Emperor, Kaiser
William II, who was thus singled out for his central role in orchestrating German
crimes during the war.38 According to Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles,
Germany was to hand over lesser German defendants to be tried before the
30. See JOHN N. HORNE & ALAN KRAMER, GERMAN ATROCITIES, 1914: A HISTORY OF DENIAL
(Ist ed. 2001).
31. See Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany art. 231, June
28, 1919,42 Stat. 1943 [hereinafter Treaty of Versailles] (containing the so-called war guilt clause).
32. See Armenian Genocide, UNITED HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL,
http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/genocide/armeniangenocide.htm (last visited Jan. 1,2016).
33. ld.; see also Vahakn N. Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law:
The World War Armenian Case and its Contemporary Legal Ramifications, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 221
(1989); John Kifner, The Armenian Genocide of 1915: An Overview, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/timestopics/topics-armeniangenocide.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2015).
34. See Harry M. Rhea, The Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on
Enforcement of Penalties and its Contribution to International Criminal Justice After World War 11, 25
CRIM. L. F. 147, 151 (2014).
35. Id.
36. Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference by the Commission on the
Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, in CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE PAMPHLET No. 32, VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR 1
4,19,23-24 (1919),
https://ia6004O6.us.archive.org/20/items/violationoflawscOOpariuoft/violationoflawscOpariuoft.pdf.
37. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 31, at art. 119-58 (renunciation of rights on various
territories), 231-43 (reparations provisions).
38. Id. at art. 227.
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domestic military tribunals convened by the Allied and Associated Powers. 39
Mixed military tribunals were to prosecute individuals "guilty of criminal acts
against the nationals of one of the Allied and Associated Powers" pursuant to
Article 229.40 By these terms, the Treaty of Versailles became the first peace
treaty to contemplate war crimes trials before hybrid institutions. Germany signed
the treaty, but only on threat of invasion.4 1
By the time the Versailles Treaty entered into force, however, the Kaiser had
fled to the Netherlands, which had ostensibly remained neutral during the war.
42
The Dutch refused to extradite him for trial, invoking both a long history of
providing asylum to political refugees and the double criminality rule, which
ostensibly prevented his extradition to face justice for acts that were not crimes
under Dutch law.43 Article 227 thus remained a dead letter. The Allies never
enforced the other penal provisions of the Treaty either. In the face of continued
Allied equivocation over war crimes trials and fierce objections among the German
public to the possible extradition of German nationals, Germany artfully proposed
hosting domestic trials before the German Supreme Court in Leipzig. 44 The Allies,
desperate to ensure stability while also salvaging some vestige of their justice
project, agreed.45 To the extent that cases were brought (out of over 800
individuals accused of war crimes, including high-level German officials, only
about a dozen judgments were issued), trials proceeded sluggishly against low-
level defendants and resulted in acquittals or disproportionately low sentences.46
Although the Allies protested and then quit the proceedings, they never made good
on their threats to further sanction Germany, and no additional cases were
pursued.47
With respect to the Ottoman Empire, the new Turkish regime-under
pressure from the British and perhaps in an effort to head off international trials of
its own former leaders-court-martialed in Constantinople an impressive array of
once prominent officials for "crimes against humanity and civilization" and other
wartime offenses. 48 Much of the output of these proceedings has been largely lost
to history; although some individuals were sentenced, others were released and
39. Id. at art. 228.
40. Id. at art. 229.
41. C.N. Trueman, The Treaty of Versailles, HIsT. LEARNING SITE (Mar. 17, 2015),
http://www.historyleamingsite.co.uk/modern-world-history-1918-to- 1980/the-treaty-of-versailles/.
42. Tony Paterson, Berlin Refuses Kaiser a Final Resting Place, THE TELEGRAPH (Oct. 15,
2000), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/netherlands/1 370484/Berlin-refuses-kaiser-
a-final-resting-place.html.
43. See GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
IN WAR 74 (2010).
44. See Alan Kramer, The First Wave of International War Crimes Trials: Istanbul and Leipzig,
14 EUROP. REV. 441 (2006).
45. Id. at 447.
46. Id. at 448.
47. Id. See generally GERD HANKEL, THE LEIPZIG TRIALS: GERMAN WAR CRIMES AND THEIR
LEGAL CONSEQUENCES AFTER WORLD WAR 1 (2014).
48. Id. at 443-45.
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went on to return to high office. 49 The first treaty of peace with Turkey, the 1920
Treaty of Srvres, contained accountability provisions mirroring those in the Treaty
of Versailles with respect to the right of the Allies to convene military tribunals to
prosecute persons guilty of having committed acts in violation of the laws and
customs of warn0 Article 230 also contemplated a tribunal created by the League
of Nations to address "the massacres committed during the continuance of the state
of war on territory which formed part of the Turkish Empire on August 1, 1914."'"
After the Turkish War of Independence, Mustafa Kemal (also known as Atatirk),
who led the Nationalists to victory, denounced and refused to ratify the Treaty of
S~vres.52  Renegotiations produced a successor treaty, the 1923 Treaty of
Lausanne, which was silent on the question of international justice for abuses.53
All told, even with the complete defeat and disintegration of the two empires, and a
comprehensive post-war treaty framework, accountability proved elusive.
After these abortive efforts to create treaty-based international tribunals with
the "consent" (however coerced) of the offending state, the real story of
international justice begins following World War I1 ("WWII"). The victorious
allies of that war created the original international tribunals at Nuremberg and
Tokyo, albeit through disparate means, without involving the defeated states. The
International Military Tribunal ("IMT") sitting in Nuremberg was the product of
the London Agreement of 1945, a quadripartite accord between the United States,
France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. 54 As contemplated by Article
5, nineteen other states eventually adhered to the treaty, which contained the
tribunal's substantive Charter in an annex.55 Like the Treaty of Versailles before
it, this treaty envisioned that individuals "whose offenses [had] no particular
geographic location" would be tried by the IMT; lesser war criminals would be
sent to the countries where their alleged crimes were committed for trial before
military commissions or domestic courts. 6 Indeed, hundreds of other war crimes
trials were held in occupation and national courts around the European and Pacific
theaters in the postwar period.57
Prosecutions for the crimes committed in the Pacific theater were
49. Id. at 445.
50. See Treaty of Peace with Turkey art. 226-30, Aug. 10, 1920, T.S. No. 11 [hereinafter Treaty
of Svres].
51. ld. at art. 230.
52. See Nick Danforth, Forget Sykes-Picot. It's the Treaty of Skvres that Explains the Modern
Middle East, FOREIGN POL'Y (Aug. 10, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/1 0/sykes-picot-treaty-
of-sevres-modem-turkey-middle-east-borders-turkey/.
53. Srvane Garibian, From the 1915 Allied Joint Declaration to the 1920 Treaty of Skvres: Back
to an International Criminal Law in Progress, 52 ARM. REv. 87, 94 (2010).
54. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis art. 1, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.C. 280 [hereinafter London Agreement].
55. Id. at art. 5.
56. Id. at art. I.
57. See, e.g., Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes
Against Peace and Against Humanity, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtl0.asp (enabling the
prosecution of lower-level defendants in the European theater).
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contemplated by the August 1945 Potsdam Declaration-signed by the United
States, the United Kingdom, and China-which demanded Japan's unconditional
surrender.58 Unlike the IMT, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East
("the Tokyo Tribunal") was created through a unilateral proclamation of General
Douglas MacArthur, who was declared the Supreme Commander of the Allied
Powers in occupied Japan. 59 The Tokyo Tribunal's Charter largely mirrored its
Nuremberg predecessor. The one-sided nature of these two institutions generated
awkward claims of tu quoque when it came to charges that could easily have been
leveled against the Allies. 60  It has also sustained perennial critiques that the
tribunals meted out little more than victor's justice.6' It is notable that neither of
these tribunals enjoyed the "consent" of the vanquished state or its polity except
insofar as the victors, as occupiers, held German and Japanese sovereignty "in
trust" following the war.62 Given that the United Nations was founded as these
tribunals were carrying out their work, the judicial proceedings received their
multilateral imprimatur only by virtue of the accession of other states to the
tribunals' constitutive documents and signatories' subsequent participation in the
trials. That said, the General Assembly later blessed the Nuremberg Principles,
63
setting in motion a process that would eventually lead to the establishment of the
ICC and the entire system of international justice, albeit decades later.
B. Security Council Action Under Chapter VII
Today's ad hoc international and internationalized tribunals have
fundamentally different origins than their WWII ancestors. For one, although
some unilateral and regional efforts exist, many contemporary international
mechanisms have been the work of various elements of the United Nations
purporting to represent the entire international community. Some have benefited
from the Security Council's coercive powers under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter; others have involved the General Assembly and/or Secretary-General.
The Security Council was centrally involved in the creation of the ICTY 64 and
58. Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender Issued, at Potsdam, July 26, 1945, 71 10
("[S]tem justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon
our prisoners.").
59. International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589,
http://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/04/4-06/militay-tribunal-far-east.xml
[hereinafter Tokyo Charter]. For a discussion of the differences between the two international military
tribunals, see Zachary D. Kaufman, The Nuremberg Tribunal v. the Tokyo Tribunal: Designs, Staffs,
and Operations, 43 JOHN MARSHALL L. REv. 753, 756-61 (2010).
60. Sienho Yee, The Tu Quoque Argument as a Defence to International Crimes, Prosecution or
Punishment, 3 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 87, 103-13 (2004).
61. Richard Overy, Making Justice at Nuremberg, 1945-1946, Victors and Judges, BBC (Feb. 17,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/war-crimes-trials_01.shtml.
62. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Structures and Standards for Political Trusteeship, 8 UCLA J. INT'L L.
& FOR. AFF. 385, 393-94 (2003).
63. G.A. Res. 1/95, (Dec. 11, 1946) (affirming the principles of international law recognized by
the IMT Charter and judgment).
64. Establishment of ICTY, supra note 1; Report of Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of
Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) and Annex thereto, U.N. Doe. S/25704, adopted by S.C. Res.
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65ICTR. In those two situations, the existence of a breach of the peace within the
meaning of Article 39 of the U.N. Charter was manifest, although arguably the
situation in Rwanda, being more internal, occasioned a greater expansion of the
Council's ambit. Rwanda originally advocated for the establishment of an
international tribunal; however, it ultimately withdrew support when the ICTR did
not reflect certain of its preferences regarding jurisdiction and the availability of
the death penalty. 66  As such, both tribunals were ultimately imposed on the
countries in question. While members of the Council no doubt supported the
pursuit of justice in its own right, creating a judicial institution in the face of mass
violence also offered the Council an alternative to more robust interventions that
may have been politically infeasible or unpalatable at the time. 67 The legality of the
Council's establishment of criminal tribunals as subsidiary organs, notwithstanding
the lack of an express Charter approval for such institutions in Article 41, was
confirmed in the Tadi6 case, the first ICTY case to be fully adjudicated.68
Over the years, the Council has remained engaged in the work of its progeny,
receiving regular briefings and occasionally tweaking their mandates and
structures, such as by establishing additional trial chambers, 69 adding judges to the
Appeals Chamber, 70 creating a roster of ad litem judges and expanding their
powers,7 1 adjusting the composition of the chambers,72 appointing or extending the
terms of key personnel,73 and assigning judges to particular cases.74 After almost a
decade, the Security Council turned its attention to devising Completion Strategies
for the two ad hoc tribunals.75 Although the original deadlines slipped (due in part
to the late arrest of fugitives and defendants' health issues), the ICTR has
concluded its closing ceremony and the ICTY is hearing its final trials and
appeals.76 Central to the tribunals' Completion Strategies was Rule 1 Ibis, an
827, 1 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
65. ICTR Statute, supra note 2.
66. MARTIN DIXON ET AL., CASES & MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 561 (5th ed. 2011).
67. See, e.g., Ralph Zacklin, The Failings ofAd Hoc International Tribunals, 2 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 541, 542 (2004) ("The reality is that the ICTY and [ICTR] were established more as acts of
political contrition, because of egregious failures to swiftly confront the situations in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, than as part of a deliberate policy, promoting international justice").
68. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
69. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1165, 11 (Apr. 30, 1998); S.C. Res. 1166, 1 (May 13, 1998).
70. S.C. Res. 1329, In 1-2 (Dec. 5, 2000).
71. Id. 1 1. See also S.C. Res. 1431, 11 (Aug. 14, 2002); S.C. Res. 1481 (May 19, 2003); S.C.
Res. 1504 (Sept. 4, 2003); S.C. Res. 1597 (Apr. 20, 2005); S.C. Res.1613 (July 26, 2005); S.C. Res.
1800, 1 (Feb. 20, 2008).
72. S.C. Res. 1411 (May 17, 2002); S.C. Res. 1837, 115 (Sept. 29, 2008).
73. S.C. Res. 1775 (Sept. 14, 2007).
74. S.C. Res. 1629 (Sept. 30, 2005); S.C. Res. 1668 (Apr. 10, 2006); S.C. Res. 1824 (July 18,
2008); S.C. Res. 1877,1 8 (July 7, 2009).
75. S.C. Res. 1503, In 1, 6-7 (Aug. 28, 2003); S.C. Res. 1534, In 3-4, 6-7, 9 (Mar. 26, 2004). See
generally Laura Bingham, Strategy or Process? Closing the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 687 (2006).
76. Press Release, U.N. Int'l. Crim. Tribunal for Rwanda, ICTR to Host Closing Events in
December 2015 (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.unictr.org/en/news/ietr-host-closing-events-december-2015.
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amendment to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence ("RPE") that facilitated the
transfer of cases under investigation or indictment involving intermediate and
lower-level defendants to the authorities of a "competent national jurisdiction" for
prosecution.
77
Following the passage of UNSCR 1966 (2010), the two tribunals now share a
residual mechanism (the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals
("MICT")) that is to wind down the tribunals' activities and manage lingering post-
completion matters, including fugitive tracking; witness protection issues; appeals,
reviews ofjudgments, and retrials; contempt charges; the enforcement of sentences
and requests for parole; and the tribunals' legacy and archives. 78 As a hybridity
feature, the MICT is also monitoring cases referred to national jurisdictions 79 and
responding to requests for assistance from national authorities that are pursuing
their own criminal or immigration cases against Rwandan and Yugoslav
defendants found in their midst, a task that is proving to be more pressing than had
originally been anticipated.
The MICT, which has branches in The Hague and Arusha, is meant to be a
"small, temporary and efficient structure," 80 although the risk of bureaucratic bloat
is ever-present. At the moment, the MICT has a limited full-time staff and a roster
of judges, professional staff, and defense counsel who will be called up as
needed. 8' The Chief Prosecutors of the ICTR and then of the ICTY have served as
the prosecutor of the MICT since its inception. 82 It is envisaged that the MICT
will prosecute three of the top Rwandan fugitives if they are located (Augustin
Bizimana, Fdlicien Kabuga, and Protais Mpiranya), while the files of the other six
have been transferred to Rwandan courts. 83 At the moment, the MICT shares its
77. See Press Release, Judge Theodor Meron, President of U.N. Int'l. Crim. Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, to U.N. Security Council (June 13, 2005),
http://www.icty.org/en/press/statement-j udge-theodor-meron-president-international-criminal-tribunal-
former-yugoslavia#page. See also RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, Int'l Criminal Trib. for the
former Yugoslavia, at II bis, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.43 [hereinafter ICTY RPE],
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%2OLibrary/Rules.procedure.evidence/IT032 Rev43_en.pdf.
78. About the MICT, UNITED NATIONS MECHANISM FOR INT'L CRIM. TRIBS. (June 7, 2012),
http://www.unmict.org/en/about.
79. See Oliver Windridge, Gone But Not Forgotten-The Ongoing Case of Jean Uwinkindi at the
ICTR and MICT, OPtNIOJURIS (July 29, 2015), http://opiniojuris.org/2015/07/29/guest-post-gone-but-
not-forgotten-the-ongoing-case-of-jean-uwinkindi-at-the-ictr-and-
mict/?utm-source=feedbumer&utm-medium=email&utm campaign=Feed%3A+opiniojurisfeed+%28
Opinio+Juris%29.
80. Letter from the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, to
the president of the Security Council, U.N. Doe. S/2015/341 (May 15, 2015),
http://www.unmict.org/sites/default/files/documents/150515_progressreport en.pdf.
81. About the MICT supra note 78.
82. Prosecutor- Serge Brammertz, UNITED NATIONS MECHANISM FOR INT'L CRIM. TRIBS.,
http://www.unmict.org/en/about/principals/prosecutor (last visited Mar. 22, 2015).
83. Statement by Justice Hassan B. Jallow, Prosecutor UN-ICTR & UN-MICT to the United
Nations Security Council, UNITED NATIONS INT'L CRIM. TRIB. FOR RWANDA (June 3, 2015),
http://www.unictr.org/en/news/statement-justice-hassan-b-jalow-prosecutor-un-ictr-un-mict-united-
nations-security-council-0. One of the last remaining ICTR fugitives, Ladislas Ntaganzwa, was
captured in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2015 and transferred to Rwanda for trial in 2016.
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administrative platform with the residual mechanism for the Special Court for
Sierra Leone ("RSCSL") and there is talk of further integrating these institutions
under a single funding stream given their congruent functions, particularly in light
of the fact that the RSCSL is having difficulty raising its modest budget.8 4 The
MICT could conceivably become a permanent institution to serve this purpose for
other current and future hybrid mechanisms once they wind down their operations.
Although the international criminal law renaissance in the 1990's was largely
initiated by the U.N. Security Council, the role of the Council-and with it the
availability of coercive Chapter VII powers-has diminished over the years and
activity has shifted elsewhere within the international community. 85 As the
extended duration and expense of proceedings before standalone ad hoc tribunals
began to raise concerns,86 a form of "tribunal fatigue" set in within the Security
Council, with China making it plain that it would not support the establishment of
yet another ad hoc body (although China was not alone in its reservations). 87 As a
result, attention largely shifted to other elements within the United Nations and the
international community to take the lead on developing judicial institutions to
ensure some measure of accountability in the face of subsequent international
crimes, as discussed below.
That said, the Council was obliquely yet decisively involved with the
establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon ("STL"), dedicated to
prosecuting individuals responsible for the 2005 assassination of former Prime
Minister Rafiq Hariri (and twenty-two others) and related violence. 88 Following a
fact finding mission dispatched by the U.N. Secretary-General, the Security
Council with UNSCR 1595 established an International Independent Investigative
Commission ("UNIIIC") under Chapter VII to "assist the Lebanese authorities in
their investigation of all aspects of this terrorist act, including to help identify its
perpetrators." 89  The UNIIIC found fault with both the Lebanese security and
Syrian military intelligence services, determined that the initial Lebanese
investigation into the bombing had been flawed, and called for an independent
Genocide Suspect Ladislas Ntaganzwa Flown to Rwanda for Trial, BBC NEWS, Mar. 20, 2016,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35856801.
84. See Beth Van Schaack, IHL Dialogs: Prosecutors' International Criminal Law Round-Up,
INTLAWGRRLS (Sept. 4, 2014), http://ilg2.org/2014/09/04/ihl-dialogs-prosecutors-intemational-
criminal-law-round-up/.
85. See generally GERHARD WERLE & FLORIAN JESSBERGER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 14 (3rd ed. 2014); The U.N. Security Council (UNSC), COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.cfr.org/intemational-organizations-and-alliances/un-security-
council-unsc/p31649.
86. Zacklin, supra note 67, at 545 (noting that the ad hocs "exemplify an approach that is no
longer politically or financially viable.").
87. WILLIAM R. SLOMANSON, FUNDAMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 425 (6
h
ed. 2011).
88. Martin Chulov, Rafik Hariri Assassination: Trial of Hezbollah Suspects Begins, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/16/rafik-hariri-assassination-
trial-hezbollah-suspects.
89. S.C. Res. 1595, 1 (Apr. 7, 2005).
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international investigation. 90 As is often the case, this commission of inquiry
served as a precursor to a judicial institution.91 Thus, in December 2005, Lebanon
requested the Council to establish a tribunal of an international character to
prosecute perpetrators identified by the UNIIIC.92  The Council turned to the
Secretary-General for assistance in formulating a response. The Secretary-
General's report recommended the establishment of a mixed tribunal with national
and international characteristics with respect to jurisdiction, applicable law,
location, composition, and funding. 93 On the basis of these building blocks, the
Council by UNSCR 1664 (2006) called for the United Nations and Lebanon to
negotiate an agreement to bring an international tribunal into fruition. 94  Once
finalized, the agreement 95 was never ratified by Lebanon due to intense domestic
opposition among some political factions made manifest by the persistent failure of
the responsible official to call for a vote.
96
In light of this political deadlock, supporters within the Lebanese government
(which at the time made up a majority in the legislature) then asked the U.N.
90. Rep. of the Fact-Finding Mission to Lebanon Inquiring into the Causes, Circumstances and
Consequences of the Assassination of Former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, U.N. Doc. S/2005/2003
(March 24, 2005).
91. A U.N. Commission of Inquiry ("COI") or other Fact Finding Mission ("FFM") of some sort
formed by the Security Council or the Human Rights Council often precedes international and hybrid
tribunals. As atrocities are unfolding, the documentation of crimes can serve as a compromise position
when creating a tribunal proves to be a bridge too far. See U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS: OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMM'R, COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY AND FACT-FINDING MISSIONS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW: GUIDANCE AND PRACTICE (United Nations Human Rights ed.,
2015), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/ColGuidance and Practice.pdf. The COts, in
turn, inevitably call for the creation of a justice mechanism or the referral of the situation to the ICC.
Id. at 94. In addition to the UNIIIC, a number of other commissions of inquiry have preceded the
establishment of international or internationalized tribunals. See, e.g., id. at 95. Judicial institutions,
however, have not always been able to use the findings of these bodies to full effect, often because
COls and FFMs are operating under a different standard of proof, and either do not preserve the chain
of custody of evidence, or are focused too heavily on crime-base evidence as opposed to linkage
evidence that would help establish individual criminal responsibility. Id. at 59-60, 62-3. The ICTY and
ICTR each were preceded by a commission of inquiry, but the statutes of those tribunals did not specify
any particular relationship between the two bodies. Id. at 101-2.
92. Letter from the Chargd d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United
Nations, to the Secretary-General, United Nations Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/783 (Dec. 13,
2005), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Lebanon%20S2005783.pdf.
93. U.N. Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of
Resolution 1644 (2005), 5, U.N. Doc. S/2006/176 (March 21, 2006).
94. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Requests Establishment of International
Tribunal for Killing of Former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri, U.N. Press Release SC/8677 (Mar. 29,
2006).
95. S.C. Res. 1757, Annex (May 30, 2007) [hereinafter STL Statute].
96. Nadim Shehadi & Elizabeth Wilmhurst, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: The UN on Trial?
CHATHAM HOUSE 6 (July 2007),
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/fi les/chathamhouse/public/Research/Midde%2East/bpO7O7leban
on.pdf.
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Secretary-General for assistance bringing the tribunal into operation. 97 Ban Ki-
moon assented, but with reservations.9" To this end, the Security Council issued
UNSCR 1757 (2007), which ultimately bypassed the domestic constitutional order
and brought the bilateral agreement and the proposed STL Statute into force by
way of Chapter VII.99 Concerns about the resolution's unprecedented intervention
into Lebanon's domestic affairs and legislative independence generated five
abstentions (including by Russia and China) during the vote in the Council. 10o The
UNIIIC was essentially folded into the Office of the Prosecutor of the STL,
although the two entities operated concurrently for a spell.' 0' Notwithstanding its
Security Council provenance, the STL, unlike the ICTY and ICTR, is not a
subsidiary organ of the United Nations, but rather a standalone international
institution. 102 Having begun operations in 2009, it remains highly controversial
within Lebanon and a flashpoint in the country's serial political crises. 10 3
Moreover, nothing in the operative UNSCRs established an obligation among U.N.
members, even Syria, to cooperate with the Court, notwithstanding its Chapter VII
imprimatur.'l4 Originally envisioned to be in existence for three years per Article
21 of the U.N.-Lebanon Agreement, the STL's lifespan has been extended in light
of the fact that the prime suspects in the Harir assassination remain at large and
judicial processes remain ongoing."°5
The 2007 reappearance of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and environs kept the
Council in the tribunal business. 10 6  Modem-day sea piracy has generated an
escalating response from the Council, which has characterized the situation in
Somalia as a threat to the peace, exacerbated by piracy's resurgence. 107 All told,
97. Jamal Saidi, Lebanon's Siniora Asks U.N. to Set Up Hariri Court, REUTERS, May 14, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL1420555620070514.
98. Shehadi & Wilmhurst, supra note 96, at 6 (noting Secretary-General's view that "regrettably,
all domestic options for the ratification of the Special Tribunal now appear to be exhausted, although it
would have been preferable had the Lebanese parties been able to resolve this issue among themselves
based on a national consensus").
99. STL Statute, supra note 95.
100. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Authorizes Establishment of Special
Tribunal to Try Suspects in Assassination of Rafiq Hariri, U.N. Press Release SC/9029 (May 30, 2007).
101. C~cile Aptel, Some Innovations in the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUSTICE 1 07, 1112 (2007). For a timeline of relevant events, see Special Tribunal for Lebanon,
Fact Sheet: Special Tribunal for Lebanon, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/lebanon/tribunal/timeline.shtml.
102. SARAH WILLIAMS, HYBRID AND INTERNATIONALISED CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: SELECTED
JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES 370 (2012).
103. William Harris, Lebanon's Day in Court: The Controversial Life of the Hariri Tribunal,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (June 30, 2011), https://www.foreignaffairs.conarticles/lebanon/2011-06-
30/lebanon-s-day-court.
104. WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at 370.
105. Special Tribunal for Lebanon's Mandate Extended by Three Years, INT'L JUSTICE RES. CTR.
(Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.ijrcenter.org/2015/01/13/special-tribunal-for-lebanons-mandate-extended-
by-three-years.
106. Helmut Tuerk, The Resurgence of Piracy: A Phenomenon of Modem Times, 17 U. MIAMI
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 39-40 (2009).
107. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1816 (June 2, 2008); S.C. Res.1838 (Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. Res. 1844 (Nov.
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the Council has called upon nations to use "all necessary means to repress acts of
piracy and armed robbery" (code for the use of armed force). The Council has thus
enabled states to deploy naval vessels and aircraft in Somali territorial waters;
imposed sanctions on individuals and entities undermining peace in Somalia; urged
states and regional organizations willing to take custody of pirates to embark law
enforcement officials ("shipriders") onboard to facilitate the investigation, transfer,
and eventual prosecution of detained persons; and linked piracy to the suite of
terrorism treaties by declaring that the 1988 Convention on the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation ("SUA") applies in
cases in which piracy is accompanied by vessel hijacking. 10 8
Criminal prosecutions with international assistance have been a part of this
concerted effort. In an early resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-
General to provide a report on options for prosecuting acts of piracy. 109 The
Secretary-General's reports discuss a number of possible options, including the
creation of a new international tribunal dedicated to piracy prosecutions.' The
20, 2008); S.C. Res. 1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1851 (Dec. 16, 2008); S.C. Res. 1897 (Nov. 30,
2009); S.C. Res. 1950 (Nov. 23, 2010); S.C. Res. 2020 (Nov. 22, 2011); S.C. Res. 2077 (Nov. 21,
2012); S.C. Res. 2125 (Nov. 18, 2013). In debates over these resolutions, several states clarified that
the resolutions should not be read to consider piracy per se a threat to the peace. On the other hand,
China, in its intervention in connection with UNSCR 1851, characterized piracy as just such a threat.
See Press Release, Security Council Authorizes States to Use Land-Based Operations in Somalia, as
Part of Fight Against Piracy off Coast, Unanimously Adopting 1851 (2008), U.N. Press Release
SC/9541 (Dec. 16, 2008).
108. S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 107, ] 10. In this resolution, the Council:
[n]otes that the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation ("SUA Convention") provides for parties to create criminal offences,
establish jurisdiction, and accept delivery of persons responsible for or suspected of seizing
or exercising control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation;
urges States parties to the SUA Convention to fully implement their obligations under said
Convention and cooperate with the Secretary-General and the [International Maritime
Organization] to build judicial capacity for the successful prosecution of persons suspected
of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.
Id. 1115.
109. S.C. Res. 1918 (2010),114 (Apr. 27, 2010). The Security Council requested:
the Secretary-General to present to the Security Council within three months a report on
possible options to further the aim of prosecuting and imprisoning persons responsible for
acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, including, in particular,
options for creating special domestic chambers possibly with international components, a
regional tribunal or an international tribunal and corresponding imprisonment arrangements,
taking into account the work of the [Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
("CGPCS")], the existing practice in establishing international and mixed tribunals, and the
time and the resources necessary to achieve and sustain substantive results.
Id. See also S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 107, 1 4.
110. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Possible Options to Further the
Aim of Prosecuting and Imprisoning Persons Responsible for Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea
off the Coast of Somalia, including, in particular, Options for Creating Special Domestic Chambers
Possibly With International Components, a Regional Tribunal or an International Tribunal and
Corresponding Imprisonment Arrangements, taking into Account the Work of the Contact Group on
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, the Existing Practice in Establishing International and Mixed
Tribunals, and the Time and Resources Necessary to Achieve and Sustain Substantive Results, U.N.
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proposal received some support within the Council.'" Given its proximity to the
Gulf, Kenya was floated as a potential host for the tribunal, although political
turmoil and weak rule of law there diminished support for this potential venue.
1 1 2
The international tribunal idea met resistance, however, from Somalia,1" 3 other
states, and the NATO Rapporteur, who argued in favor of more effective domestic
implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
("UNCLOS") I 4 and SUA. 1 5  Ultimately, and in part due to the feared start-up
costs, the idea of a standalone international tribunal was abandoned in favor of the
creation of specialized chambers with substantial international support within the
domestic courts of the region along with the provision of assistance to increase
regional coordination and domestic capacity, to be discussed below. 1
16
C. UN-Administered Transitional Authorities
Two accountability mechanisms, launched almost concurrently, owe their
existence to nearly identical United Nations transitional authorities established
pursuant to the Security Council's Chapter VII powers.' 17 These efforts present
elements of both consent and coercion. Because the U.N. administration was
acting as the de facto government of the territories involved-Kosovo and Timor
Leste-it did not need to "negotiate" the terms of these arrangements with any
sovereign entity."H8 Although expedient at the front-end, the imposition of these
systems on the local polity raised problems of legitimacy, particularly among local
elites and jurists, who felt sidelined by the process.
The first such transitional judicial administration was created in Kosovo.
Following the war and NATO's 1999 intervention, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia signed an agreement on June 10, 1999, for the withdrawal of Yugoslav
Doc. S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010) [hereinafter Possible Options to Further the Aim of Prosecuting
Persons Responsible for Acts of Piracy]; see also Douglas Guilfoyle, Prosecuting Somali Pirates: A
Critical Evaluation of the Options, 10 J. INT'L CRIM. JUSTICE 767 (2012).
111. See, e.g., U.N. Press Release SC/9541, supra note 107, at 29 (statement of Carsten Staur,
representative from Denmark: "[l]n the long term, there might be a need to examine the possibility of
bringing suspected pirates before an international tribunal .... ").
112. Andrew Lee, Hybrid Tribunals to Combat Regional Maritime Piracy: Guiding the Rule of
Law Through the Rocks and Shoals 5 (July 10, 2010) (on file with One Earth Future Foundation),
http://oneearthfuture.org/sites/oneearthfuture.org/fles//documents/publications/Hybrid-Tribunals-
Andrew-Lee.pdf.
113. Somali Government Opposes Piracy Tribunal, ALLAFRICA (May 31, 2009),
http://allafrica.com/stories/200905310009.html.
114. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 437
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
115. See Lord Jopling, The Growing Threat of Piracy to Regional and Global Security, North
Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], 1 87, 169 CDS 09 E REV 1 (2009), http://www.nato-
pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT = 1770.
116. S.C. Res. 2125, supra note 107.
117. See Nicolas Lemay-Hdbert, The 'Empty Shell' Approach: The Set Up Process of International
Administrations in Timor-Leste and Kosovo, Its Consequences and Lessons, 12 INT'L STUDIES
PERSPECTIVES 190 (May 2011).
118. Id. at 204.
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forces from Kosovo.'1 9 The next day, the Security Council invoked Chapter VII to
establish the U.N. Mission in Kosovo ("UNMIK"), a transitional administration
that was charged with overseeing the development of self-governing institutions
pending the determination of Kosovo's future status. 120 UNMIK's international
civil presence was administered by a Special Representative of the Secretary-
General ("SRSG"). In implementing UNMIK's four-pillar mandate, the SRSG
coordinated work with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
("OSCE") and the European Union ("EU"), among other regional and international
entities. Although the Council condemned abuses committed during the war, it
was silent on accountability.
At the time, the rule-of-law situation in postwar Kosovo (the subject of Pillar
I of UNMIK's mandate) was dire-the legal infrastructure had been destroyed
during the war, most legal professionals had been of Serbian descent and many had
fled Kosovo for fear of retribution or discrimination, and there were hundreds of
suspects in custody with little prospects of being expeditiously tried. 12 2 It was
clear that the ICTY would not be able to take on more than a handful of cases
arising out of the Kosovo conflict and, in any case, had no jurisdiction over crimes
(except genocide) that post-dated the war. 12 3 And yet, UNMIK personnel had
detained individuals accused of war crimes. Under the circumstances, UNMIK in
1999 proposed the establishment of a Kosovo War and Ethnic Crimes Court
("KWECC") in Pristina that would enjoy concurrent jurisdiction with the ICTY. 124
Temporal jurisdiction would have begun on January 1, 1998, and remained open-
ended.'2 5 As the SRSG began appointing personnel, resistance arose within the
Kosovo bar over the proposed court, which was seen as usurping the jurisdiction of
119. S.C. Res. 1244 (June 10, 1999).
120. Id. 1110; see generally UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN KOSOVO,
http://www.unmikonline.org/pages/default.aspx.
121. Mandate and Structure, UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN Kosovo,
http://www.unmikonline.org/Pages/about.aspx.
122. Laura A. Dickinson, The Relationship Between Hybrid Courts and International Courts: The
Case of Kosovo, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1059, 1061, 1065 (2003). In response to prison over-crowding
and the lack of a functioning judicial system, the OSCE made a number of controversial decisions
expanding the availability of pre-trial detention. See WILLIAM G. O'NEILL, KOSOvO: AN UNFINISHED
PEACE 78 (2002).
123. See Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Statement by
Carla Del Ponte Prosecutor of the Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia on the
Investigation and Prosecution of Crimes Committed in Kosovo, ICTY Press Release PR/P.I.S./437-E
(Sept. 29, 1999). The ICTY did indict Slobodan Milogevid for events in Kosovo along with former
KLA commander and Kosovo Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj, among others. See History, U.N.
Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia, http://www.icty.org/en/about/office-of-the-
prosecutor/history (last visited Feb. 1, 2016); see also Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et. al., Case No. IT-04-
84, Indictment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 4, 2005).
124. Tom Perriello & Marieke Wierda, Lessons from the Deployment of International Judges and
Prosecutors in Kosovo, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST. I I (March 2006),
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-FormerYugoslavia-Courts-Study-2006-English 0.pdf.
125. The UNMIK Programme, TRACK IMPUNITY ALWAYS [TRIAL] (Aug. 4, 2015),
http://www.trial-ch.org/en/resources/tribunals/hybrid-tribunas/programme-of-intemational-judges-in-
kosovo/the-unmik-programme.html.
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the local judiciary.' 2 6  Meanwhile, members of the international community
expressed unease about having to bear the costs of another standalone court as well
as the security risks given simmering tensions in the region. 27 It has also been
speculated that there were concerns that the new court would investigate potential
war crimes committed by NATO during Operation Allied Force. 28 In the end, the
KWECC was abandoned in 2000 for lack of support, necessitating the
development of other solutions for war crimes prosecutions.1
29
Meanwhile, the SRSG had begun to lay the groundwork for rebuilding the
domestic justice system and appointing judges and prosecutors. The initial
candidates were mostly Kosovar Albanians, given that individuals of Serbian
descent refused to cooperate with UNMIK. 130  As concerns lingered about
domestic capacity as well as actual and perceived bias, the SRSG empowered
himself to designate international personnel to prosecutors' offices and district
courts. 131 These individuals were to participate in criminal cases, including those
involving war crimes charges. However, a majority of local and lay judges
originally staffed the mixed panels, allowing them to outvote their international
colleagues. 1
32
In the face of allegations of ethnic partiality, the intimidation of judges and
witnesses, and unsubstantiated verdicts, the SRSG issued a new directive enabling
the establishment of majority international panels, now called Regulation 64
Panels after their constitutive regulation.' 33 Such panels could be convened on a
case-by-case basis by the SRSG or upon the request of the defendant, defense
counsel, or the prosecutor in situations when it was deemed "necessary to ensure
the independence and impartiality of the judiciary or the proper administration of
justice."' 34  This designation brought charges of war crimes and ethnically-
motivated violence before the Regulation 64 Panels, although international judges
also heard a range of politically-sensitive cases involving government officials and
former Kosovo Liberation Army ("KLA") members, organized crime, drug
trafficking, terrorism, and corruption. 1
35
In 2008, and following the declaration of independence by Albanian
126. Org. for Sec. and Co-operation in Eur., Kosovo's War Crimes Trials: An Assessment Ten
Years On 1999 - 2009, at 11 (May 2010).
127. O'NEILL,supra note 122, at 91.
128. Perriello & Wierda, supra note 124, at 12.
129. O'NEILL,supra note 122, at 91.
130. Adam Day, No Exit Without Judiciary: Learning a Lesson From UNMIK's Transitional
Administration in Kosovo, 23 WIS. INT'L L.J. 183, 185-86 (2005).
131. UNMIK Reg. 2000/6 On the Appointment and Removal from Office of International Judges
and Prosecutors (Feb. 15, 2000) (rolling out international personnel in the district court of the divided
and insecure city of Mitrovica); see also UNMIK Reg. 2000/34 (May 27, 2000) (expanding this
program to all the district courts); see also Day, supra note 130, at 187.
132. Day, supra note 130, at 187.
133. UNMIKReg.2000/64,§ 1.1 (Dec. 15, 2000).
134. Id.
135. See Kosovo's War Crimes Trials: A Review, OSCE 12 (Sept. 2002),
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/12549?download--rue (for a summary of early cases).
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Kosovars, the European Union created the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
("EULEX"), which at the time marked the largest EU foreign policy effort to
date. 136 Over the course of 2008, and not without difficulty, the UNMIK rule-of-
law competencies were transitioned to EULEX with a mandate that now expires in
2016.137 EULEX structures continue to hear politically-sensitive cases, although it
has adopted a "normally no new cases" policy that applies except in extraordinary
circumstances. 138
The Regulation 64 Panels thus evolved organically over the years in the face
of perceived "needs and [the] political reality" rather than being fully designed at
the outset. 139 The various amendments to the transitional judiciary have been
criticized for being too reactive and for being implemented with insufficient
engagement with the local legal community, leading to charges of
disenfranchisement. 40 The high degree of discretion accorded to the SRSG (to
appoint international judges and prosecutors and to allocate cases to mixed panels),
the lack of transparency around the process, and the persistent appearance of bias
against Albanian defendants were other grievances.1 4' Finally, recruiting qualified
staff was a challenge, in part due to the security situation but also because only
short-term contracts were available. As a result, the jurisprudence emerging from
the Regulation 64 panels was weak at times.1 42 All told, the Regulation 64 Panels
in Kosovo have been deemed a qualified success, although accountability efforts
there remain unfinished as will be discussed in connection with current regional
initiatives. 143
Turning to the second such transitional administration, when violence erupted
in Timor-Leste in 1999 following the referendum on independence from Indonesia,
there were calls for the Council to establish another international tribunal, a
proposal advanced by several U.N. fact-finding missions.144 The Council did not
pursue this option, in part because Indonesia made it clear that it preferred to
prosecute its own citizens and would not cooperate with any international body
endeavoring to do so.' 45 In an effort to establish good relations with Indonesia, the
136. See generally Erika de Wet, The Governance of Kosovo: Security Council Resolution 1244
and the Establishment and Functioning ofEULEX, 103 AM. J. INT'L L. 83 (2009).
137. Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP, art. 1.1, 2008 O.J. (L 112) (EU). See also Org. for Sec.
and Co-operation in Eur., Monitoring Department: Monthly Report (August 2008).
138. EULEX Implements its Mandate Through Four Operational Objectives, EULEX,
http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,44 (last visited Nov. 12, 2015).
139. Perriello & Wierda, supra note 124, at 21.
140. Id.
141. Jd. at 19-20.
142. John Cerone & Clive Baldwin, Explaining and Evaluating the UNMIK Court System, SOCIAL
SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK 40, http://ssm.com/abstract= 1647211.
143. See infra note 257 et seq.
144. See Caitlin Reiger & Marieke Wierda, The Serious Crime Process in Timor-Leste: In
Retrospect, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 8 (March 2006),
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-TimorLeste-Criminal-Process-2006-English.pdf
[hereinafter Reiger & Wierda, Timor-Leste].
145. Ellen Nakashima, Indonesia Attempts to Avert Tribunal to Probe East Timor, WASH. POST
(July 16, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2005/07/16/indonesia-attempts-to-
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Timorese leadership did not push for an international tribunal or even for a more
robust COI. 146 Instead, it jointly convened a Commission of Truth and Friendship
("CTF") with Indonesia in 2004 to "seek truth and promote friendship as a new
and unique approach rather than the prosecutorial process."'
147
With the issuance of UNSCR 1272 under Chapter VII, the Security Council
established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
("UNTAET"), a peacekeeping operation organized to exercise Timorese legislative
and executive authority, including the administration of justice, during the
fledgling country's transition to self-government. 148 Although not express in its
mandate, UNTAET established a system of Special Panels for Serious Crimes
within the Dili District Court with exclusive jurisdiction over serious criminal
offenses, including genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, murder, sexual
offenses, and torture.149 UNTAET administrators appointed a mix of international
and Timorese judges, with the former making up a majority of each panel. 150 In
2000, UNTAET created a Serious Crimes Unit ("SCU"), which was eventually
housed in the public prosecutor's office, and a Defence Lawyers Unit, both of
which were dominated by international staff.151 UNTAET exercised this virtually
unprecedented mandate until the transfer of full sovereignty to Timor-Leste in May
2002; at that point, UNTAET was transformed into another peacekeeping
operation, the U.N. Mission for Support for East Timor ("UNMISET"), to help
prepare the country for self-sufficiency. 1
5 2
avert-tribunal-to-probe-east-timor/87a19052-b4af-43da-9cOa-e37368927625/.
146. The Special Panels for Serious Crimes - Justice for East Timor? 5 THE LA'O HAMUTUK
BULLETIN 1, 7 (Oct. 2004).
147. See S.C. Letter, Annex II, at 81, U.N. Doc. S/2005/458 (July 15, 2005) [hereinafter Timor-
Leste COE Report]. The International Center for Transitional Justice observed that while the CTF was
criticized for its ability to grant amnesty to perpetrators of serious crimes, it did confirm the commission
of crimes against humanity by Indonesian security forces and the civilian authorities and criticize
domestic prosecutorial efforts in Indonesia. See Megan Hirst, An Unfinished Truth: An Analysis of the
Commission of Truth and Friendship's Final Report on the 1999 Atrocities in East Timor, Executive
Summary, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 5 (March 2009),
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-TimorLeste-Unfinished-Truth-2009-English.pdf. See also
Per Memoriam Ad Spem, Final Report of the Commission of Truth and Friendship, (CTF) Indonesia-
Timor-Leste, THE COMMISSION OF TRUTH AND FRIENDSHIP (March 31, 2008),
http://www.cja.org/downloads/Per-Memoriam-Ad-Spem-Final-Reeport-of-the-Commission-of-Truth-
and-Friendship-ndonesiaTimor-Leste.pdf.
148. See generally United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmit/background.shtml (last visited Nov. 12, 2015)
(providing details on the many U.N. operations in Timor-Leste).
149. Reiger & Wierda, Timor-Leste, supra note 144, at 12. In practice, prosecutors primarily
charged crimes against humanity and murder. Id. at 23.
150. UNTAET Reg. No. 2000/15, U.N. Doe. UNTAET/REG/2000/15 22.1, 23.1 (June 6,
2000). This Regulation also incorporated the international crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity.
151. See UNTAET Reg. No. 2000/11, U.N. Doe. UNTAET/REG/2000/I I 9.5 (Mar. 6,2000).
152. See S.C. Res. 1543, 6 (May 14, 2004) (extending UNMISET for a final year and calling for
the conclusion of SCU cases by May 2005); see also S.C. Res. 1573 (Nov. 16, 2004) ("[N]oting with
concern that it may not be possible for the Serious Crime Unit to fully respond to the desire for justice
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Although the quest for accountability was unfinished in East Timor, the
Security Council originally planned for the United Nations' operations to wind
down by 2005. The Secretary-General appointed a Commission of Experts
("COE") to evaluate the serious crimes prosecution process in both East Timor and
Indonesia.153 The Timor-Leste COE issued a series of recommendations, including
that the prosecutorial process in Timor-Leste continue with greater resources or be
transitioned to a truly international tribunal. 54 Despite these calls and others, the
Security Council did not gi',e the successor political mission, the U.N. Office in
Timor-Leste ("UNOTIL"), a mandate to support serious crimes prosecutions
except with respect to records preservation. 155 Eventually, all cases were handed
over to the ordinary courts of East Timor. Following the expiration of the U.N.
mandate in May 2005 and urgent calls to continue prosecutions following renewed
internal violence, the Security Council in UNSCR 1704 (2006) created the U.N.
Integrated Mission in Timor-Lest ("UNMIT") with a mandate to establish
international investigative teams within the Office of the Prosecutor-General of
Timor-Leste. These Serious Crimes Investigation Teams ("SCITs") resumed the
SCU's investigative functions and helped to prepare for trial lingering cases of
serious human rights violations dating back to 1999.156 The SCITs can conduct
investigations, but Timorese prosecutors must lead prosecutions. 157
All told, the Special Panels system is widely considered a failure of
international justice.15 8 Besides the crippling inability to assert jurisdiction over
the key architects of the violence, the Timorese legal system lacked indigenous
capacity and could not hold up its side of the hybridity equation.159 UNTAET was
faulted for failing to consult with Timorese civil society and experts in the design
and implementation of the system from the outset.160 The difficulty in recruiting
for both the international and domestic sides led to delays, inefficiencies, and
of those affected by the violence in 1999 bearing in mind the limited time and resources that remain
available" and taking "note of the Secretary-General's intention to continue to explore possible ways to
address this issue with a view to making proposals").
153. Timor-Leste COE Report, supra note 147.
154. Id.
155. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Establishes One-Year Political Mission in
Timor-Leste, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1599 (2005), U.N. Press Release SC/8371 (Apr. 28,
2005).
156. See Serious Crimes Investigation Teams, UNMIT,
http://unmit.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=12067&language=en-US (last visited Nov. 12, 2015);
Agreement between the United Nations and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste Concerning
Assistance to the Office of the Prosecutor-General of Timor-Leste, Timor-Leste-U.N., Feb. 12, 2008,
http://www.laohamutuk.org/reports[UN/UNMIT/UNMIT-SCIT-PGFebO8.pdf.
157. East Timor: National Judicial Decisions, RULE OF LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS PROJECT
[RULAC], http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/national judical decitions.php?id state=219 (last
visited Nov. 12, 2015).
158. Cf. Reiger & Wierda, Timor-Lesle, supra note 144, at 86 (describing the process as "generally
satisfactory" and "accord[ing] with international standards" while decrying the inability to prosecute
those most responsible).
159. Id. at 1.
160. Id. at 13.
VOL. 44:2
THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF HYBRID JUSTICE
inconsistent jurisprudence.' 61 Although international staff expressed a willingness
to train Timorese recruits, there were insufficient trainees to meaningfully enhance
domestic capacity. 162 The proceedings also suffered from political interference on
the part of a local government eager to improve relations with Indonesia and from
a lack of dedicated resources from the international community.' 
63
Notwithstanding the collapse of other states, and the relative success of the
United Nations' post-conflict management endeavors writ large in Timor-Leste
and Kosovo, the United Nations has never since assumed such a comprehensive
administrative role.' 64 As such, there has been no opportunity to replicate and
improve upon these justice models in the context of subsequent transitional
administrations.
D. Bilateral Treaties With The United Nations
The East Timor and Kosovo systems were essentially imposed on the target
situations during a transition period, necessitating a strong but ebbing role for the
United Nations in the absence of domestic capacity. Other hybrid bodies came
into being in more of a collaborative fashion with the local government. Toward
the end of the brutal civil war in Sierra Leone, the Security Council requested that
the Secretary-General negotiate an agreement with the Government of Sierra
Leone to create what became the Special Court for Sierra Leone ("SCSL").165 The
Council took a special interest in the situation in Sierra Leone following two
noteworthy events: (1) the seizure of 500 U.N. peacekeepers in May of 2000,166
and (2) a request from the Sierra Leonean government for assistance in prosecuting
perpetrators (including captured rebel leader Foday Sankoh) out of fear that
national trials would be destabilizing. 167 By virtue of the finalized agreement,
168
which was ratified in 2002,169 the SCSL was conceived as a stand-alone tribunal,
fully separate from the domestic legal order.170 Its international character enabled
it to dodge what might have been tricky legal issues around the impact of an
amnesty provision in a prior peace treaty' 71 and any residual immunity potentially
161. Id. at 14-15.
162. Id. at 16-17.
163. Timor-Leste COE Report, supra note 147, 13; see also The Special Panels for Serious
Crimes - Justice for East Timor?, supra note 146, at 6.
164. See DANIEL JACOB, JUSTICE AND FOREIGN RULE: ON INTERNATIONAL TRANSITIONAL
ADMINISTRATION (2014).
165. S.C. Res. 1315, 1 (Aug. 14,2000).
166. Michael Fleshman, Sierra Leone: Peacekeeping Under Fire, 14 AFRICA RECOVERY 8 (July
2000), http://www.un.org/en/africarenewal/voll4no2/sierral.htm.
167. Michelle Sieff, A "Special Court" for, GLOB. POLICY FORUM (2001),
https://www.globalpolicy.org/componentlcontent/article/203/39438.htnl (last visited Nov. 12, 2015).
168. Agreement Between the United Nations and The Government of Sierra Leone on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Sierra Leon-U.N., Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137,
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/scsl-agreement.pdf [hereinafter SCSL Agreement].
169. Special Court Agreement, Ratification Act of 2002, (Sierra Leone).
170. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145,
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/scsl-statute.pdf [hereinafter SCSL Statute].
171. See Security Council, Letter Dated 12 July 1999 From the Chargd d'Affaires ad Interim of the
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enjoyed by ex-Liberian President Charles Taylor.' 72  At the same time, this
arrangement opened the institution up to a legal challenge-ultimately
unsuccessful-that the agreement and legislation unconstitutionally amended the
domestic judicial framework. 173
As the product of a treaty with the United Nations, and as compared to the
ICTY/R, the SCSL did not enjoy any Chapter VII authority, although the U.N.
Secretary-General and others had argued that it should. 174 Although the Security
Council was quite involved in the SCSL's creation and design, it did not mandate
that all states cooperate with the tribunal. 175  This weakness became most
pronounced when Ghana, and then Nigeria, refused to surrender former Liberian
President Charles Taylor to the Court notwithstanding his indictment for war
crimes and crimes against humanity. 176  In 2006, and under pressure to do so,
Nigeria finally transferred Taylor to U.N. peacekeepers billeted with the United
Nations Mission in Liberia ("UNMIL"). 177 The Council-invoking Chapter VII-
specially authorized UNMIL to detain and transfer Taylor to the SCSL for
prosecution, making this one of the first U.N. peacekeeping mandates to include a
justice component. 178
Although the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia ("ECCC")
have their origins in a similar bilateral treaty between Cambodia and the United
Nations, 179 the final result was a domestic tribunal' 80 with comparable international
Permanent Mission of Togo to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council,
Annex, art. IX, U.N. Memoranda SC/1999/777 (June 3, 2009) [hereinafter Lomd Peace Accord].
Although the United Nations served as a moral guarantor to this agreement, the SRSG appended an
unprecedented declaration indicating that "the amnesty provision ... shall not apply to international
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or other serious violations of international
humanitarian law." See Prosecutor v. Kallon, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Decision on
Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomd Accord Amnesty 81 (Special Court for Sierra Leone Mar. 13, 2004)
(indicating that the amnesty provision within the Lomd Peace Accord had no force before the SCSL).
172. See Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-OI-I, Decision on
Immunity from Jurisdiction, In 38-39 (Special Court for Sierra Leone May 31, 2004) (confirming the
international character of the SCSL and disallowing any immunity defenses).
173. See Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon et aL, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Decision on
Constitutionality and Lack of Jurisdiction, 11 1, 82-83 (Special Court for Sierra Leone March 13, 2004),
www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/AFRC/.../SCSL-04-16-PT-033.doc.
174. Rep. of the S.C., Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court for
Sierra Leone, 1 10, U.N. Doe. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000).
175. S.C. Res 1315, supra note 165.
176. Tom Perriello & Marieke Wierda, The Special Court for Sierra Leone Under Scrutiny, ICTJ
34 (March 2006), https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Sierra Leone-Special-Court-2006-
English.pdf [hereinafter Perriello & Wierda, The Special Court for Sierra Leone Under Scrutiny].
177. See ANNIE BIRD, US FOREIGN POLICY ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 95-99 (2015) (recounting
these events).
178. S.C. Res. 1638, 1 (Nov. 11, 2005).
179. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning
the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea, Cambodia-UN, June 6,2003, 2329 U.N.T.S. 117 [hereinafter ECCC Agreement].
180. See Prosecutor v. Duch, Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC01), Decision on
Appeal Against Provisional Detention Order of Kaing Guek Eav Alias "Duch," 11 18-19 (Dec. 3,
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elements. These include the incorporation of international criminal law and the
provision of technical assistance and staff provided through the United Nations
Assistance to the Khmer Rouge Trial ("UNAKRT")."" Given the lack of a live
threat to international peace or security, the Security Council was never
substantively involved in the creation of the ECCC. Instead, the U.N. Secretary-
General and General Assembly-at times at odds with each other-brought about
the ECCC's establishment through negotiations with the Royal Cambodian
Government. Ultimately, the General Assembly acted as the mandating body,
which suggests an interesting route to accountability in the event that action at the
Security Council is not forthcoming.
The road to the establishment of the ECCC was long and winding.
182
Following decades of impunity after the Khmer Rouge was ousted from Phnom
Penh in 1979, Cambodia asked, through a 1997 letter to the U.N. Secretary-
General, that the international community create an international tribunal to
prosecute surviving members of the Khmer Rouge.' 83 In response, the Secretary-
General commissioned an expert report, which originally recommended the
creation of an international tribunal to be located somewhere in Southeast Asia
given concerns about the competency and independence of the Cambodian
judiciary.' 4  Meanwhile, the Government of Cambodia produced a competing
proposal that was almost entirely domestic in structure and generated enabling
legislation. 185
Protracted negotiations ensured. Cambodian intransigence on certain points
led to the withdrawal of Secretary-General Kofi Annan from the process. 186 After
the General Assembly urged him to resume talks, 187 an agreement was reached on
June 6, 2003, that offered several key concessions to the Cambodian side. 188 This
2007), http://www.ecec.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/PTC-decision-appealduch-C5-
45 EN 0 0.pdf [hereinafter Dutch Pre-Trial Detention Decision] (ruling that while the ECCC was
"distinct from other Cambodian Courts in a number of respects," it nevertheless operates as "an
independent entity within the Cambodian court structure").
181. See UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE TO THE KHMER ROUGE TRIALS, http://www.unakrt-
online.org/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2015).
182. See Helen Horsington, The Cambodian Khmer Rouge Trials: The Promise of a Hybrid
Tribunal, 5 MELBOURNE J. OF INT'L L. 462 (2004) (recounting detailed history).
183. U.N. Legal Council Hans Corell, Statement at Press Briefing at U.N. Headquarters in New
York, (Feb. 8, 2002), http://www.un.org/news/dh/infocus/cambodia/corell-brief.htm.
184. U.N. G.A. Rep. of the Group of Experts for Cambodia established pursuant to General
Assembly Resolution 52/135, U.N. Doc. A/53/850 (Feb. 18, 1999),
http://wwwl .umn.edu/humanrts/cambodia-1999.html.
185. See Peter J. Hammer & Tara Urs, The Elusive Face of Cambodian Justice, in BRINGING THE
KHMER ROUGE TO JUSTICE: PROSECUTING MASS VIOLENCE BEFORE THE CAMBODIAN COURTS 27-29
(Jaya Ramji & Beth Van Schaack eds., 2005) (discussing of the many twists and turns of these
negotiations).
186. Annan insisted the United Nations could be involved only if there was a majority of
international judges, an independent international prosecutor, and certain guarantees that the local
authorities would arrest indictecs. Id.
187. G.A. Res. 57/228 B (May 22,2003).
188. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning
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agreement-which regulates cooperation between the Government and the United
Nations but also contains a number of substantive building blocks-was later
ratified in 2004. 89 The relevant domestic legislation was then amended to reflect
elements of the agreement, but some key points of divergence remain. 19' The
ECCC was finally staffed and funded in 2005-6.'9' The ECCC is thus the only
U.N.-originated tribunal to be the creature of domestic legislation. 192 Although a
domestic court, it is entirely "self-contained" from investigation through appeals
with no overlap with the ordinary court system.' 
93
The latest effort in this tradition is the Special Criminal Court ("SCC") for the
CAR, which has the strong support of Catherine Samba-Panza, the then-
transitional head of state. 194 The SCC is the product of newly-passed legislation, 1
95
which follows on the heels of a U.N. commission of inquiry recommendation,1 96 an
August 2014 agreement between CAR and the United Nations that contemplates
the establishment of the SCC, 197 and a Special Investigation Cell formed by
presidential decree to begin investigations. 198 The legislation envisions a mixed
bench composed of international and domestic judges in roughly equal numbers.'1 99
the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea, Cambodia-UN, June 6, 2003, 2329 U.N.T.S. 117; see also G.A. Res. 57/228, supra note
187 (approving the establishment of the ECCC).
189. Instrument of Ratification on the Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal
Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed
during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Oct. 19, 2004,
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-
documents/Instrument of Ratification of Agreement.pdf.
190. Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, with the inclusion of
amendments as promulgated on 27 October 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006), Oct. 27, 2004,
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-
documents/KRLaw as amended 27 Oct 2004 Eng.pdf [hereinafter ECCC Statute].
191. Judges Sworn in for Khmer Rouge, BBC NEWS (Jul. 03, 2006),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5140032.stm.
192. Ciorciari & Heindel, supra note 25, at 371.
193. Dutch Pre-Trial Detention Decision, supra note 180, 1118.
194. Gdraldine Mattioli-Zeltner, Taking Justice to a New Level: The Special Criminal Court in the
Central African Republic, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jul. 13, 2015),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/07/13/taking-justice-new-level-special-criminal-court-central-african-
republic.
195. Loi Organique N0 15.003 Portant Creation, ORGANISATION ET FONCTIONNEMENT DE LA
COUR PENALE SPECIAL, RtSEAU DES ONG DES DROITS DE L'HOMME EN RtPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
(Jul. 22, 2015), https://rongdhrca.wordpress.com/2015/07/22/loi-organique-nl5-003-portant-creation-
organisation-et-fonctionnement-de-la-cour-penale-speciale/ [hereinafter Loi Organique].
196. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Dec. 19, 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2041/928 (Dec. 22, 2014).
197. See U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Centr. Afr.
Rep., U.N. Doc. S/2014/857 (Nov. 28, 2014) [hereinafter SG CAR Report].
198. Parliament of the Central African Republic Adopts the Law Establishing a Special Criminal
Court, PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR GLOBAL ACTION (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.pgaction.org/car-
centralafricanrepublic-criminalcourt.html; Mattioli-Zeltner, supra note 194, at 1, 4 and 5.
199. Loi Organique, supra note 195, at arts. 11-14.
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The Prosecutor will be a foreign national, but the Chief Justice will hail from
CAR.2° It is anticipated that the SCC will be in existence for five years, subject to
renewal at the initiative of the government in consultation with the United
Nations.2 °'
This new hybrid entity is unique in that it was created after CAR self-referred
the situation on its territory to the ICC in December 2004.202 The ICC Office of
the Prosecutor has now opened two separate CAR investigations: one relating to
violence surrounding the 2003 coup that deposed President Angd-Felix Patass6,
and the other concerned with crimes committed since 2012 by the Sdldka and their
anti-Balaka foes. 20 3 The SCC is meant to complement this work. 204 Its temporal
jurisdiction remains open-ended in light of ongoing abuses. 20 5 Because the armed
groups that will be the target of investigation and prosecution are still operating in
parts of CAR, strong measures for witness protection and judicial security will be
necessary. The role of the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission
("MINUSCA") in assisting the SCC is also unprecedented. UNSCR 2149
empowers MINUSCA to "support and work with the Transitional Authorities to
arrest and bring to justice those responsible for war crimes and crimes against
humanity in the country, including through cooperation with States of the region
and the ICC" and to "adopt urgent temporary measures ... to maintain basic law
and order and fight impunity. ' ' 20 6 MINUSCA forces have already arrested some
atrocity crimes suspects 20 7 and will be involved in assisting with SCC logistics and
the nomination of international personnel.
E. Regional Efforts
All of these prior efforts have involved the United Nations. Another set of
recent institutional innovations are primarily regional: the African Union's
Extraordinary African Chambers ("EAC") devoted to prosecuting former Chadian
dictator Hissrne Habrd; 208 the proposed African Court of Justice and Human
Rights ("ACJHR"), which would add penal jurisdiction to the region's human
200. Id. at art. 18.
201. Id. atart. 70.
202. Press Release, ICC - Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-Prosecutor received Referral Concerning
Central African Republic (Jan. 7, 2005) (on file with the ICC press release database). See also Cases &
Situations: Central African Republic, COALITION FOR THE INT'L CRIM. CT.,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=car (last visited Feb. 1, 2016).
203. Press Release, Worldwide Movement for Human Rights, Central African Republic: The ICC
Opens an Investigation on International Crimes Committed Since 2012 (Sept. 24, 2014) (on file with
the Worldwide Movement for Human Rights website).
204. Kersten, supra note 5, at 1.
205. Loi Organique, supra note 195, at art. 3.
206. S.C. Res. 2149 1 30(f)(i), 40 (Apr. 10, 2014). The latter authority is heavily caveated to
make clear that these innovations are included "on an exceptional basis and without creating a
precedent and without prejudice to the agreed principles ofpeacekeeping operations." Id.
207. See SG CAR Report, supra note 197, 50.
208. See infra text accompanying notes 213-232.
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rights court;209 a potential African Union ("AU") hybrid court for South Sudan that
remains in the conceptual phase; 210 and the European Union's recent formation of
a tribunal to prosecute crimes committed by Kosovo's ethnic Albanian rebels
during and after the further dissolution of Yugoslavia. 211 Prior to the emergence of
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant ("ISIL"), there was also talk of the League
of Arab States setting up a tribunal for Syria.2t2 So far, however, this has yet to
materialize. These regional tribunals owe a degree of legitimacy to the regional
political organization involved in their creation, be it the AU, EU, or Arab League.
All have received support outside the region.
The full history of the EAC is too convoluted to fully recount here,213 but
suffice it to say that the concept of an ad hoc regional criminal court to prosecute
Habrd emerged after domestic proceedings against him in Senegal-where he had
enjoyed safe haven following his 1990 overthrow-failed for lack of
214jurisdiction. At the time, Senegalese law did not adequately incorporate
international criminal law or universal jurisdiction, even though Senegal had been
the first country to sign the Rome Statute. 215 Upon the petition of Chadian victims,
Belgian authorities eventually initiated proceedings against Habre and sought his
extradition pursuant to the universality and passive personality principles of
jurisdiction.216 When Senegal refused, in part on the grounds that Habrd enjoyed
residual head-of-state immunity, Belgium brought suit in 2009 before the
International Court of Justice, which ruled in 2012 that Articles 6 and 7 of the
Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment
or Punishment ("CAT") obliged Senegal to either prosecute Habrd or extradite him
elsewhere for prosecution. 2 17 The ICJ suit helped galvanize the search for local
solutions to the impasse, particularly in light of increased hostility within some AU
209. See infra text accompanying notes 233-250; Perriello & Wierda, supra note 124, at 23.
210. See infra text accompanying notes 251-256.
211. See infra text accompanying notes 257-269. See generally Firew Kebede Tiba, Regional
International Criminal Courts: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 17 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RES.
521 (2016) (discussing trend).
212. Aryeh Neier, An Arab War-Crimes Court for Syria, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/opinion/an-arab-war-crimes-court-for-syria.html? r=O.
213. See Sarah Williams, The Extraordinary African Chambers in the Senegalese Courts: An
African Solution to an African Problem, II J. INT. CRIM. JUST 1139 (2013). Updates on the EAC can
be found here: http://www.chambresafricaines.org/ and https://www.hrw.org/tag/hissene-habre.
214. Vaios Koutroulis, Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v
Senegal), OXFORD PUB. INT'L L. (May 2014),
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/1aw-9780199231690-e2129.
215. Press Release, Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, Senegal First State to Ratify Rome
Statute of International Criminal Court, U.N, Press Release L/2905 (Feb. 3, 1999).
216. Koutroulis, supra note 214, 3.
217. Case Concerning Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v.
Sen.), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 430 (Jul. 20). The ICJ focused on CAT obligations, ruling that no
actual dispute existed as to whether Senegal was in breach of customary international law. Id. 1 54-55.
See generally Sangeeta Shah, Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium
v Senegal), 13 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 351 (2013). The Committee Against Torture had reached a similar
result. Id. at 353.
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member states toward international justice efforts that appeared to be "aimed" at
Africa.218
In the meantime, Senegal sought the views of the AU, which convened a
Committee of Eminent African Jurists to consider options for Habr6's trial taking
into account the "total rejection of impunity" and the "priority [of] an African
mechanism," among other factors. 21 9 The Committee recommended that Habr be
tried either within an AU member state, preferably Chad or Senegal, or before an
ad hoc African tribunal.22 ° Upon receipt of these recommendations, the AU
mandated Senegal to prosecute Habrd "on behalf of Africa, [in] a competent
Senegalese court with guarantees for fair trial." 22' Starting in 2007, Senegal began
amending its legislation and constitution accordingly, adding international crimes
to its penal code and incorporating the principle of nullum crimen sine lege as
formulated by Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR").222  On the basis of a petition by Habrd, however, the
Community Court of Justice ("ECCJ") of the Economic Community of West
African States ("ECOWAS") largely rejected this solution on nullum crimen sine
lege grounds, reasoning that only an international tribunal could prosecute Habr6
without running afoul of the principle of legality.223  This ruling prompted
negotiations between Senegal and the AU to create just such a tribunal. In 2012,
after talks stalled under President Abdoulaye Wade and then revived following the
election of President Macky Sail, the AU and Senegal produced a treaty
218. Williams, supra note 213, at 1148.
219. AfT. Union Assembly/AU/Dec.103 (VI), Doc.Assembly/AU/8 (Vl))Add.9, Decision on the
Hiss~ne Habr6 Case and the African Union (Jan. 24, 2006), http://webmail.africa-
union.org/AllDec/ASSEMBLY%20AU%20DEC%2091%20-%20 11 0%20(VI)%20_E.PDF.
220. Afr. Union, Report of the Committee of Eminent African Jurists on the Case of Hissene Habr
(2006), https://www.hrw.org/legacy/justice/habre/CEJA Repor05O6.pdf [hereinafter CEJA Report].
221. Aft. Union Assembly/AU/Dec.127 (VII), Doc. Assembly/AU/3 (VII), Decision on the
Hissrne Habr6 Case and the African Union (Aug. 2, 2006),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2006/08/02/decision-hissene-habre-case-and-african-union.
222. See Mandiaye Niang, The Senegalese Legal Framework for the Prosecution of International
Crimes, 7 J. 1NT'L CRIM. JUST. 1047, 1053-4 (2009). ICCPR Article 15 states:
No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which
did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it
was committed... Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any
person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal
according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter
ICCPR].
223. Hiss~ne Habrd v. Rdpublique du S6ndgal, ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/10, Judgment, Court of Justice
of the Economic Community of West African States, M 58-61 (Nov. 18, 2010),
http://www.courtecowas.org/site20l2/pdf files/decisions/judgements/2010 /HISSEIN-HABRE- v-REP
UBLIQUE DU SENEGAL.pdf. See generally Valentina Spiga, Non-Retroactivity of Criminal Law: A
New Chapter in the Hissne Habr Saga, 9 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 2 (2011). A similar effort before the
African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights failed on the grounds that Senegal had not consented to
the filing of individual petitions before the Court. Michelot Yogogombaye v. The Republic of Senegal,
Appl. No. 001/2008, Judgment, African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights [Afr. Ct. H.P.R.] (Dec.
15, 2009).
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establishing the EAC.224 Senegal then enacted the necessary domestic legislation
and activated the EAC. 2 5 Habrd tried returning to the ECCJ, but it denied his
petition to suspend the proceedings on the grounds that it had no jurisdiction over
decisions or actions by the AU.226
Habr was taken into custody in 2013 and transferred to EAC custody.227 The
EAC is largely devoted to prosecuting him, although indictments have been issued
against five other associated individuals who remain at large. 228 In seeking the
extradition of the other defendants, who have no contacts at all with Senegal, the
EAC are exercising an internationalized form of "pure" universal jurisdiction.229
Chad has supported this process, waived any residual immunity Habrd might
enjoy, and launched domestic proceedings against security agents from the Habr
era, including two individuals also wanted by the EAC. 230 A relentless campaign
by civil society groups in the region and beyond was crucial in keeping the
pressure on in favor of prosecution.23 1 At first, Habr and his counsel refused to
cooperate, and the proceedings were continued until September 2015 so that his
224. Project d'Accord entre l'Union Africaine et Gouvernement de la Republique du Senegal sur
la Creation de Chambres Africaines Extraordinaires au sein des Jurisdictions Senegalaises [Draft
Agreement between Afr. Union and the Gov't of the Rep. of Sen. on the Establishment of Extraordinary
Chambers African in the Courts Senegalese], AU-Sen. (Jul. 24, 2012).
225. Statut des Chambres Africaines Extraordinaires au sein des Juridictions S6ndgalaises pour la
Poursuite des Crimes Internationaux Commis au Tchad durant la Pdriode du 7 Juin 1982 au ler
D6cembre 1990 [Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers in the Senegalese courts for the
prosecution of international crimes committed in Chad during the period from 7 June 1982 to I
December 1990], art 2, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/node/248651
[hereinafter EAC Statute].
226. Brittany West, ECOWAS Court Refuses to Suspend Case Against Hiss~ne Habr6, HUMAN
RIGHTS BRIEF (Feb. 23, 2014), http://hrbrief.org/2014/02/ecowas-court-refuses-to-suspend-case-
against-hissene-habre/.
227. Anne Bodley & Sousena Kebede Tefera, The Extraordinary Role Of The
Extraordinary African Chambers Convened To Try Former Chadian Leader Hiss~ne
Habr , 3 AFRICA LAW TODAY 7 (2013),
https://www.academia.edu/5410029/THEEXTRAORDINARYROLE OF THEEXTRAORDINAR
YAFRICANCHAMBERSCONVENED TO TRYFORMER CHADIAN LEADERHISS%C3%
88NE HABR%C3%89.
228. Thijs B. Bouwknegt, Chad-Dakar: lfabr Trial is Litmus Test for Pan-African Justice,
AFRICAN ARGUMENTS (June 1, 2015), http://africanarguments.org/2015/06/01/chad-dakar-habre-trial-
is-litmus-test-for-pan-african-justice-by-thijs-b-bouwknegt/.
229. See Sienho Yee, Universal Jurisdiction: Concept, Logic, and Reality, 10 CHINESE JL 503,
508 (2011). "Pure universal concern jurisdiction" is:
an assertion of jurisdiction based solely on the universal concern character of the crime,
without more ... [T]his form of jurisdiction would entitle, as far as the jurisdictional
requirement is concerned, the prosecuting State to the extradition of the suspect from a
foreign State, if other conditions are met.
Id.
230. Chad: Habr -Era Agents Convicted of Torture, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 25, 2015),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/03/25/chad-habre-era-agents-convicted-torture.
231. Marie Gibert, Trial in Senegal offormer Chadian President is a Victory for Civil Society, THE
CONVERSATION (Jul. 20, 2015), http://theconversation.com/trial-in-senegal-of-forner-chadian-
president-is-a-victory-for-civil-society-44920.
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court-appointed lawyers could get up to speed.232 A judgment is expected in May
2016.
The other potential regional criminal court, the African Court of Justice and
Human Rights ("ACJHR"), remains in the building phase. Like the ICC, it will be
the product of a multilateral treaty. By way of background, the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights (also known as the Banjul Charter),233 the continent's
omnibus human rights treaty, gave rise to the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights, a body analogous to the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (but with weaker enforcement powers) that is dedicated to enforcing the
Banjul Charter within AU member states. A 1998 Protocol to the Charter led to
the creation of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights ("ACHPR") in
2004.234 The Court (which can hear claims against those states parties that have
accepted its jurisdiction) entertains petitions submitted by states parties, African
intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, and individual citizens concerning the
interpretation and application of the Banjul Charter or any other human rights
treaty that has been ratified by the state concerned.235 So far, the Court has not
been particularly active. Since 2008, the Court has received over fifty
applications, half of which have been finalized; the rest remain pending.23 6 That
said, applications are on a steep uptick (twenty-two applications have been filed in
2015), and the Court is making its mark on the continent with some important
rulings (including the issuance of provisional measures against Libya during its
2011 revolution).237
Meanwhile, the Constitutive Act of the AU238 envisioned the creation of the
African Court of Justice ("ACJ"), a forum for state-to-state disputes between AU
member states that is roughly analogous to the European Court of Justice.
Although the ACJ's Protocol entered into force, the Court itself did not come into
existence because an intervening Protocol approved by the AU in 2008 envisioned
that the ACJ would be merged with the ACHPR to create an African Court of
Justice and Human Rights. 239  Fifteen ratifications are required to bring this
232. The Case of Hissone Habri before the Extraordinary African Chambers in Senegal:
Questions and Answers, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 27, 2015),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related-material/2015_Senegal ChadHabr/C3A9 case Q%
26A 2.pdf [hereinafter Q&A: The Case of Hissdne Habrel.
233. See generally African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520
U.N.T.S. 26363.
234. OAU, Protocol to the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of
the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (1998) [hereinafter ACHPR Protocol].
235. Id. at art. 3, 5.
236. List of Applications Received By the Court, AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES'
RIGHTS, http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/2012-03-04-06-06-00/cases-status l.
237. Libya: African Rights Court Issues First Ruling Against a State, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/30/libya-african-rights-court-issues-first-ruling-
against-state.
238. Afr. Union, Constitutive Act of the African Union, AU Assembly, 36"h sess., (Jul. 1I, 2000)
[hereinafter AU Constitutive Act].
239. Aft. Union, Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, Annex.
(July 1, 2008) [hereinafter ACJHR Protocol].
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Protocol into force; only five states have ratified it so far-Benin, Burkina Faso,
Congo (Brazzaville), Libya, and Mali.2 40  As originally conceived, the merged
Court was to have two sections: a "general affairs" section, to handle inter-state
disputes, and a human rights section, to assume the docket of the African Court on
Human and Peoples' Rights and exercise jurisdiction over a range of human rights
241treaties .
In early 2009, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government began
considering the possibility of expanding the jurisdiction of the not-yet-formed
African Court of Justice and Human Rights to include a third chamber with the
power to assert penal jurisdiction over individuals accused of having committed
international crimes, such as war crimes and crimes against humanity (among
others).242 Discussions, drafting, and negotiations ensued, and in 2011, a draft
report and statute were provisionally adopted by the Ministers of Justice and
Attorney Generals that was largely complete except for the crime of effectuating
an unconstitutional change of government, which remained under consideration.243
In 2012, a Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the
African Court of Justice and Human Rights was finalized (with the one contentious
crime bracketed). 2 " In May 2014, the AU Special Technical Committee ("STC")
on Justice and Legal Affairs adopted the Draft Protocol, which contains the draft
245statute of the tripartite successor court z. The full AU then followed suit in June
in Equatorial Guinea.246 Arguably, this new Protocol has superseded the original
Protocol merging the ACHPR and the ACJ, requiring ratifications to start anew.
The motivations behind the proposed African criminal court are
multifaceted.247  Some members of the AU are no doubt driven by antagonism
240. Ratification Status: Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights,
COALITION FOR AN EFFECTIVE AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS (Jul. 12, 2014),
http://www.africancourtcoalition.org/index.php?option=com content&view-article&id=87 :ratification-
status-protocol-on-the-statute-of-the-african-court-of-justice-and-human-rights&catid=7:african-
union&ltemid=12.
241. ACJHR Protocol, supra note 239, at Annex, art. 28.
242. Afr. Union Assembly/AU/Dec. 213(X11), Decision on the Implementation of the Assembly
Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction-Doc. Assembly/A U/3(XI), 12th Sess.
(Feb. 1-3, 2009). The Committee of Eminent African Jurists convened to consider options for
prosecuting Habrd were also asked to consider long-term solutions to impunity on the continent and
floated the idea of expanding the jurisdiction of the ACJHR. CEJA Report, supra note 220, at 5.
243. Issaka K. Souard, The AU and the Challenge of Unconstitutional Changes of Government in
Africa, ISS Paper 197 (Aug. 2009).
244. Afr. Union Specialized Technical Comm. on Just. and Legal Aff., Draft Protocol on
Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights,
Exp/Min/IV/Rev.7 (May 15, 2012) [hereinafter Draft Protocol on Amendments].
245. Press Release, Afr. Union, First Session of the Special Technical Committee on Justice and
Legal Affairs of the African Union Concluded with Concrete Recommendations on Way Forward (May
16, 2014).
246. Caitlin Behles, Assembly of the African Union Adopts Legal Instruments at its 23rd Ordinary
Session (June 27, 2014), AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Aug. 8, 2014, 11:46 AM),
http://www.asil.org/blogs/assembly-african-union-adopts-legal-instruments-its-23rd-ordinary-session-
june-27-2014#sthash.REPG4ZDb.dpuf.
247. See generally Martin Matasi & Brdhmer Jirgen, The Proposed International Criminal
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toward the ICC, especially in light of its issuance of indictments against African
sitting heads of state.248 In a show of post-colonial solidarity, members of the AU
have also objected to the assertion of universal jurisdiction over African
defendants, particularly by former colonial powers (with Germany's prosecution of
Rose Kabuye, Rwanda's Chief of Protocol, and the United Kingdom's arrest of
Emmanuel Karenzi Karake, head of Rwanda's National Intelligence and Security
Services, serving as particular flashpoints).249 In urging African states to do more
to prosecute international crimes committed in Africa, these critics find common
cause with human rights advocates in the region who are championing the creation
of the proposed regional criminal court in order to expand the fora capable of
prosecuting serious crimes committed on the continent. 250 The creation of the
EAC no doubt serves as a model for implementing African solutions to African
problems, and the complex and protracted negotiations around its establishment
offer additional support for the creation of a standing body. It remains to be seen,
however, whether there is adequate political and financial support for the new
African institution. Its location in Arusha-The Hague of Africa-offers the
potential for productive institutional synergy.
In other regional developments, there have been discussions that the branch of
the MICT located in Arusha, Tanzania, might house, or be transformed into, an
international or hybrid court being contemplated for crimes committed in South
Sudan.25' This would enable the new entity to share resources with the MICT,
which is funded through U.N. assessed contributions and will receive new
premises in 2016.252 Although these discussions remain in the early phases,
repurposing the MICT would likely require additional action by the Security
Council, particularly if the consent of South Sudan is not forthcoming. An AU
Peace and Security Council-sponsored Commission of Inquiry devoted to South
Chamber Section of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights: A Legal Analysis, I INT'L L. J.
LONDON 77 (2014) (recounting vacillating relationship between African states and the ICC).
248. M. Cherif Bassiouni et al., Is the International Criminal Court (ICC) Targeting Africa
Inappropriately?, ICC FORUM, http://iccforum.com/africa (last visited Mar. 28, 2016).
249. Tam John, Why the Arrest of Rwanda's Intelligence Chief in the UK Is Causing Wows, TIM E (Jun.
23, 2015), http://time.com/3932134/rwandas-intelligence-chief-uk/.
250. Marc Schulman, The African Court of Justice and Human Rights: A Beacon of Hope or a
Dead-End Odyssey?, INKUNDLA (2013), http://www.inkundlajournal.org/inkundla/2013-inkundla-2.
251. IGAD Proposes Hybrid Court With No Amnesty For South Sudan War Criminals, RADIO
TAMAZUJ (Jul. 27, 2015), https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/igad-proposes-hybrid-court-no-amnesty-
south-sudan-war-criminals. Chapter V of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the
Republic of South Sudan envisions the establishment of such a tribunal. The Security Council has
endorsed the effort. See S.C. Res. 2241 (Oct. 9, 2015). The U.N. Secretariat will thus, for the first
time, provide technical assistance to a regional accountability mechanism. See Report of the Secretary-
General on technical assistance provided to the African Union Commission and the Transitional
Government of National Unity for the implementation of chapter V of the Agreement on the Resolution
of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, U.N. Doe. S/2016/328 (Apr. 7, 2016),
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/328.
252. Eagle, supra note 9. The United States has already offered $5 million toward this effort. US
Willing to Fund Hybrid Court for South Sudan War Crimes, RADIO TAMAZUJ (May 6, 2015),
https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/us-willing-fund-hybrid-court-south-sudan-war-crimes.
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Sudan-the first such regional effort-first proposed resort to an Africa-led "legal
mechanism under the aegis of the African Union supported by the international
community" and including South Sudanese judges and lawyers, among other
transitional justice mechanisms. 25 3 The AU and the Inter-Governmental Authority
on Development ("IGAD"), with technical assistance from the United Nations
Secretariat, will play a central role in standing up a new institution either by way of
a resolution or another multilateral treaty. The limited domestic legal capacity and
continuing insecurity in South Sudan makes it unlikely that a viable hybrid tribunal
could be established in the country itself at the moment.254 Tanzania, which
already plays host to a number of justice institutions,255 offers a viable neutral
forum given the links between various South Sudanese factions and other regional
powers. Proceedings could be transferred to Juba when security conditions allow.
In principle, President Salva Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar have
agreed to pursue a transitional justice program, including options for
accountability, in both the February 2015 "Areas Agreement" and the August 2015
Peace Agreement.
256
Turning to the European theater, notwithstanding intense international
involvement in the Kosovar judicial system through the U.N. Mission in Kosovo
("UNMIK") and EULEX, the international community remained concerned about
the inability of domestic judges to ensure fair and impartial justice in sensitive
cases.257 The problem of witness protection has been particularly acute in both
domestic and ICTY cases. 258 Meanwhile, a report by a Swiss prosecutor, Dick
Marty, to the Council of Europe contained allegations that a Kosovar Albanian
organ-trafficking scheme may have led to the deaths of Serb war-time captives in
Albanian territory259 The Marty Report, which indirectly implicated Prime
Minister Hashim Thagi, also accused members of the KLA of committing a range
253. Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, 11148 (Oct. 15,
2014).
254. ENDING THE ERA OF INJUSTICE, supra note 9 (concluding that the South Sudanese courts are
incapable of hosting domestic or even internationalized trials and calling for the creation of a standalone
hybrid tribunal).
255. About MCIT, UNITED NATIONS MECHANISM FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS,
http://www.unmict.org/en/about. The ICTR, ACJI-R, and a branch of the MICT are located in Arusha,
Tanzania.
256. South Sudan: South Sudan Parties Sign Areas of Agreement on the Establishment of the
Transitional Government of National Unity, RELIEFWEB (Feb. 2, 2015),
http:!reliefweb.intfreport/south-sudan/sOuth-sudan-parties-sign-areas-agreenient-establishment-
transitional-goernment; Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
(Aug. 17, 2015), https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5FAwdVtt-
gCelBQZVAxbjhUc1 FmSHo3VnNaT09LdmIGNEhz/view.
257. AMNESTY INT'L, KOSOvO (SERBIA): THE CHALLENGE TO FIX A FAILED UN JUSTICE SYSTEM 4,
6 (2008).
258. Michael Farquhar, Witness Intimidation a Serious Problem in Kosovo Cases, INSTITUTE FOR
WAR & PEACE REPORTING (Nov. 18, 2005), https://iwpr.net/global-voices/witness-intimidation-serious-
problem-kosovo-cases.
259. EUR. PARL. ASS., inhuman Treatment of People and Illicit Trafficking in Human Organs in
Kosovo, Doe. No. 12462 (2011) [hereinafter Marty Report].
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of other international crimes.260  In 2011, the Council of Europe endorsed the
report and established under EULEX authority an autonomous Special
Investigative Task Force ("SITF"), which was located in Brussels and composed
entirely of international investigators and lawyers, to conduct a full-scale criminal
investigation into the allegations. 261 The first Chief Prosecutor of the SITF (a
former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues) indicated that he found
compelling evidence against senior members of the KLA of an organized program
of ethnic persecution and violence, including the targeting of civilians, illegal
detentions, "counter-ethnic cleansing," and summary executions of Serb and Roma
victims as well as of Albanian political opponents and perceived collaborators.
262
Although there is apparently evidence that torture was also committed, the statute
of limitations for the crime has expired. 263 The SITF found indications of organ
trafficking, but on a small scale not supported by evidence that would yet justify
the issuance of indictments.2 6
The SITF indicated that it would not issue indictments or unseal its files until
there is a court that is dedicated to hearing the cases. The model arrived upon, as
set forth in agreement between Kosovo and the EU, and Kosovo and the
Netherlands, involves "Specialist Chambers" located in the Netherlands but
headquartered in Kosovo and operating under Kosovar jurisdiction as an extension
of EULEX. 65 Its official (and ungainly) title reveals its hybrid nature: the Kosovo
Relocated Specialist Judicial Institution. This is technically a Kosovar court,
relocated to a neutral venue, that will be composed of Pre-Trial, Trial, Appellate,
Supreme, and Constitutional panels or courts along with a Registry. The Kosovo
parliament had the proposal under review for some time; part of the delay in
finalization stemmed from the fact that implementation required legislation and a
constitutional amendment, which was finally approved in August 2015.266 The
proposal was also politically contentious since it focuses on crimes allegedly
committed by the KLA, who are still considered national heroes by many.
267
Supporters had argued that if Parliament did not approve the specialized court, the
proposal would have shifted from the EU to the Security Council, where it enjoyed
260. Id. at 1-2.
261. About SITF, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE TASK FORCE, http://sitf.eu/index.php/en/about-sitf.
262. Statement by the Chief Prosecutor Clint Williamson, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE TASK FORCE
(July 29, 2014), http://www.sitf.eu/index.php/en/news-other/42-statement-by-the-chief-prosecutor-cint-
williamson.
263. Id. at 2.
264. Id. at 3.
265. Law on Ratification of the International Agreement between the Republic of Kosovo and the
European Union on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, Law No. 04 / L-274 (Apr. 23,
2014) (Kos.). Petrit Collaku, Kosovo President Signs War Court Agreement with Holland, BALKAN
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-president-
gives-green-light-for-the-start-of-the-special-court-02-29-2016.
266. Kosovo: Approve Special Court for Serious Abuses, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 11, 2014),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/1 1/kosovo-approve-special-court-scrious-abuses.
267. Nened Sebak, The KLA-Terrorists or Freedom Fighters, BBC (Jun. 28, 1998, 13:41 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/l 21818.stm.
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268
strong support from Russia. It was also feared that if the agreement went
unratified, prospects for wider international recognition and EU integration would
be stymied. 269 The proposed tribunal, which will be made up of international
judges applying Kosovar law as charged by international prosecutors within a
Specialist Prosecutor's Office, is currently under construction and is slated to open
by the end of the year.
The potential Arab League tribunal devoted to prosecuting crimes committed
in Syria would have been located in a state bordering Syria in order to facilitate the
gathering of testimonial and documentary evidence. 270  An additional reason to
focus on neighboring states as potential hosts might be less obvious. Such states
may be empowered to exercise jurisdiction on multiple bases given the direct
effects of the conflict on them. To be sure, the principle of universal jurisdiction-
which empowers all states to prosecute individuals accused of the commission of
international crimes regardless of any nationality or territorial nexus to the
prosecuting state-is available to any state that is so inclined to move forward with
prosecutions of individuals responsible for the commission of war crimes, crimes
against humanity, genocide, and certain acts of terrorism by virtue of either
customary international law or a treaty authorization. 271 Nonetheless, some states
remain squeamish about advancing the universal jurisdiction norm, perhaps all the
more so in a novel collective form. As such, there is an obvious utility to
identifying states that can lawfully exercise domestic jurisdiction on other, less
contentious jurisdictional bases.2 72 A regional tribunal devoted to Syria could have
been premised on the collective exercise of the passive personality or protective
principles of jurisdiction given massive refugee flows and the overall instability
caused by the war in Syria and now Iraq.
F. A Selective Multilateral Treaty
The ICC is the creature of a multilateral treaty, but one open to all states.
27 3
Besides the regional tribunals discussed above, it has been rare for a subset of
states since Nuremberg to form an "international" tribunal by way of multilateral
268. Una Hajdari, US Warns Kosovo: Approve New War Court Quickly, BALKAN TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE (Apr. 17, 2015), http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/us-if-kosovo-war-crimes-court-fails-
un-tribunal-to-be-formed.
269. Emma Founds, Risks for the Republic of Kosovo if Parliament Fails to Establish the Special
Court, 4 GROUP FOR LEGAL AND POLITICAL STUDIES 1, 6 (Apr. 2015),
http://legalpoliticalstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Risks-for-the-Republic-of-Kosovo-if-the-
Parliament-fails-to-Establish-the-Special-Courtl .pdf.
270. David Scheffer, Opinion, Let Justice Be Served in Syria and Iraq, LA TIMES (Jul. 5, 2014),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oce-scheffer-prosecuting-atrocities-syria-iraq-20140706-
story.html.
271. The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA HUMAN
RIGHTS LIBRARY (2001) at princ. 2.1, https://www I .umn.edu/humanrts/instree/princcton.html.
272. See Beth Van Schaack, Mapping War Crimes in Syria, 92 INT'L L. STUDIES (forthcoming
2016) (outlining proposals).
273. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 125(3), Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
38544 [hereinafter Rome Statute] ("This Statute shall be open to accession by all States").
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treaty. One partial precedent is found in the mixed slavery courts established by
Great Britain in the early 19 th century in an effort to eradicate the slave trade, a
forgotten chapter in the story of international criminal law rediscovered by
scholars.274 The British strategy involved executing a network of bilateral treaties
with maritime states, including Spain, Brazil, the Netherlands, and Portugal.
2 75
These treaties gave parties the right to search and condemn vessels engaged in the
slave trade and to subject them to trial before a mixed commission featuring judges
from the capturing nation, the flagship nation, and potentially a "neutral" nation.
276
The mixed commissions were established in treaty-partners' ports-of-call,
including Freetown, Sierra Leone; Havana, Cuba; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and
Suriname.2 7 7 This network of otherwise bilateral treaties established something
close to a global enforcement regime even without the involvement of France
(which never joined) and the United States (which joined late in the game).
British overtures to the United States met resistance, due in part to
antagonism toward granting a mutual right to search ships on the high seas (a
central pillar of the British approach), but also to perceived constitutional
infirmities, notwithstanding the U.S. Constitution's expansive Treaty Power.
2 78
The United States preferred for U.S. vessels captured by the British to be returned
to the United States for trial. It should be noted that U.S. opposition did not reflect
any desire to preserve or protect the slave trade; although slavery remained legal in
the United States at the time, Congress had already declared the slave trade to be a
form of "piracy" punishable by death.279 In 1862 and in the midst of the Civil
War, the United States finally assented to the British proposal and entered into
what became known as the Lyons-Seward Treaty.28 ° Mixed courts involving the
United States were established in New York, Sierra Leone, and Capetown.281 By
this time, however, the slave trade had been largely suppressed, and these courts
274. See Jenny S. Martinez, Antislavery Courts and the Dawn of International Human Rights Law,
117 YALE L. J. 550, 552-53 (2008).
275. Id at 603.
276. Id. at 579.
277. Id.
278. See Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitutionality Of International Courts: The Forgotten
Precedent Of Slave Trade Tribunals, 158 U. PA. L. Rev. 39 (2010). Constitutional objections to the
United States' participation in mixed tribunals revolved around the permissibility of creating non-
Article III courts and whether such courts needed to adhere to individual rights set forth in the Bill of
Rights, such as the right to a jury or a right to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. Detractors gave voice
to these objections even though the United States had participated in the past in other such commissions
for different legal claims. Id. at 74.
279. An Act to Protect the Commerce of the United States and Punish the Crime of Piracy, Pub. L.
No. 16-13, § 5, 3 Stat. 600 (1820). The statute applied to "any citizen of the United States, being of the
crew or ship's company of any foreign ship or vessel engaged in the slave trade" or "any person
whatever" engaged in the slave trade on a ship "whol[ly] or in part, or navigated for, or in behalf of, any
citizen or citizens of the United States." Id. §§ 4-5.
280. Martinez, supra note 274, at 609-10; id. at n.257. Professor Martinez explains the United
States' volteface in part on a perceived need to appease Great Britain and prevent its recognition of the
Confederacy.
281. ldat595.
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were never activated.282
These tribunals were not strictly penal in nature. Rather, they "had
jurisdiction only over the ships and their cargo; the crew would either be let loose
or repatriated for prosecution." 2 83 Later, "the mixed courts were authorized to hold
slave crews in custody until they could be transferred to national authorities for
trial. 28a The ships were generally auctioned off, with the proceeds going toward
the expenses associated with the courts, the two governments, and the captors as
prize money.285 As such, these courts administered what were more in the nature
of in rem actions, although it has been argued that "[c]ondemnation of a vessel,
while nominally in rem, can be criminal when done to punish the owner 286 as with
civil forfeiture laws.287  There was no right to appeal.2 8  All told, upwards of
80,000 would-be slaves were freed by these mixed courts over the course of their
existence.2 89
The Lockerbie Tribunal provides another notable example of the use of a
treaty amongst a limited group of states to create an accountability mechanism. 290
Following the bombing of Pan-Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988,
an international investigation led to the conclusion that the bombing had been the
work of two Libyan agents. 291 The United Kingdom and the United States both
issued indictments in 1991.292 Libya, however, refused to extradite its nationals,
asserting the right to prosecute them itself under the Montreal Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, which contains
an aut dedere autjudicare provision at Article 7.293 In an unprecedented move, the
Security Council demanded that Libya cooperate with the investigations and
surrender the suspects to either the United Kingdom or the United States for trial.
It also imposed sanctions on Libya for non-cooperation.294
Following a decade of negotiations and a foray to the International Court of
282. Id. at 629-30.
283. Kontorovich, supra note 278, at 83.
284. Martinez, supra note 274, at 591 n.180.
285. Id. at 591.
286. Kontorovich, supra note 278, at 84.
287. Id. at 84-85.
288. Id. at 78.
289. Martinez, supra note 274, at 602.
290. See generally Michael Scharf, The Lockerbie Model of Transfer of Jurisdiction, in II
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 525(M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., 3rd ed., 2008).
291. Jesse Greenspan, Remembering the 1988 Lockerbie Bombing, THE HISTORY CHANNEL (Dec.
20, 2013), http://www.history.com/news/remembering-the-1988-lockerbie-bombing.
292. Id.
293. The Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation art. 7, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; see generally JOHN P. GRANT, THE
LOCKERBIE TRIAL: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (2004).
294. S.C. Res. 731, 3 (Jan. 21, 1992). UNSCR 731 marks the first Security Council resolution
to, in essence, require a state to hand over its nationals for trial abroad. These demands were reiterated
in UNSCRs 748 (1992) and 883 (1993), which also imposed strict sanctions in light of Libya's non-
compliance. S.C. Res. 748 (Mar. 31, 1992); S.C. Res 883 (Nov. 11, 1993).
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Justice (ICJ), 295 an agreement was reached in 1998296 that would allow the suspects
to be prosecuted in a neutral forum: a decommissioned U.S. army base in the
Netherlands staffed by a panel of Scottish High Court judges (in lieu of a jury)
applying Scots law. Although the Security Council blessed the arrangement,
297
implementation required the passage of Scottish legislation to enable a Scottish
court, possessing a full juridical personality and enjoying all applicable privileges
and immunities, to sit extraterritorially. 298 The United Kingdom covered any costs
incurred by the Netherlands.299 The deal also enjoyed the endorsement of the
Organization of African Unity (now the African Union), the League of Arab
States, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization of the Islamic
Conference. 300 As had been arranged in advance, upon the appearance of the two
accused in the Netherlands, the Security Council suspended the sanctions against
Libya, which had begun to erode in any case. 301 The Lockerbie Tribunal convicted
one of the two defendants in 2001, but he was released early on compassionate
grounds when he developed terminal cancer; he died in 2012.302 Libya also
acknowledged responsibility for the bombing and paid reparations to the victims'
families.303
295. Libya brought suit under the Montreal Convention, arguing that neither the United States nor
the United Kingdom could compel it to surrender its nationals. The respondents claimed that the ICJ
lacked jurisdiction under the treaty and that the claims had been rendered moot by action before the
Security Council. See Press Release, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of
America), Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Press Release 1998/5 (Feb. 27, 1998) http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?pr=173&code-lus&pl=3&p2=3&p3=6&case=89 (finding the case to be
admissible and dismissing the United States' preliminary objections; the cases were eventually
discontinued in 2003 with prejudice).
296. Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands Concerning a Scottish Trial in the
Netherlands, U.K.-Neth., Sept. 18, 1998, art. 3, 2062 U.N.T.S. 81 [hereinafter Lockerbie Treaty]. (The
terms of the arrangement were set forth in an August 24, 1998, letter from the United Kingdom and the
United States to the U.N. Secretary-General, which is attached as an annex to the aforementioned
treaty).
297. S.C. Res. 1192, 3 (Aug. 27, 1998) (calling upon the United Kingdom and the Netherlands to
take steps to enable a Scottish court to operate on Dutch territory, mandating that all states cooperate
with the proceedings, and indicating an intention to suspend sanctions when the two accused arrived in
the Netherlands).
298. 1998 No. 2251, United Kingdom High Court of Justiciary (Proceedings in the Netherlands)
(United Nations) Order 1998, § 3, as reprinted in 38 1.LM. 942 (1999),
http://www.opsi.gov. uk/si/si 1998/19982251.htm.
299. Lockerbie Treaty, supra note 296, at 91.
300. KHALIL I. MATAR & ROBERT W. THABIT, LOCKERBIE AND LIBYA: A STUDY IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 95-96 (2004).
301. S.C. Res. 1506, art. I (Sept. 13, 2003) (lifting sanctions). In its pronouncements, the Security
Council also mandated Libya's cooperation with respect to the 1989 downing of a French airline, UTA
flight 772, which also implicated the then-head of the Libyan intelligence agency and Gaddafi's
brother-in-law, Abdullah Senussi, who has been indicted by the ICC.
302. Greenspan, supra note 291.
303. See Hurst v. The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 474 F.Supp.2d 19, 23 (D.D.C.
2007).
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This arrangement had some of the features of the Nuremberg Tribunal in that
it was established by the agreement of a small number of implicated states. It
embodied a negotiated compromise of competing entitlements to jurisdiction as
between Libya (which asserted the nationality principle), Scotland (entitled to
invoke the passive personality and territorial principles), and the U.S. (passive
personality, but also territoriality given that Pan Am was a U.S. airline). By
involving fewer states, such arrangements are potentially easier to negotiate. The
similarities between Lockerbie and Nuremberg end there, however. Besides the
obvious difference in scope, the Lockerbie Tribunal also proceeded with the
consent-albeit coerced by crippling sanctions--of the nationality state.
In a similar initiative, the Secretary-General's Special Adviser on Legal
Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, Jack Lang, and others have
proposed the establishment of an extraterritorial Somali anti-piracy court in a
secure location to act as a "focal point" for regional and international prosecutorial
support and to help strengthen the rule of law in Somalia. 304 It was suggested that
the premises of the ICTR might be a suitable temporary venue given the winding
down of that tribunal's activities. 30 5 This extraterritorial Somali court, which
would be staffed with internationally trained Somali and diaspora judges, 30 6 would
be the product of multiple overlapping treaties between Somalia, the host state, and
the apprehending states.30 7 Under Lang's proposal, the court would work in
tandem, and potentially share a prosecutorial office, with secure specialized
chambers in the courts of the autonomous regions of Puntland (deemed the
"epicenter of piracy") and Somaliland. °8  It would eventually decamp to
Mogadishu. Funding was to come from the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, the
U.N. Development Programme ("UNDP"), International Maritime Organization
("IMO"), and a Trust Fund set up by the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia ("Contact Group"). 30 9 Although Somalia has not been supportive of this
plan, the Security Council has kept it under consideration. 310 To date, the Council
has primarily stressed the need for cooperative legal action and focused on
coordinating assertions of domestic jurisdiction and efforts to apprehend and
transfer individuals for prosecution, as discussed below.
A model similar to the Lockerbie solution is under consideration for the
304. Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy Off the Coast of
Somalia, Report of the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy Off
the Coast of Somalia, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/2011/30 (Jan. 25, 2011), http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/Langreport S-2011-301 .pdf [hereinafter Lang Report].
305. Id. 11 122.
306. Id. 1 125-26.
307. Id. 124.
308. Id. 133.
309. Id. at Summary, 138.
310. See S.C. Res. 1976, 1 (Jul. 18, 2008); see also U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the
Secretary-General on Specialized Anti-Piracy Courts in Somalia and other States in the Region,
S/2012/50, 37-38 (Jan. 20, 2012); U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the
Modalities for the Establishment of Specialized Somali Anti-Piracy Courts, S/2011/360 (June 15, 2011)
(discussing specialized chambers model).
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downing of Malaysia Air Flight 17 ("MH-17") as a way of circumventing Russia's
veto of a Dutch/Malaysian proposal to establish an international tribunal. 311 If
such a Lockerbie-style tribunal were to move forward, at a minimum, the most
affected states would include Ukraine, as the territorial and potentially nationality
state; Malaysia, as the state of registration as well as the state of nationality of the
victims; and the Netherlands (and others), also invoking the passive personality
principle (two-thirds of those killed were Dutch).31 2 These states could, in essence,
"pool" their respective jurisdictional competencies. Such a tribunal could also be
premised on the collective exercise of universal jurisdiction if the attack amounts
to a war crime or an act of terrorism subject to universal jurisdiction.313 The
nationality of the perpetrators is unknown, which complicates the question of
whether Russia's assent would be required, as a legal or practical matter, for any
tribunal to be established, especially given that the acts in question may be subject
to universal jurisdiction. Assuming Russia would block any decisive action by the
Security Council, additional international legitimacy could be afforded to this
effort by the U.N. General Assembly.
3 14
G. Occupation Courts
International tribunals have also been created as part of a postwar occupation
in order to deal with the problem of captured war criminals. The United States
created the Tokyo Tribunal, for example, by executive fiat while occupying the
country after WWII. 315  In addition, the victorious allies staged thousands of
prosecutions in military commissions and courts in their respective zones of
occupation. 316 In the European Theater, the Control Council, comprised of the
commanders of Germany's four occupation zones, passed Law No. 10 to enable
311. See Rick Gladstone, Russia Vetoes U.N. Resolution on Tribunal for Malaysia Airlines Crash
in Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/30/world/europe/russia-
vetoes-un-resolution-on-tribunal-for-malaysia-airlinescrashin-ukrainehtml?r=0. The Minister for
Transport of Malaysia presented the draft resolution, which received eleven affirmative votes and three
abstentions (Angola, China and Venezuela). Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Fails to
Adopt Resolution on Tribunal for Malaysia Airlines Crash in Ukraine, Amid Calls for Accountability,
Justice for Victims, U.N. Press Release SC/I 1990 (July 29, 2015),
http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/scl1990.doc.htm Russia's veto reflected its views that any
international tribunal would be "politicized" and "counterproductive." Moscow Explains Why it Sees
Establishment of International Tribunal on MHI7 Crash as Premature, RUSSIA BEYOND THE
HEADLINES (July 30, 2015),
http://rbth.com/news/2015/07/30/moscow explainswhyit sees establishment of intl tribunal on m
h17 crash 48130.html.
312. See Aleksandra Gjorgievska, The Lives Lost in the MHI7 Disaster, T[ME (July 21, 2014),
http://time.com/3012667/mh 17-victims/ (providing the breakdown of number of deaths).
313. See Aaron Matta & Anda Scarlat, Malaysia Airlines Flight MH-I 7-Possible Legal Avenues
for Redress (Part 2), OPINIOJURIS (Aug. 28, 2015), http://opiniojuris.org/2015/08/28/guest-post-
malaysia-airlines-flight-mh I 7-possible-legal-avenues-for-redress-part-2/.
314. Id.
315. The Nuremberg Trial and the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE OFF. OF THE
HISTORIAN (1945 -1948), https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nuremberg.
316. Id.
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the prosecution of persons deemed guilty of international crimes. 3 17  The allies
conducted similar trials in the Far East,318 although the United States was the sole
occupying power in Japan. 319  Whether these subsequent trials should be
considered "international" or quasi-international in light of their multilateral
origins and their incorporation of international law has generated differing
views.
320
In theory, states could continue to create internationalized tribunals or mixed
courts in occupation or quasi-occupation situations if the conditions were right.
321
A modem twist on this tradition is found in the Iraqi High Tribunal ("IHT"), which
was stood up to prosecute Saddam Hussein and other Ba'athists following the 2003
Iraq War ("Operation Iraqi Freedom").322 The Security Council in UNSCR 1483
(2003) authorized the United States and the United Kingdom acting as the
Coalition Provisional Authority ("CPA") to, inter alia, administer the territory of
Iraq, encourage the restoration of the civil infrastructure, and promote legal and
judicial reform, particularly in light of the articulated need to ensure accountability
317. See Control Council, Law no. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes
Against Peace and Against Humanity, arts. 1-2 (Dec. 20, 1945),
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtl0.asp.
318. See Generally Arujunan Narayanan, Japanese Atrocities and British Minor War Crimes
Trials After World War It in the East, 33 JEBAT: MALAYSIAN J. OF HIST. 1 (2006),
http://joumalarticle.ukm.my/373/1/1.pdf.
319. See, e.g., Phillip R. Picigallo, THE JAPANESE ON TRIAL: ALLIED WAR CRIMES OPERATIONS IN
THE EAST, 1945-1951 (1979).
320. See Cherif Bassiouni, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION AND
CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION 133 (2011) ("[CCL 10] was purported to be a national law applicable
only territorially but its source deriv[ed] from international law, and its formulation and enactment was
by the victorious Allies acting pursuant to their supreme authority over Germany by virtue of that
country's unconditional surrender").
321. Article 42 of the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention (IV) on the Laws and
Customs of War on Land considers territory to be occupied when it is "actually placed under the
authority of the hostile army." Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Annex, § Ill 1 42, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277. Although a foundational
principle of occupation law dictates that the occupying power should not make major changes to the
territorial state's governmental institutions, there are exceptions to this minimalist principle when
replacing prior penal laws is in the best interest of the population and necessary for the effective
administration ofjustice or when prosecuting violations of international humanitarian law. See Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, arts. 64-
65, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; see generally GREG Fox, HUMANITARIAN
OCCUPATION (2008).
322. But see Michael Newton, The Iraqi High Criminal Court: Controversy and Contributions,
862 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 399, 401 (2006) (arguing that the IHT was "not an exercise dictated
by occupation authorities, but was initiated by Iraqis and revalidated at every stage by the domestic
political processes"). Compare Michael P. Scharf, Is it International Enough? A Critique of the Iraqi
Special Tribunal in Light of the Goals of International Justice, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 330, 330 (2004)
[hereinafter Scharf, Critique] (noting the risk that the IHT would "[be] seen by both Iraqis and outsiders
as a puppet of the Occupying Power, and as a tool for vengeance by Saddam Hussein's enemies, rather
than as the cornerstone of a new judicial system committed to the rule of law"), with Michael Scharf &
Ahran Kang, Errors and Missteps: Key Lessons the Iraqi Special Tribunal Can Learn from the ICTY,
ICTR, and SCSL, 38 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 911, 912-14 (2005) (adopting a more sanguine view of the
IHT).
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for the "crimes and atrocities committed by the previous Iraqi regime" identified in
the Resolution's preamble. 323 The Council was not willing, however, to create an
international tribunal, notwithstanding the scale of the abuses in and around Iraq,
in part because many members considered the war in Iraq to have been illegal.324
For its part, the United States wanted an "Iraqi-led" process and resisted efforts to
bring the process under a United Nations banner. 325 In any case, many Iraqis were
reticent to allow the United Nations a role in the process in light of the Oil for
Food debacle and the long history of U.N. sanctions in Iraq.326
On December 10, 2003, the CPA, led by Administrator Paul Bremer,
promulgated Order No. 48 and established what was then called the Iraqi Special
Tribunal ("IST").327  After the interim government began exercising Iraq's
sovereignty following the passage of UNSCR 1546 (2004), the newly elected
Transitional National Assembly annulled the IST Statute and replaced it with the
Statute of the IHT in 2005.328
The IHT was by all measures a domestic court-staffed by Iraqi personnel
applying Iraqi law-that was internationalized by the presence of international
advisors selected by the International Bar Association and others and by the
training and administrative support provided by the U.S. Department of Justice's
Regime Crimes Liaison Office ("RCLO"). 329 Although CPA Order Number 48
and the original statute envisioned the appointment of non-Iraqi judges, this did not
come to pass. Instead, foreign lawyers (mostly from the United States) were
323. S.C. Res. 1483 (May 22, 2003). The CPA announced that it was vested with "all executive,
legislative, and judicial authority necessary to achieve its objectives" by virtue of two sources of law:
the relevant UNSCRs (which authorized measures under Articles 41 and 48 of the U.N. Charter) and
the international law of armed conflict. Coalition Provisional Authority, Regulation Number 1, § 1 2
(2003) (Iraq).
324. Michael P. Scharf, The Iraqi High Tribunal: A Viable Experiment in International Justice?, 5
J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 258, 261 (2007) [hereinafter Scharf, Experiment].
325. Eric Stover et al., Bremer's Gordian Knot: Transitional Justice and the US Occupation of
Iraq, 27 HUM. RTs. Q. 830, 838-9 (2005); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUDGING DUJAIL: THE FIRST TRIAL
BEFORE THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL (2006).
326. Tom Parker, Prosecuting Saddam: The Coalition Provisional Authority and the Evolution of
the Iraqi Special Tribunal, 38 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 899, 900 (2005).
327. See generally Coalition Provisional Authority, Order No. 48: Delegation of Authority
Regarding an Iraqi Special Tribunal (2003) (Iraq),
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/hussein/docs/20031210 CPAORD 48 IST and AppendixA.pdf. The
order delegated to the Interim Governing Council, which had been appointed by the CPA, authorization
to establish the tribunal; a draft statute purporting to be the result of extensive consultations between the
CPA and the Governing Council appeared as an appendix to this order.
328. See Law of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, no. 4006 of 2005 (Iraq), http://gjpi.org/wp-
content/uploads/2009/02/iraqstatuteengtrans.pdf [hereinafter IHT Statute]; Gudnael Mettraux, The 2005
Revision of the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 287, 288 (2007) (noting the
"Iraqization" of the new Statute, which diminished the role of international personnel and weakened
certain procedural guarantees).
329. Scharf, Experiment, supra note 324, at 259 ("[the] (IHT) merits the characterization
internationalized domestic tribunal.... [It] is not fully international or even international enough to be
dubbed a hybrid court"). On the RCLO, see Stover, supra note 325, at 841.
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relegated to an advisory role. 330  The pool of qualified advisors was limited,
however, by the fact that the U.N. Secretary-General prohibited senior personnel
from the ad hoc tribunals to participate in any training programs. 33' As an exercise
of lustration, Article 33 of the IHT Statute prohibited the appointment of anyone
who had been a member of the Ba'ath party, which may have "dilute[d] the pool of
qualified jurists significantly." 332 The IHT was plagued by allegations of political
interference (on the part of the new Iraqi authorities and the United States) as well
as threats to judges and defense counsel.33 3 In part due to its controversial origins
and in part due to perceived procedural flaws, the IHT never earned the support, or
respect, of the international community, perhaps unfairly.334
H. Specialized Chambers With International Involvement
On their own initiatives, or with prompting from the international community,
states emerging from periods of mass violence have created national institutions
dedicated to prosecuting international crimes and invited the involvement of
international experts in various capacities. Included within this community of
courts are entities that are deeply ensconced within the relevant domestic system
but that benefit from international support and expertise through seconded
personnel and the provision of technical assistance.
Several examples are found in the former Yugoslavia. Once it became clear
that the ICTY would not be able to manage all, or even a solid percentage, of war
crimes cases generated by the dissolution of Yugoslavia, policymakers in the
newly independent states with encouragement from the international community
began to consider local options. Eventually, special war crimes chambers were
established in Bosnia-Herzegovina ("BiH"), Serbia and Montenegro, and
Croatia. 335 The most successful-in terms of international legitimacy, perceived
fealty to due process protections, and the number of verdicts-is the hybrid system
in BiH.336  Following an October 2003 donors' conference, the War Crimes
330. Iraqi High Tribunal, Revised Version Iraqi Special Tribunal Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, [hereinafter IHT RPE].
331. Stover, supra note 325, at 843.
332. Newton, supra note 322, at 406.
333. Chatham House, The Iraqi Tribunal: The Post-Saddam Cases, at 6 (Dec. 4, 2008)
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field-document/Discussion%2Group%20
Summary/o20The%20Iraqi%2OTribunal.pdf.
334. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal of the Iraq
Special Tribunal, 38 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 327 (2005).
335. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUSTICE AT RISK: WAR CRIMES TRIALS IN CROATIA, BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA, AND SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO (2004),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2004/10/13/j ustice-risk/war-crimes-trials-croatia-bosnia-and-herzegovina-
and-serbia-and; MLADEN OSTOJIt(, BETWEEN JUSTICE & STABILITY: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIME
PROSECUTIONS IN POST-MILO EVIt SERBIA 165-215 (2014) (discussing domestic fully domestic War
Crimes Chamber in Serbia).
336. See generally Law on Court of Bosnia And Herzegovina 49/09 (Bosn. & Herz.)
http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/docs/zakoni/en/Law on Court BiH- Consolidated text_- 49 09.pdf
[hereinafter WCC Law]. Under Article 14, Section II is devoted to Organized Crime, Economic
Crimes, and Corruption and Section III exists for general crimes. Id.
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Chamber ("WCC") and the Special Department for War Crimes in the Prosecutor's
Office began operating in 2005 within the newly created federal State Court.337
The system is based upon a proposal developed by the ICTY and the United
Nation's High Representative (appointed to implement aspects of the 1995 Dayton
Peace Agreement and to represent the multilateral Peace Implementation
Council), 338 and blessed by the Security Council in UNSCR 1503 as part of the
ICTY completion process. The WCC were originally intended to receive cases
from the ICTY pursuant to Rule 1 Ibis (subject to OSCE oversight), but they could
also hear cases resulting from the prosecutors' own investigations. 339 Prior to the
establishment of the WCC, war crimes cases had been subject to the Rules of the
Road program, an international oversight system aimed at preventing
unsubstantiated pre-trial detentions. 340 The Rules of the Road required Bosnian
authorities to submit proposed war crimes cases to the ICTY Office of the
Prosecutor to determine if there was sufficient evidence by international standards
to justify either the arrest or indictment of a suspect or the continued detention of
an individual.34 1 The Rules of Road program folded in October 2004, and its
functions were transferred to the BiH Prosecutor's office.
342
337. See generally David Schwendiman, Prosecuting Atrocity Crimes in National Courts: Looking
Back on 2009 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 8 NORTHWESTERN J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 269 (2010).
338. See generally Agreement between the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Establishment of the Registry for Section 1 for War Crimes and Section
!1 for Organized Crime, Economic Crime and Corruption of the Criminal and Appellate Divisions of the
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Special Department for War Crimes and the Special
Department for Organized Crime, Economic Crime and Corruption of the Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (Dec. 1, 2004),
http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/docs/zakoni/en/RegistryAgreement Englishversion.pdf. The High
Representative promulgated the State Court Act of 2000, which the Parliamentary Assembly
subsequently endorsed. Technically, jurisdiction over international crimes was concurrent between the
national State Court and cantonal and district courts, although the lack of a comprehensive national war
crimes strategy has hindered coordination.
339. Schwendiman, supra note 337, at 276; see supra note 77.
340. Working with the Region, U.N. INT'L CRIM. TRIB'L FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/sid/96#rules (last visited Nov. 7, 2015); see generally Org. For Security and Co-
operation in Europe Mission to Bosnia & Herzegovina, War Crimes Trials Before the Domestic Courts
of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Progress and Obstacles (March 2005),
http://www.oscebih.org/documents/osce-bih doc_2010122311024992eng.pdf.
341. See generally 18 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOOKING FOR JUSTICE: THE WAR CRIMES
CHAMBER IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (2006) [hereinafter LOOKING FOR JUSTICE]. The Rules of the
Road program was the product of the Rome Agreement, signed by the same signatories as the Dayton
Peace Accords. The Rome Agreement stated:
Persons, other than those already indicted by the International Tribunal, may be arrested and
detained for serious violations of international humanitarian law only pursuant to a
previously issued order, warrant, or indictment that has been reviewed and deemed
consistent with international legal standards by the International Tribunal.
Rome Agreement, Bosn. & Herz.-Croat.-Serb., art. 5, Feb. 18, 1996. See also General Framework
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosn. & Herz.--Croat.-Serb., Dec. 14, 1995,
http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-frm.htm [hereinafter Dayton Peace Accords].
342. See Louise Mallinder, Retribution, Restitution and Reconciliation: Limited Amnesty in
Bosnia-Herzegovina 93-97 (Belfast: Institute of Criminology and Crim. Justice, Queens University
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The WCC legislation allowed for the injection of international staff-
administrators (including the Registrar), judges at the trial and appellate levels, and
prosecutors working alongside national staff-who were gradually phased out over
the years. 343  The President and Chief Prosecutor, however, were Bosnian
nationals, who worked under considerable domestic pressure at times.
Controversially, there were no prospects for the provision of international defense
counsel. 344  The ICTY, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Human
Rights Violators Unit, and other outside organizations provided professional
advice and technical assistance to various elements of the WCC, particularly when
it came to the reform of national legislation, scanning documents and forensics,
and the training of staff, defense counsel, and judges. 345 The ICTY also shared its
electronic databases as well as evidentiary materials procured from U.N. member
states; the latter may have been less likely to share information with an entirely
local judicial process.346 Information sharing went both ways with respect to
certain cases, including the case against Karali. The WCC, which have become
a permanent addition to the court system, continue to receive international support
but are largely self-sufficient.
347
As an alternative to the creation of a stand-alone tribunal, specialized courts,
or mixed judicial chambers, the United Nations and donor countries have also
sought to strengthen domestic investigative and prosecutorial authorities through a
range of rule-of-law initiatives that include the secondment of international experts
to dedicated war crimes prosecutorial units. The Commission Against Impunity in
Guatemala ("CICIG"),34 8 for example, embeds international experts in the
Guatemalan Attorney General's office and the National Police to help investigate
and disband criminal organizations with ties to the security forces-known as
Cuerpos Ilegales y Aparatos Clandestinos de Seguridad ("CIACS")-and other
corrupt state structures that are threatening the enjoyment of human rights in
2009), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmn?abstract-id=1531762; Schwendiman, supra note 337, at
275-76 (noting that although the Rules of the Road program provided important guidance for national
proceedings, it "throttled", rather than enabled, national prosecutions).
343. WCC Law, supra note 336, at art. 24.
344. David Tolbert & Aleksandar Kontid, Final Report of the International Criminal Law Services
(ICLS) Experts on the Sustainable Transition of the Registry and International Donor Support to the
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2009, 23-
24 (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.iclsfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/20l2/02/icls-bih-
finalreportwebsitecorrected.pdf (raising equality of arms concerns).
345. Bogdan lvanigevi6, THE WAR CRIMES CHAMBER IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: FROM
HYBRID TO DOMESTIC COURT 40-41 (2008), https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-
FormerYugoslavia-Domestic-Court-2008-English.pdf; Lilian A. Barria & Steven D. Roper, Judicial
Capacity Building in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Understanding Legal Reform Beyond the Completion
Strategy of the ICTY, 9 HUM. RTS. REV. 317 (2008); Completion Strategy, U.N. INT'L CRIM. TRIB'L
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/sid/10016 (last visited Nov. 7, 2015).
346. LOOKING FOR JUSTICE, supra note 341.
347. See COURT OF BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA, http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/?jezik=e (last visited
Nov. 8, 2015).
348. See generally U.N. Dep't of Political Affairs, CICIG (International Commission Against
Impunity in Guatemala), U.N., http://www.un.org/undpa/americas/cicig (last visited Feb. 1, 2016).
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Guatemala.349 CICIG does not investigate international crimes stemming from the
thirty-six year armed conflict, such as the genocide case against Efrain Rios Montt,
but rather focuses on corruption and organized crime syndicates that arose during
and after the armed conflict.35 0  For example, it is investigating allegations of
corruption that have implicated the former president, Otto Pdrez Molina.3"' Some
CICIG cases, however, involve the commission of what could be deemed
international crimes, such as a social cleansing operation that resulted in the
execution of a number of prisoners. Nonetheless, CICIG offers a model that could
be applied to atrocity crimes elsewhere and is widely deemed a success.352
CICIG has its origins in civil society demands and a 2002 request from the
Government of Guatemala to the United Nations for assistance in dealing with the
high levels of postwar violence and entrenched impunity. 353 The U.N. Department
of Political Affairs originally proposed a hybrid commission that would enjoy both
investigative and prosecutorial powers-to be called the Commission for the
Investigation of Illegal Groups and Clandestine Security Organizations
("CICIACS").3 54 The Guatemalan Constitutional Court in a consultative opinion
raised concerns that such a delegation of prosecutorial authority might be
unconstitutional, attesting to the importance of sorting such legal issues out in
advance. 355 Accordingly, the final bilateral agreement between Guatemala and the
United Nations established special investigative cells of embedded international
experts who provide technical assistance to local actors and undertake direct
investigations. 356 Although dependent on Guatemalan officials to pursue charges,
349. See generally Open Society Justice Initiative, Unfinished Business: Guatemala's
International Commission Against Impunity (CISIG) (March 2015); see generally Andrew Hudson &
Alexander Taylor, The International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala: A New Model for
International Criminal Justice Mechanisms, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 53 (2010) (noting that even
minimally international efforts like CICIG are not immune from criticism of international meddling).
350. U.N. Dep't of Political Affairs, supra note 348.
351. Arturo Matute, Ending Corruption in Guatemala, IN PURSUIT OF PEACE (April 30, 2015),
http://blog.crisisgroup.org/latin-america/2015/04/30/ending-corruption-in-guatemala/.
352. See WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION AGAINST
IMPUNITY IN GUATEMALA: A WOLA REPORT ON THE CICIG EXPERIENCE 27 (June 2015) [hereinafter
WOLA] (describing CICIG's "transcendental results" and advocating its adoption elsewhere in the
region and beyond to deal with high rates of violence and the shortfalls of the formal justice sector).
353. U.N. Secretary-General, Activities of the International Commission Against Impunity in
Guatemala 2, U.N. Doc. A/64/370 (Sept. 23, 2009),
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view doc.asp?symbol=A/64/370 [hereinafter CICIG Report].
354. A Brief Background on the UN Commission Against Impunity In Guatemala, WOLA (Apr.
26, 2007), http://www.wola.org/es/node/337.
355. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Constitutional Court], Opini6n Consultiva [advisory opinion],
Expediente No. 1250-2004 (Aug. 5, 2004) (Guat.).
356. See Agreement Related to the Creation of an International Commission Against Impunity in
Guatemala, Guat.-U.N., Dec. 12, 2006, art. 6, 2, 2472 U.N.T.S. 47,
http://www.wola.org/publications/cicigtext of theagreementbetween the united nations and the
state-of guatemala on th [hereinafter CICIG Agreement]. The agreement was ratified by the
Guatemalan legislature on Aug. 1, 2007. Hudson & Taylor, supra note 349, at 55 n.16. Beyond this
agreement, the U.N. General Assembly also endorsed CICIG in Resolution 63/19 (Dec. 16, 2008) and
called upon states to support CICIG through voluntary contributions, financial and in kind. Id. at 72
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CICIG is entitled to present potential criminal charges to the Public Prosecutor
(Minist&io Piibico) and join proceedings as a private prosecutor (querellante
adhesivo).357 It can also seek sanctions against Guatemalan officials who hinder
ongoing investigations or prosecutions. 358 On a structural level, CICIG has been
instrumental in proposing legal reforms (including the establishment of a witness
protection program), capacitating domestic actors, and establishing a merit-based
judicial appointment system. Some CICIG investigations and prosecutions have
contributed to related proceedings in foreign courts, 359 including in the United
States.36 In this way, CICIG's achievements go beyond the provision of technical
assistance.36' In 2015, and just prior to the emergence of the corruption
allegations, President Otto Perez Molina asked the United Nations to extend
CICIG's mandate another two years.
362
This model of external support for investigations and prosecutions is also seen
in the DRC, this time via a U.N. peacekeeping mission. The mandate of the U.N.
Stabilization Mission ("MONUSCO")-which since March 2013 has included an
unprecedented Intervention Brigade capable of undertaking offensive operations
against armed groups-is the most far-reaching to date when it comes to providing
support for justice processes.363  MONUSCO's Joint Human Rights Office
("UNJHRO")" has staffed Joint Investigations and Verification Teams and
Prosecution Support Cells ("PSCs"), 365 which are meant to bolster the investigation
n. 108.
357. CICIG Agreement, supra note 356, at art. 3; see generally Tove Nyberg, Smoking the Rats
Out: CICIG "s Effort to Strengthen the Justice System in Guatemala, http://www.diva-
portal.org/smash/get/diva2:730171/FULLTEXT0 .pdf.
358. Id.; Hudson & Taylor, supra note 349, at 61; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2014:
GUATEMALA, http://www.hrw.org/world-reportl/2014/country-chapters/guatemala?page-1.
359. For example, former Chief of the National Civil Policy of Guatemala, Erwin Sperisen, was
convicted in Switzerland and sentenced to life in prison for the extrajudicial killing of seven inmates.
See Sperisen Case, TRIAL, http://www.trial-ch.org/guatemala-en/sperisen.html (last visited Nov. 8,
2015); Guatemala Ex-Police Chief Jailed for Life by Swiss Court, BBC NEWS (June 6, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27740109.
360. Randal C. Archibold, Ex-Guatemalan President Extradited to U.S. in Corruption Case, N.Y.
TIMES (May 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/25/world/americas/ex-president-portillo-of-
guatemala-is-extradited-to-us.html?_r-0.
361. Hudson & Taylor, supra note 349, at 6.
362. Guatemala Requests Extension of UN Anti-Impunity Commission, PANAM POST (Apr. 24,
2015), http://panampost.com/panam-staffJ2015/04/24/guatemala-requests-extension-of-un-anti-
impunity-commission/.
363. See S.C. Res. 2098, pmbl. (Mar. 28, 2013); Bruce Oswald, The Security Council and the
Intervention Brigade: Some Legal Issues, 13 ASIL INSIGHTS (June 6, 2013),
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/ 7/issue/l 5/security-council-and-intervention-brigade-some-legal-
issues.
364. See generally What is UNJHRO's Mandate?, MONUSCO,
http://monusco.unmissions.orgiDefault.aspx?tabid=10766& (last visited Nov. 8, 2015); see generally
Liam Mahony & Tessa Mackenzie, Protecting Human Rights in the DRC." Reflections on the Work of
the Joint Human Rights Office and MONUSCO (Fieldview Solutions, eds., Sept. 2010). The UNJHRO
involves representatives from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the DPKO, and
MONUSCO. Id.
365. The Security Council mandated the formation of PSCs in UNSCR 1925 (2010), issued under
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and prosecution of international crimes by national authorities (particularly in the
armed forces military justice system) through the provision of substantive
expertise, training, technical support, and local capacity building 366 (although most
of the experts involved come from national systems and lack experience with
international crimes). 367 These entities operate by virtue of a 2011 Memorandum
of Understanding between MONUSCO and the Government of the DRC and
function with a high degree of coordination among NGOs, donors, and other
stakeholders.365 Although somewhat counter to the classical conception of
peacekeeping, these elements of the MONUSCO mandate indicate that the
Security Council has been increasingly willing to vest modem peacekeeping
missions with an accountability mandate.3 69 These efforts are also part of a much
larger multi-year strategy for civilian protection and justice sector reform in the
country.
A similar model of international capacity building within otherwise domestic
institutions has been employed in Kenya, Mauritius, Somalia, Tanzania, and the
Seychelles to address the resurgence of transnational piracy on the international
scene.370  The focus on prosecutions has accompanied-and in part been
necessitated by--other more operational responses to piracy, including the
deployment of multinational naval forces in the region (e.g., Combined Task Force
("CTF") 150 and the EU's Operation Atalanta), the creation of patrol corridors, the
enhancement of self-protection measures, and the convening of a piracy Contact
Group to coordinate joint action.371 As naval forces began to capture presumed
pirates, it became necessary to devise a plan for their detention, repatriation, and/or
prosecution to avoid the prospect of an endless game of catch-and-release. The
most obvious states, however, were not always in a position to take the lead on
prosecutions for a range of articulated and tacit reasons: the legal complexities of
such cases, a lack of domestic judicial capacity or transfer authority, the cost, an
inadequate legal framework, the lack of political will, and evidentiary
Chapter VII. Specifically, MONUSCO is required to "[s]upport national and international efforts to
bring perpetrators to justice, including by establishing Prosecution Support Cells to assist the [DRC
Armed Forces ("FARDC")] military justice authorities in prosecuting persons arrested by the FARDC."
See S.C. Res. 1925, 12(d) 1925 (May 28, 2010),
http://monusco.unmissions.orgfDefault.aspx?tabid=10806&language=en-US. Upon its renewal,
MONUSCO was further mandated to support the Congolese authorities in holding perpetrators of war
crimes and crimes against humanity accountable. See S.C. Res. 2053 (June 27, 2012),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/505084b42.html.
366. S.C. Res. 1925, supra note 365, at pmbl.
367. SOFIA CANDEIAS ET. AL., THE ACCOUNTABILITY LANDSCAPE IN EASTERN DRC: ANALYSIS
OF THE NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMES (2009-2014) 27
(International Center for Transnational Justice ed., 2015), https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-
Report-DRC-Accountability-Landscape-2015.pdf.
368. ld. at 26.
369. See ALEX J. BELLAMY & PAUL D. WILLIAMS, UNDERSTANDING PEACEKEEPING 173 (2012)
(noting the "holy trinity" of peacekeeping: consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force).
370. See generally Current Projects, UNODC, https://www.unodc.org/easternafrica/en/ongoing-
projects/maritime-crime-programme.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2015).
371. See generally S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 107.
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challenges. 372 As it turned out, many states did not have modem piracy provisions
in their penal codes; for example, Denmark released some pirates on a Somali
beach because it lacked the legal framework to prosecute them and did not want to
convey them to Somali authorities for fear that they would be mistreated.373 Other
states have been reluctant to allow potential pirates on their territories out of
concern that detainees will either make claims for asylum or invoke the principle
of non-refoulement to prevent their repatriation post-trial given the continued
unrest in Somalia.
374
The international community, after considering a number of options, finally
charged the Vienna-based U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime ("UNODC") with
taking the lead on facilitating international coordination around domestic
prosecutions in the courts of implicated states based on an ethos of shared
responsibility and various principles of jurisdiction, including universal
jurisdiction. Somalia has consented to these prosecutions.375 In the piracy context,
UNODC's role is primarily a capacity-building one, aimed at enhancing the
domestic legal systems of countries most proximate to the affected region. 376 It
has worked with Somalia to build its prison system and assisted with
administrative tasks, forensics, and prison transfers.377 Similarly, the UNDP
provides training, legal reform advice, and new equipment and physical
infrastructure to prosecuting states. 37 In 2009, states of the region adopted a non-
binding Djibouti Code of Conduct under the auspices of the IMO concerning the
Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in the Western Indian
Ocean and the Gulf of Aden to facilitate cooperation and information sharing
aimed at combatting and prosecuting acts of piracy. 379  In addition, with
international support, the Seychelles opened a Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecution
and Intelligence Coordination Centre ("RAPPICC"), under the auspices of the
Indian Ocean Commission, to track piracy financing and develop prosecutable
cases. 3 80 The Security Council, which explored but ultimately rejected the idea of
372. See generally Tullio Treves, Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the
Coast of Somalia, 20 EUROP. J. INT'L L. 399 (2009).
373. Pirates Released on Beach, POLITIKEN (Sept. 24, 2008).
374. Treves, supra note 372, at 408-09.
375. See S.C. Res. 2184, at art. 14 (Nov. 12, 2014) (noting Somalian consent).
376. UNODC Maritime Piracy Programme, U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS AND CRIME,
https://www.unodc.org/eastemafrica/en/piracy/index.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2015).
377. See generally U.N. Off. on Drugs and Crime, In Depth Evaluation of the Counter Piracy
Programme (June 2013), https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/indepth-
evaluations/2013/CPPEvaluationReport -_Final incl Management Response_27NOV2013.pdf.
378. United Nations Development Program (UNDP), OCEANS BEYOND PIRACY,
http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/matrix/united-nations-development-programme-undp (last visited Nov.
8,2015).
379. S.C. Res. 1897, at pmbl. (Nov. 30, 2009); S.C. Res. 1950, at pmbl. (Nov. 23, 2010); see
generally International Maritime Organization, Djibouti Code of Conduct,
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PIU/Documents/PUBrochure Ist-edition.pdf.
380. RAPPICC Open for Business, REGIONAL FUSION & LAW ENFORCEMENT CENTER FOR
SAFETY & SECURITY AT SEA, http://www.rappicc.sc/page13.html (last visited Nov. 8,2015).
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an international piracy court, endorsed UNODC's and related efforts.3 8 1
To facilitate prosecutions, the European Union has been empowered to
conduct military operations in support of Security Council resolutions and
consistent with UNCLOS's terms. 382  This includes the power to transfer of
suspects to places where they can be prosecuted per Article 12,383 subject to the
ability of the destination court to ensure the suspects' human rights. 3 4 Forum
states have been encouraged to amend their laws to harmonize their penal codes
with the relevant provisions of UNCLOS and to allow for the exercise of universal
jurisdiction over the crime of piracy.385  Although the exercise of universal
jurisdiction over piracy is optional under UNCLOS, the SUA Convention contains
an aut dedere aut judicare provision that mandates either the prosecution or
extradition of captured suspects. 3 86  That said, some states have restrained their
381. S.C. Res. 2184,supra note 375, at arts. 18-19. See supra text accompanying notes 110-116.
382. Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 Nov. 2008 on a European Union Military
Operation to Contribute to the Deterrence, Prevention and Repression of Acts of Piracy and Armed
Robbery off the Somali Coast, 2008 O.J (1 301/33).
383. Article 12 "Transfer of Persons Arrested and Detained with a View to their Prosecution"
reads:
On the basis of Somalia's acceptance of the exercise of jurisdiction by Member States or by
third States, on the one hand, and Article 105 of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, on the other hand, persons having committed, or suspected of having commied,
acts of piracy or armed robbery in Somali territorial waters or on the high seas, who are
arrested and detained, with a view to their prosecution, and property used to carry out such
acts, shall be transferred: to the competent authorities of the flag Member State or of the third
State participating in the operation, of the vessel which took them captive, or if this State
cannot, or does not wish to, exercise its jurisdiction, to a Member State or any third State
which wishes to exercise its jurisdiction over the aforementioned persons and property.
ld. at art. 12(1).
384. The EU Joint Action stresses the human rights implications of such transfers:
no person ... may be transferred to a third State unless the conditions for the transfer have
been agreed with that third State in a manner consistent with relevant international law,
notably international law of human rights, in order to guarantee in particular that no one shall
be subjected to the death penalty, to torture or to any cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
ld. at art. 12(2).
385. UNODC Maritime Crime Program, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/piracy/indian-ocean-
division.html; Lang Report, supra note 304, at 21-22; S.C. Res. 1918 (Apr. 27, 2010) (calling on all
states to criminalize piracy).
386. Compare UNCLOS, supra note 114, at art. 105 ("On the high seas, or in any other place
outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft
taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board.
The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and
may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the
rights of third parties acting in good faith") with Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Activities (SUA) art. 6(4), Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 222, 227
("Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the
offences... where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him to any of
the States Parties which have established their jurisdiction in accordance with" the territorial or
nationality principles of jurisdiction). But see Tamsin Page, Piracy and Universal Jurisdiction, 12
MACQUARIE L. J. 131, 148 (2013) (arguing that piracy is not subject to universal jurisdiction but rather
of concurrent municipal jurisdiction).
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jurisdictional reach in order to avoid becoming a "dumping ground" for captured
pirates.387 Domestic prosecutions have been hampered by the lack of extradition
agreements between the nationality, littoral, and apprehending states; accordingly,
the United States, the European Union, and others have promulgated a web of
transfer agreements with Kenya and other regional states to facilitate the transfer of
piracy suspects for trial.388 This set of initiatives has proven to be quite successful
in terms of the number of prosecutions underway. By the end of 2014, more than
300 individuals had been prosecuted, with the vast majority of trials ending in
conviction. 389 The preponderance of these defendants are rank-and-file pirates,
who are drawn from impoverished communities offering little in way of equally
lucrative vocational alternatives. 390  These prosecutions are thus not necessarily
reaching the individuals "most responsible" for acts of piracy, given that the
financiers and piracy king-pins likely enjoy sanctuary on Somali territory. 391
Enabling the successful prosecution of these more senior figures is important on
fairness grounds and will also make real the possibility of restitution, given the
staggering economic cost of acts of piracy.
UNODC also serves as the guardian of the U.N. Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime, 3 9 2 which contains provisions on international
387. For example, Section 66(3) of the Tanzanian Penal Code provides that unless a pirate ship is
registered in Tanzania, "no prosecution shall be commenced unless there is a special arrangement
between the arresting state or agency and Tanzania." Likewise, pursuant to Section 66(4), the Director
of Public Prosecutions must consent to any piracy prosecution. See Roger L. Phillips, Tanzania, A Case
Study, COMMUNIS HOSTiS OMNIUM (Mar. 3, 2011), http://piracy-law.com/2011/03/03/tanzania-
%E2%80%93 -a-case-study/.
388. See Possible Options to Further the Aim of Prosecuting Persons Responsible for Acts of
Piracy, supra note 110, 1 23. See Council Decision 2011/640/CFSP of 12 July 2011 on the signing and
conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Mauritius on the
Conditions of Transfer of Suspected Pirates and Associated Seized Property from the European Union-
led Naval Force to the Republic of Mauritius and on the Conditions of Suspected Pirates after Transfer,
2011 O.J. (I. 254). Kenya originally signed agreements with the EU, the United States, and other states
to accept suspected pirates for prosecution. See Council Decision 2009/293/CFSP of 26 February 2009
concerning the Exchange of letters between the European Union and the government of Kenya on the
conditions and modalities for the transfer of persons suspected of having committed acts of piracy and
detained by the European Union-led naval force (EUNAVFOR), and seized property in the possession
of EUNAVFOR, from EUNAVFOR to Kenya and for their treatment after such transfer, 2009 O.J. (.
79). Kenya suspended these agreements in 2010--citing security concerns, insufficient international
support, repatriation issues, and the imperative of greater burden-sharing-but reinstated them after
receiving additional funding from the UNODC. Beck Pemberton, THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR
THE LAW OF THE SEA AS A HIGH COURT OF PIRACY 9, ONE EARTH FUTURE FOUNDATION WORKING
PAPER (2010) at 18-19 (suggesting advisory role for ITLOS in domestic prosecutions).
389. UNODC Maritime Crime Program, Annual Report 2014 (2014),
http://www.unodc.org/documents/eastemafica//MCPBrochureDecember_2014 wv 6 1.pdf.
390. Paul R. Williams & Lowry Pressly, Maritime Piracy: A Sustainable Global Solution, 46
CASE W. RESERVE J. INT'L L. 177, 196, 197 (2013).
391. Possible Options to Further the Aim of Prosecuting Persons Responsible for Acts of Piracy,
supra note 110, at Annex I1, 8.
392. U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209 (2000),
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC /20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf
[hereinafter UNTOC]. The treaty also notes the linkages between organized crime and terrorism. The
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cooperation around transnational crimes 393 (including articles effectuating
extraditions, prisoner transfers, and other forms of mutual legal assistance). The
concept of transnational crime is historically (and narrowly) construed to cover
crimes of trafficking (in illicit goods, weapons, drugs, and people), organized
crime, money laundering, corruption, and terrorism, but not necessarily the atrocity
crimes that are normally subject to prosecution before international and hybrid
tribunals. Indeed, a 2012-13 initiative by the Netherlands to draft a multilateral
mutual legal assistance protocol to UNTOC dedicated to atrocity crimes under
UNODC auspices generated resistance amongst delegates on the grounds that it
was outside the organization's core historical mandate. 394 There is nothing in
UNTOC, however, that would limit its utility in the international criminal law
context.395 The international community is continuing to explore the degree to
which the UNTOC framework could be deployed to facilitate the provision of
mutual legal assistance around atrocity crimes prosecutions.
L Domestic Special Chambers
A number of states have established (or contemplated establishing) special
courts or specialized chambers to prosecute international crimes, often with
minimal or no direct involvement by the international community except, in many
cases, as a critic of the process. Examples include Indonesia, Bangladesh,
39639Kenya, Uganda,3 97 and Darfur.39 8  For example, as part of the process
Convention's Protocols address trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants, and the illicit
manufacturing and trafficking in firearms.
393. Transnational crimes are generally defined as those criminal actions that transcend
international borders and breach the laws of several states. See id at art. 3; Neil Boister, Transnational
Criminal Law?, 14 EUROP. J. INT'L L. 953 (2003). Multiple "suppression conventions" are dedicated to
facilitating the prosecution of various transnational crimes within the domestic courts of treaty parties.
394. See Ward Ferdinandusse, Improving Inter-State Cooperation for the National Prosecution of
International Crimes: Towards a New Treaty?, 18 ASIL INSIGHT (2014). The proposal sought to
operationalize the imperative within General Assembly Resolution 3074 calling for international
cooperation in the detection, arrest, extradition, and punishment of persons accused of war crimes and
crimes against humanity. See Principles of Int'l Co-Operation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition &
Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes & Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII),
28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (30A) at 78, U.N. Doc. A/9030/Add. 1 (1973).
395. The treaty applies to transnational "serious crime[s]" (defined in terms of the length of the
associated penalty) involving "organized criminal group[s]." UNTOC, supra note 392, at arts. 1-2.
396. Kenyans for Peace with Truth & Justice, A Real Option for Justice? The Int'l Crimes Div. of
the High Court of Kenya (July 2014),
http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/34936/1 /a-real_option-forjustice the intema
tional crimes division.pdf. Proposals to establish an International Crimes Division ("ICD") emerged
following the post-election violence in 2007-8, but they have yet to come to fruition.
397. The Ugandan ICD is a product of the Juba peace talks aimed at ending hostilities between
Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army and the 2007 Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation
that was executed following the negotiations. So far, the ICD has pursued a handful of LRA eases,
which have been complicated by the existence of an amnesty law. See Kasande Sarah Kihika &
Meritxell Regud, Pursuing Accountability for Serious Crimes in Uganda's Courts (Jan. 2015),
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Briefing-Uganda-Kwoyelo-2015.pdf.
398. PanPress, Sudan Backs AU Draft Resolution on Darfur War Crime Trials (Feb 1, 2009, 4:38
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establishing the Special Panels in Timor-Leste, Indonesia adamantly rejected
proposals for an international tribunal, arguing that any crimes committed by
Indonesian citizens within Timor-Leste were within the exclusive jurisdiction of
Indonesian courts. 399 In an effort to stave off international efforts in this regard,4 °0
Indonesia created an Ad Hoc Human Rights Court on Timor-Leste in Jakarta,
ostensibly to prosecute Indonesian citizens responsible for violence in newly-
independent Timor-Leste.4 ° 1  International observers, including the High
Commissioner for Human Rights and a U.N. Commission of Experts, were highly
critical of the process, 40 2 which generated little in the way of genuine
accountability (only a handful of individuals were prosecuted and most defendants
were acquitted at trial or on appeal except those of Timorese nationality). 40 3 By
virtue of statutory limitations, the jurisdiction of the Ad Hoc Courts extended only
to individuals who committed crimes outside of Indonesia and in designated
Timorese districts during the months of April and September 1999; these
limitations helped to mask patterns of violence. 40 4 The acquittals ran counter to the
observations contained in a comprehensive report generated by the Indonesian
Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights Violations in East Timor ("KPP
HAM"), which concluded that the violence in Timor-Leste was systematic and
orchestrated by the Indonesian military working through locally-recruited militia to
give the impression that the violence was purely internal.40 5 Although the
Commission of Experts called for Indonesia to retain a team of international legal
PM), http://www.panapress.com/Sudan-backs-AU-draft-resolution-on-Darfur-war-crime-trials- 12-
522244-20-lang2-index.html.
399. See generally Mark Cammack, The Indonesian Human Rights Court, in NEW COURTS IN
ASIA 178 (Andrew Harding & Penelope Nicholson, eds. 2010); see text accompanying note 145.
400. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUSTICE DENIED FOR EAST TIMOR: INDONESIA'S SHAM
PROSECUTIONS, THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE TRIAL PROCESS IN EAST TIMOR, AND THE IMPERATIVE
OF U.N. ACTION (Dec. 20, 2002), https://www.hrw.org/report/2002/12/20/Justice-denied-east-
timor/indonesias-sham-prosecutions-need-strengthen-tria [hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED].
401. See PENGADILAN HAK ASASI MANUSIA [Court of Human Rights], Law No. 26 of 2000
(Indon.),
http://www.setneg.go.id/components/comperundangan/docviewer.php?id=235&filename-UU-no 26
th 2000.pdf.; Amnesty Int'l, Commentary, Amnesty International's Comments on the Law on Human
Rights Courts (Law No. 26/2000), (Feb. 9, 2001), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3c29defl a.htmI.
402. Comm'n on Human Rights, Report of the United Nations High Comm 'rfor Human Rights on
the situation of human rights in Timor-Leste, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/107, at 14-15 (Jan. 19, 2004);
Timor-Leste COE Report, supra note 147, at 6 (describing the process as "manifestly inadequate"); see
also Fergus Kerrigan & Paul Dalton, Human Rights Courts & Other Mechanisms to Combat Impunity
in Indonesia, in 5(2) ARTICLE 2 OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
13 (Asian Legal Resource Centre ed., 2006), http://www.article2.org/mainfile.php/0502/225/.
403. See DAVID COHEN, INTENDED TO FAIL: THE TRIALS BEFORE THE AD HOC HUMAN RIGHTS
COURT IN JAKARTA (Int'l Center for Transitional Justice ed., 2003); Institute For Policy Research and
Advocacy (ELSAM), Final Report: The Failure of Leipzig Repeated in Jakarta,
http://wcsc.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/ET-ELSAM-Reports/ELSAM-Final-Report.pdf.
404. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 400.
405. See Komnas HAM, Report of the Indonesian Comm 'n for Human Rights Violations in East
Timor (KPP-HAM) (Jan. 31, 2000), http://www.etan.org/news/2000a/3exec.htm; Timor-Leste COE
Report, supra note 147, at 5 (describing the KPP HAM process as "credible and objective").
VOL. 44:2
THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF HYBRID JUSTICE
experts to advise and improve upon the process and urged the Security Council to
supervise the proceedings or convene an international tribunal dedicated to the
post-referendum violence, 40 6 these recommendations were not taken up by either
party.
The Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal ("BICT") is "international" in
name and subject matter only. Tracing its roots to the War of Liberation that gave
rise to modem-day Bangladesh, the BICT is dedicated to prosecuting alleged
collaborators with the Pakistani Army (then West Pakistan) for atrocities
committed when East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) sought to secede in March of
1971.407 A creature of domestic law with little international involvement, the
BICT is asserting jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
and "other crimes under international law" pursuant to a law that dates from the
independence period.40 8 The BICT was inspired by principled objectives that have
been betrayed by implementation. In the postwar period, Sheikh Rahman, the
primary political force behind the independence movement, quite presciently
contemplated local prosecutions of East Pakistani citizens and an international
tribunal to prosecute foreign prisoners of war.40 9 The Bangladesh Collaborators
(Special Tribunals) Order came into force in 1972 by Presidential Decree. 410 The
next year, Parliament promulgated the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act "to
provide for the detention, prosecution and punishment of persons for genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes under international law."
41
'
This legislation, which mostly incorporates the Nuremberg/Tokyo definitions of
the crimes and benefited from the assistance of international law experts, was quite
forward leaning for its time in terms of substantive law. By today's sensibilities,
however, the legislation is outdated and does not reflect recent developments in the
law occasioned by the work of the ad hoc criminal tribunals.4 12 In any case, the
4131975 assassination of Sheikh Rahman ultimately scuttled these efforts. It was
thus left to Rahman's daughter-Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed who came
to power in 2008 on a platform that included promises of accountability for the
rape, murder, and mayhem committed during the War of Liberation-to complete
406. Timor-Leste COE Report, supra note 147, at 7.
407. See generally Beth Van Schaack, The Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal (BICT):
Complementarity Gone Bad, INTLAWGRRLS (Oct. 8, 2014), http://ilg2.org/2014/10/08/the-bangladesh-
intemational-crimes-tribunal-bict-complementarity-gone-bad/; Steven Kay, Bangladesh War Crime
Tribunal: A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?, http://www.internationallawbureau.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2010/1 1/Bangladesh-Intemational-War-Crimes-Tribunal.pdf.
408. The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 (Act No. XIX) art. 3, (Bangl.)
http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections all.php?id-435 [hereinafter 1973 Act].
409. See generally Suzannah Linton, Completing the Circle: Accountability for the Crimes of the
1971 Bangladesh War of Liberation, 21(2) CRIM. L. FOR. 191 (2010).
410. Collaborators (Special Tribunal) Order, President's Order No. 8 of 1972 (as amended
February 1972), in NEIL J. KRITZ, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: LAWS, RULINGS, AND REPORTS 540 (1995).
411. 1973 Act, supra note 408.
412. See Morris Davis, Bangladesh War Crimes Tribunal: A Near-Justice Experience, CRIMES OF
WAR, http://www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/bangladesh-war-crimes-tribunal-a-near-justice-
experience/.
413. Linton, supra note 409, at 17.
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this aspect of her father's legacy.4 14
The international community initially supported this effort at historical
justice, given the longstanding impunity stemming from the war. Human Rights
Watch, for example, called the trials an important and long overdue step to achieve
justice for victims. 415 The UNDP among others offered assistance, and the
European Union passed resolutions praising the trials.416 However, this support
soon soured when it was clear that the process had been corrupted and would be
more political than legal. Today, the international community is engaged largely
as a critic, endeavoring to bring the proceedings closer in line with international
standards,417 particularly given that the only individuals being prosecuted are
associated with opposition parties.
J. Repurpose An Existing Institution
The idea of amending the constitutive instruments of an existing institution to
enable, or expand the ability to hold, criminal trials-as seen with respect to the
MICT and the proposed criminal chamber of the ACJHR-has arisen in other
circumstances. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ("ITLOS"),
located in Hamburg, Germany, has no criminal jurisdiction; it can only hear cases
involving disputes concerning the interpretation or application of treaties that
confer jurisdiction on it, including 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas 418
and its successor, the 1982 UNCLOS. 4 19 When it comes to criminal activity on the
seas, UNCLOS envisions member states undertaking domestic prosecutions under
varying jurisdictional principles. For example, cases involving collisions are, per
Article 97, to proceed before the judicial or administrative authorities "either of the
flag State or of the State of which such person is a national., 420 Acts of piracy may
be prosecuted pursuant to the principle of universal jurisdiction.421 That said,
ITLOS has heard cases touching on criminal behavior, such as illegal fishing.422
As the threat of piracy re-emerged in 2007 in the Indian Ocean, the Gulf of
Aden, and elsewhere, there was talk of vesting ITLOS with criminal jurisdiction by
amending UNCLOS, and the ITLOS Statute annexed thereto; promulgating a new
414. CAITLIN REIGER, FIGHTING PAST IMPUNITY IN BANGLADESH. A NAT. TRIBUNAL FOR THE CRIMES
OF 1971 3 (Int'l Center for Transitional Justice ed., 2010).
415. Bangladesh: Unique Opportunity for Justice for 1971 Atrocities, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(May 19, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/19/bangladesh-unique-opportunity-justice-1971-
atrocities.
416. Jacek Wlosowicz, International Support for Bangladesh War Crimes Tribunal, EP TODAY
(Feb. 8, 2014), http://eptoday.com/intemational-support-bangladesh-war-erimes-tribunal/.
417. See Stephen J. Rapp, Press Roundtable, Dhaka, Bangladesh (Aug. 5, 2014),
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/bangladesh/621750/SpeechesRemarks_2014/AmbRappPress Round
tableAug_5 2014.pdf.
418. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958,450 U.N.T.S. 11.
419. See UNCLOS, supra note 114.
420. Jd. at art. 97.
421. Id. at art. 105.
422. The "Monte Confurco" Case (Seychelles v. France), Case No. 6, Judgment of Dec. 18, 2000,
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case no 6/Judgment.18.12.00.E.pdf.
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protocol; or, alternatively, creating a special chamber with penal jurisdiction.423
This proposal had the benefit of utilizing a pre-existing institution with some
competency in the law of the sea, although not necessarily with respect to piracy
per se.4 24 While this solution seemed to promise certain institutional efficiencies,
at the same time, it would have required a rather comprehensive overhaul of the
ITLOS's rules of procedure to incorporate penal procedures and all the due process
protections expected in a criminal proceeding.425 Because the tribunal would be
exercising a form of international universal jurisdiction, it should not have
mattered which states joined the regime in terms of flag-ship states, littoral nations,
the nationality state (Somalia in most cases), or cargo owners. Ultimately, this
proposal was not pursued. Instead, the international community has supported
domestic trials in littoral states, as discussed above.426
K. Conclusion
The above reveals that international and internationalized tribunals can be
created a number of different ways. Truly international tribunals enjoying the
coercive powers that come with a Chapter VII provenance have been rare. Rather,
more recent justice efforts have been more consensual in nature and more domestic
in format if plotted along a hybridity continuum. As the remainder of this paper
reveals, the origins of a particular justice mechanism often dictate--or limit the
degree of creativity that can be employed with respect to-other fundamental
institutional characteristics, including its structure, staffing patterns, venue,
jurisdictional competencies and limitations, rules of procedure, and funding
options.
III. STRUCTURE AND THE RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER COURTS WITH
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
The architects of hybrid justice must make a number of decisions about the
structure of any justice mechanism in terms of organs of the court and the mix of
chambers of first instance and of appeal. Those institutions that are embedded
within the domestic legal system often inherit elements of the existing underlying
system, subject to occasional adjustments. So, for example, the ECCC contains
many civil law features, and the IHT reflected standard components of the ordinary
423. See Possible Options to Further the Aim of Prosecuting Persons Responsible for Acts of
Piracy, supra note 110, at 106; Pemberton, supra note 388, at 17-18.
424. See Gentian Zyberi, Is There a Need to Establish New International Courts?, INT'L LAW
OBSERVER (May 20, 2010, 7:43 PM), http://www.intemationallawobserver.eu/2010/05/20/is-there-a-
need-to-establish-new-intemational-courts/ ("establishing new courts should be approached with
restraint. Before committing to such a huge step a feasibility study needs to be prepared and options
explored whether an already existing court can eventually exercise jurisdiction for that specific issue or
be bestowed jurisdiction over it.").
425. UNCLOS, supra note 114, at Annex VI, art. 16.
426. See supra text accompanying notes 375-391.
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Iraqi courts, including a role for investigating judges.4 27 By contrast, autonomous
ad hoc tribunals that enjoy a separate legal personality under international law
have been the subject of greater structural and procedural innovation. Thus,
despite the fact that the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are civil law countries, the
ICTY/R were originally modeled very much on the common law adversarial
tradition. In addition to these decisions about structure, any hybrid or
internationalized entity will need to be governed by rules setting forth its
relationship with tse "ordinary courts" of the target state, drawing on concepts of
primacy, subsidiarity, and complementarity.
One aspect of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals that has not stood the test
of time is their lack of a true appellate body to effectuate the defendants' right to a
meaningful appeal. In theory, the Allied Control Council sitting in Berlin
supervised the IMT,428 although all pleas for clemency or mitigation of sentences
were summarily rejected.429 In Tokyo, General MacArthur was empowered to
execute, and potentially alter, sentences ordered by the Tokyo Tribunal, with input
from U.S. allies in the region.430  He never exercised this power.431  Several
Japanese defendants attempted to appeal their verdicts to the U.S. Supreme Court,
which ruled that it lacked jurisdiction because the Tokyo Tribunal was not a
United States court.432 This lack of an automatic right to a judicial appeal is deeply
problematic by today's human rights due process standards.433 Accordingly, all the
contemporary international and hybrid tribunals offer defendants a right to
appeal. 434  Most international/hybrid tribunals-including the SCSL and the
427. IHT Statute, supra note 328, at art. 8.
428. Article 29 of the IMT Charter read:
In case of guilt, sentences shall be carried out in accordance with the orders of the Control
Council for Germany, which may at any time reduce or otherwise alter the sentences, but
may not increase the severity thereof. If the Control Council for Germany, after any
Defendant has been convicted and sentenced, discovers fresh evidence which, in its opinion,
would found a fresh charge against him, the Council shall report accordingly to the
Committee established under Article 14 hereof, for such action as they may consider proper,
having regard to the interests ofjustice.
Charter of the Int'l Military Tribunal art. 29, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter IMT Charter].
429. DANIEL J. LANAHAM, JUSTICE FOR ALL: LEGENDARY TRIALS FOR THE 2 0T" CENTURY 106
(2006); NORBERT EHRENFREUND, THE NUREMBERG LEGACY: HOW THE NAZI WAR CRIMES TRIALS
CHANGED THE COURSE OF HISTORY 116 (2007).
430. Article 17 of the Tokyo Charter read:
The judgment will be announced in open court and will give the reasons on which it is based.
The record of the trial will be transmitted directly to the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers for his action thereon. A sentence will be carried out in accordance with the order of
the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, who may at any time reduce or otherwise
alter the sentence except to increase its severity.
Tokyo Charter, supra note 59, at art. 17. See Kaufman, supra note 59, at 755, 758.
431. EHRENFREUND, supra note 429.
432. Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1949).
433. See ICCPR, supra note 222, at art. 14(5) ("Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right
to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law").
434. See generally Mark C. Fleming, Appellate Review in the International Criminal Tribunals, 37
TEX. INT'L L. J. 111 (2002).
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STL-have followed the lead of the ICTY/R when it comes to having a two-tiered
appellate system. The original model of the ECCC envisaged three layers of
appeal consistent with the Cambodian court system, but the final constitutive
documents reduced this to two, but also established a Pre-Trial Chamber.
435
Although the right to an appeal is now well established under international human
rights law, some lingering doctrinal controversy surrounds the question of when
the prosecution should be entitled to appeal an acquittal 436 and whether the
Appeals Chamber should enter convictions or increase sentences on appeal.437
In terms of other structural elements, the two ad hocs were unique in that they
originally shared a Chief Prosecutor and Appeals Chamber. 438  Although this
overlap promised efficiencies and opportunities for jurisprudential coherence,
complaints emerged that the original Chief Prosecutors spent more time and
energy on their ICTY docket.43 9 These concerns and the emergence of a row with
Rwanda over whether members of the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front should be
prosecuted before the ICTR led the Security Council in 2003 to split the
prosecutorial function and appoint a Chief Prosecutor dedicated to the ICTR. 440
The new Prosecutor subsequently stayed focused on Hutu Power crimes. 44' The
joint Appeals Chamber remained in place, however, which helped to harmonize'
the jurisprudence emerging from the two tribunals but may have contributed to less
robust genocide prosecutions in the ICTY given that the crimes in the former
Yugoslavia were of a lesser magnitude in comparison with Rwanda. As the SCSL
was under construction, the Security Council in UNSCR 1315 suggested that
appeals from Sierra Leone could also go to the joint ICTY/R Appeals Chamber,
but this proposal was not pursued and the SCSL had its own appellate body. The
introduction of a Pre-Trial Chamber ("PTC") to manage preliminary legal issues
(confirmation of indictments, issuance of warrants, etc.) 442 is an innovation found
435. The WCC in Bosnia-Herzegovina have a three-tiered review process. Rulings of the court of
first instance (a three-judge panel) can be appealed to an appellate division. Some issues, including
claims under the European Convention on Human Rights, can then be heard by the Constitutional
Court. See Schwendiman, supra note 337, at 278.
436. See ICTR Statute, supra note 2; ICTY Statute, supra note 64, at Annex, art. 25 (allowing the
prosecution to appeal on grounds of an error of law or an error of fact that has occasioned "a
miscarriage of justice"). See generally Magali Maystre, Right to Appeal, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: THE INTERFACE OF CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS 192 (Linda Carter &
Fausto Pocar, eds., 2013).
437. Prosecutor v. Mrkie & ,l9jivandanin, Case No. IT-95-13/I-A, Partially Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Pocar (May 5, 2009) (reasoning that by augmenting a verdict, an Appeals Chamber violates the
defendant's right to an appeal).
438. VICTOR PESKIN, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IN RWANDA AND THE BALKANS: VIRTUAL TRIALS
& THE STRUGGLE FOR STATE COOPERATION 164 (2008).
439. Id.
440. S.C. Res. 1505 (Sept. 4, 2003) (appointing Hassan Jallow as the Chief Prosecutor of the
ICTR).
441. Katherine Iliopoulos, ICTR Accused of One-Sided Justice, CRIMES OF WAR,
http://www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/ictr-accused-of-one-sided-justice/.
442. STL Statute, supra note 95, at art. 18. The judges of the ICTY later amended their RPE to
introduce Rule 65ter and the concept of the Pre-Trial Judge. See ICTY Plenary Session, Amendment to
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in the STL as well as the Rome Statute in Articles 57-58. 443 As at the ICC, the
STL Trial Chamber has no appellate role vis-A-vis the PTC; appeals from PTC
rulings go directly to the Appeals Chamber. 444
The organograms of the SCSL and STL are unique in that they include an
independent Defense Office as a formal organ of the tribunal. 445 The STL Defence
Office is responsible for maintaining a list of qualified counsel, experts, and
investigators; providing research and operational support to defense counsel;
administering a system of legal aid and assigning counsel for in absentia
proceedings; and protecting the rights of the accused at an institutional level (e.g.,
with respect to amendments to the RPE)." 6 By contrast, most other tribunals have
only a skeletal defense coordination office within the Registry. " 7 These entities
maintained lists of qualified defense counsel amenable to representing indigent
accused but did not include competent duty counsel. 448  In practice, most
defendants before international criminal courts received pro bono counsel, even
those who would not be considered impoverished by domestic standards. 449 This
system has been marred by fee-splitting and over-charging allegations,4 5 ° which
have been addressed with fee caps, the shift from an hourly to a flat fee system,
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Dec. 17, 2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/j ud supplement/supp46-e/.
443. The ICC also adopted Rule 132bis authorizing a single-judge practice for efficiency, although
there are concerns that the new rule runs counter to the Statute, which envisions a three-judge Trial
Chamber. Gilbert Bitti, Article 21 & the Hierarchy of Sources of Law before the ICC, in CARSTEN
STAHN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIM. COURT 411, 416 (2015).
444. STL Appeal Chamber, http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/about-the-stl/structure-of-the-
stl/chambers/appeals-chamber.
445. This entity is statutory before the STL, but was created through the RPE at the SCSL. See
STL Statute, supra note 95, at arts. 4, 13; RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, Special Court for
Sierra Leone, at Rule 35, https://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/SCSURules-of-proced-SCSL.pdf.
By way of comparison, Article II of the ICTY Statute lists the Tribunal's organs as comprising the
Chambers, Prosecutor, and Registry (servicing both the Chambers and the Prosecutor).
446. See SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON, Defence Office, http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/about-the-
stl/structure-of-the-stl/defence/defence-office.
447. UNTAET failed to establish a specialized defense office for the Special Panels, leaving the
nascent public defenders' office responsible for defending individuals accused of serious international
crimes. International mentors and NGO secondees eventually provided some assistance. In 2002, the
United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor ("UNMISET"), the successor mission established by
the Security Council after Timor-Leste achieved independence in 2002, finally established a Defence
Lawyers Unit with international staff, although this entity remained chronically underfunded. See
Reiger & Wierda, Timor-Leste, supra note 144, at 26-27; Timor-Leste COE Report, supra note 147, at
4, 36.
448. See generally Richard J. Wilson, Special Issues Pertaining to International and War Crimes
Tribunals, in Nat. Legal Aid & Def. Ass'n, INT'L LEGAL AID & DEF. SYs. DEV. MANUAL 184 (2010),
http://www.nlada.org/Defender/DefenderPublications/nternationalManual_2010.
449. Mark Ellis, The Evolution of Defense Counsel Appearing before International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 949, 961 (2003) (noting that most
defendants before the ICTY received appointed counsel).
450. See Rep. of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Investigation Into Possible Fee-
Splitting Arrangements Between Defence Counsel and Indigent Detainees at the ICTR and ICTY, U.N.
Doc. A/55/759 (Feb. 1, 2001).
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and codes of professional conduct. 451  Before the ICC, more well-heeled
defendants-who at one time included Uhuru Kenyatta, the President of Kenya
and one of the continent's richest men-have been able to hire expensive private
practitioners to represent them.452
The inclusion of an entity dedicated to the defense-with institutional
memory, allocated resources, and clout-offers a counterweight to the power of
the prosecution. It is meant to rectify equality of arms concerns generated by the
fact that prosecutors enjoy a stable source of funding and the privilege of being
repeat players before the tribunal in question.453 It also responds to potential
conflicts of interests (real or perceived) between the Registry and defense counsel
given that the Registry's mandate to ensure efficient judicial proceedings may run
counter to the duty of zealous representation by counsel. That said, whether the
Defense Section is organizationally part of the registry or an organ of the court in
its own right may not make much difference so long as defense counsel are
sufficiently resourced and can act independently.
The ECCC's structure is unique and, in certain notable respects, not worthy of
emulation. First, and not inherently problematic, the tribunal is premised on a civil
law model whereby independent and impartial investigations, involving the
accumulation of inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, are conducted by
Investigating Judges upon the request of the Prosecution in its Introductory
Submission.454 The Investigating Judges issue a Closing Order (analogous to an
indictment); the prosecution then decides which charges to pursue at trial. Civil
law trials are normally a summary affair based on the dossiers compiled during the
long investigative phase; atrocity crime trials, by contrast, are historically more
complex in part because they inevitably involve huge and varied crime bases, but
also because they are expected to serve an expressive and pedagogic function.455
Despite these civil law elements, trials before the ECCC have modeled the
common law and been elaborate and-at times-repetitive affairs. 456 This was
true even with respect to the first defendant, who effectively pled guilty to the
charges against him.
457
Second, and what has been more problematic, every key position at the ECCC
451. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BRINGING JUSTICE: THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE:
ACCOMPLISHMENTS, SHORTCOMINGS, AND NEEDED SUPPORT 7 (2004),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/sierraleone0904.pdf.
452. See generally Karim A. A. Khan & Anand A. Shah, Defensive Practices: Representing
Clients Before The International Criminal Court, 76 LAw & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 191 (2013).
453. Kevin Jon Heller, (In)equality of Arms at the International Tribunals, OPINIO JuRIS (Feb. 7,
2006), http://Iawofnations.blogspot.com/2006/02/inequality-of-arms-at-intemationa.htmI.
454. The Timor-Leste Special Panels also featured Investigating Judges, but they were somewhat
subordinate to the Prosecutor and charged with ensuring the rights of defendants and alleged victims
were respected. UNTAET Reg. No. 2000/30 on Transitional Rules of Criminal Procedure, §§ 7.1, 9.6,
UNTAET REG/2000/30 (Sept. 25, 2000).
455. Mirjan Damaka, What Is the Point of International Criminal Justice, 83 CHI.-KENT. L. REV.
329, 334, 335 (2008).
456. Ciorciari & Heindel, supra note 25, at 377-78.
457. Id. at 375.
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is shared by a Cambodian and an international appointee. So, there are two Co-
Investigating Judges ("CIJs"), Co-Prosecutors ("CPs"), Co-Civil Party
Representatives, etc.; even the Office of Administration is bifurcated into two
distinct components that service the national and international "sides" of the
ECCC. Coordination and communication problems abound. Third, unlike the
other ad hoc tribunals, the ECCC also includes a Pre-Trial Chamber that is
supposed to resolve conflicts between the CIJs and CPs during the investigation
stage and hear "appeals" against CIJ orders.458 The PTC's rulings, however, are
not binding beyond of the decision at issue or subject to appeal; as a result, the
Trial and Appeal Chambers have considered many of the same issues de novo,
albeit following concentrated consideration by the PTC.459 In principle, this
arrangement respects the prevailing legal architecture more than a common-law
style process would, but in practice, it has resulted in repetitive proceedings at
460
every step along the way.
Cambodian negotiators also succeeded in ensuring that each Chamber has a
majority of Cambodian judges, although a super-majority of trial/appellate judges
is necessary to render any important ruling.461 As such, the tribunal is considered
only as strong as its weakest international judge. A longstanding dispute between
the CPs and CIlJs over whether to move forward with charges in Cases 003 and 004
led to pointed criticism that the government was interfering in the judicial process
and the Cambodian personnel were failing to fulfill their mandate.462 Multiple
international CIJs have resigned amidst complaints that they had either been
"captured" by the Cambodian side or prevented from functioning independently.463
At the moment, and although there were some joint rulings, these cases are
proceeding without the full blessing of the Cambodian CIJ or CP because the PTC
did not achieve the super-majority required to halt the investigation. 4 64 Wisely, no
other hybrid court has adopted this strict hybrid formula for staffing.
The EACs in Senegal are minimally international: they are staffed by a
sprinkling of international judges (who do not comprise a majority) applying
international criminal law and domestic procedural law.465 The EACs exist within
458. ECCC Statute, supra note 190, at 7-8.
459. Ciorciari & Heindel, supra note 25, at 378.
460. Id. at 374-77.
461. Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers as amended art. 14 (Oct. 27, 2004),
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/documents/legal/law-establishment-extraordinary-chambers-amended
[hereinafter ECCC Law].
462. Open Soc'y Justice Initiative, The Future of Cases 003/004 at the Extraordinary Chambers in
the Courts of Cambodia (Oct. 2012), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/eccc-
report-cases3and4-100112_0.pdf.
463. Cambodia: Judges Investigating Khmer Rouge Crimes Should Resign, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Oct. 3, 2001), https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/03/cambodia-judges-investigating-khmer-
rouge-crimes-should-resign.
464. Open Society Justice Initiative, Recent Developments at the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia: March 2015 3, 4, https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/eccc-
march-2015-20150323.pdf.
465. EAC Statute, supra note 225, at art. 11.
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the ordinary Senegalese district and appeals court structure in Dakar. In keeping
with local law, there are four chambers: an investigative chamber, an indicting
chamber, a trial chamber, and an appeals chamber.466 The presiding judges of the
latter two chambers hail from another AU member state.467 Individuals were
nominated by the Senegalese Justice Minister and appointed by the AU
Commission Chair, although there is no requirement that they be experts in
international criminal law as is usually required for other international tribunals.
468
An independent Defense Office has been established to protect the rights of the
defense and otherwise support defense counsel.469 Chadian officials are not
involved in any way in the EAC, diminishing the opportunities for domestic
capacity building, particularly given that Senegal's judiciary already enjoys a solid
reputation for competence and independence.
470
The DRC offers a microcosm of internationalized justice mechanisms.
According to a long-standing proposal, which originated within Congolese civil
society471 and which has received high-level international 472 and executive
support,473 legislation would create specialized mixed chambers with jurisdiction
over the range of international crimes. These would be housed within provincial
appeals courts and staffed with a mix of national and international personnel,
including judges, prosecutors, administrators, investigators, and defense counsel.474
466. Id. at art. 2. See generally Mbackd Fall, The Extraordinary African Chambers: The Case of
Hiss~ne Habrg, in AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 117 (Sept. 10, 2014),
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-6265-029-9_8/fulltext.html.
467. Id. at art. 11.
468. Id. Compare id. with SCSL Statute, supra note 170, at art. 13.
469. Q&A: The Case of Hissine Habre, supra note 232.
470. Emanuele Cimiotta, The First Steps of the Extraordinary African Chambers, 13 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUSTICE 177, 193-94 (2015).
471. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DR CONGO: ESTABLISHMENT OF A SPECIALIZED MIXED COURT FOR
THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS INTERNATIONAL CRIMES (April 15,2011),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/15/dr-congo-establishment-specialized-mixed-court-prosecution-
serious-international.
472. A 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework signed by all major parties involved in
stabilization efforts in the Great Lakes region called for an end to the long-standing impunity for grave
international crimes in the DRC. See generally David Zounmenou & Naomi Kok, Peace, Security &
Cooperation Framework for the DRC: Hopes & Challenges (March 8, 2013),
https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/peace-security-and-cooperation-framework-for-the-drc-hopes-and-
challenges.
473. Cohesion nationale: Discours de "Joseph Kabila" devant le Congrb.s, KONGO TIMES! (Oct.
23, 2013), http://afrique.kongotimes.info/rdc/politique/6768-cohesion-nationale-discours-joseph-kabila-
devant-congres.html (recounting a speech by President Kabila calling for the institution of special
chambers to address international crimes). See generally Richard Lee, Plans for a Hybrid Court in
Congo-Pascale Kambale, Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (Mar. 6, 2012),
http://www.osisa.org/openspace/drc/plans-hybrid-court-congo-pascale-kambale.
474. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES COMMITTED IN THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (Apr. 1, 2014),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/01/accountability-atrocities-committed-democratic-republic-
congo#_ftnref3 [hereinafter HRW, DRC]; SOFIA CANDEIAS ET. AL., supra note 367, at 13-16. See
Article 91, Avant Projet de Loi Pour la Repression des Crimes de Gdnocide, des Crimes Contre
L'Humanitd et des Crimes de Guerre Completant la Loi Organique Portat Organisation,
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Under current proposals, international judges would be in the minority of each
panel and would gradually be phased out. 4 75 The Cour de Cassation in Kinshasa
would also include a specialized chamber to hear appeals from the mixed
chambers, which would have primary, but not exclusive, jurisdiction over
international crimes committed in the country since 1990.476
Although this scheme remains in flux, the basic structure of the proposed
mixed chambers involves three five-member Trial Chambers (including two
foreign advisor judges) and one Appeals Chamber. The national Cour de
Cassation would be empowered to review judgments from the Appeals Chamber,
which will be co-located in Kinshasa. The Trial Chambers will be housed in
existing civilian Courts of Appeal.477 Investigative and Prosecutorial Units for
each Chamber will be made up of a mix of foreign and Congolese staff. The
Congolese President would appoint the Congolese judges and senior prosecutorial
staff, including a Congolese chief prosecutor.478 All foreign members would be
appointed by the Prime Minister, with recommendations from the Justice and
Foreign Ministers. 479 Nationals of states that border the DRC would be excluded
from consideration given the involvement of neighboring states in perpetrating and
perpetuating the violence. 480 Military and police defendants would be entitled to
have career military magistrates serve on their panels.
481
The necessary constitutive legislation has been pending before the National
Assembly and the Council of Ministers (an executive body) for several years
alongside the Rome Statute Implementation Act,4 82 finally enacted in late 2015,
which will better align the subject matter jurisdiction of the specialized mixed
courts with the Rome Statute as well as provide a legal framework for cooperation.
Progress on both initiatives was stymied by elections, parliamentary delays and
adjournments, fears of international meddling in domestic affairs, confusion about
Fonctionnement et Competence des Jurisdictions de I'Ordre Judiciaire (setting forth the composition of
the proposed mixed chambers) [herein after Draft Mixed Chambers Legislation].
475. SOFIA CANDEIAS ET. AL., supra note 367, at 15.
476. HRW, DRC, supra note 474.
477. Id. at 3.
478. Id. at 4.
479. See Draft Mixed Chambers Legislation, supra note 474, at art. 91.11.
480. Id.
481. HRW, DRC, supra note 473, at 2. In this way, the proposed panels will be mixed/mixed,
featuring judges who are domestic and foreign as well as civilian and military. See Draft Mixed
Chambers Legislation, supra note 474, at art. 91.9 (providing for military magistrates on any panel
hearing charges against members of the armed forces or national police).
482. La proposition de Loi de Mise en Oeuvre du Statut de Rome dans la Legislation Congolaise,
http://www.pgaction.org/pdf/pre/ComorosAdubango.pdf. The draft legislation (proposition de loi)
also shifts jurisdiction over international crimes from military courts to civilian courts and provides for
certain procedural protections. See generally Patryk Labuda, The Democratic Republic of Congo's
Failure to Address Impunity for International Crimes: A View from Inside the Legislative Process
2010-2011, INT'L JUSTICE MONITOR (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.ijmonitor.org/201 I/1 l/the-democratic-
republic-of-congos-failure-to-address-impunity-for-intemational-crimes-a-view-from-inside-the-
legislative-process-2010-2011.
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the scope and interaction of the two pending bills, and shifting political will.483
Some Parliamentarians have voiced objections to the presence of foreign judges in
Congolese courts, the exercise of civil jurisdiction over members of the military,
and the absence of the death penalty (notwithstanding the current moratorium).4 4
Separate and apart from these internal structural issues, the terms of reference
of any hybrid or international entity will generally need to spell out the nature of
the relationship with the ordinary judicial system when there is concurrent
jurisdiction over international crimes.485 For example, the International Criminal
Court is expressly complementary; it asserts jurisdiction only when there is no
domestic court that is willing or able to bring charges.486 Although the ad hoc
criminal tribunals enjoyed primacy over domestic systems due to their terms of
reference 487 and Security Council provenance, the relationship was still a
partnership, as evidenced by the high degree of information sharing between the
tribunals and their domestic counterparts, the provision of technical assistance and
training to local actors, and the ICTY's Rules-of-the-Road project. Eventually,
Rule 11 bis was added to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence to enable the ad hoc
tribunals to refer low-level cases to a domestic system with jurisdiction as part of
the tribunals' Security Council-mandated Completion Strategies.
488
The STL enjoys primacy per Article 4 of its Statute. Accordingly, Lebanon
conveyed all its files to the STL in 2009 and has deferred any ongoing
investigations. 489 At its inception, the STL immediately gained custody of four
suspects who had been held by domestic authorities, but these individuals were
released when the STL Prosecutor indicated that he did not possess sufficient
evidence against them to justify their continued detention. 490 One has since moved
the court for the release of his casefile "related to the crimes of libellous [sic]
denunciations and arbitrary detention." 49' While the STL has primacy over the
domestic authorities, the Statute does indicate that in questioning suspects, victims,
483. See generally Labuda, supra note 482.
484. SOFIA CANDELAS ET. AL., supra note 367, at 3.
485. See generally Bartram Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of
National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 383 (1998).
486. Rome Statute, supra note 273, at art. 17.
487. See, e.g., ICTR Statute, supra note 2, at art. 8(2). Similarly, other courts in Timor-Leste were
to defer to the Special Panels. See UNTAET Reg. No. 2000/15, supra note 150, at art. 1.4. The MH-
17 Statute envisioned a relationship of primacy with national courts. MH-1 7 Draft Statute, supra note
615, at Article 10.
488. See supra note 77.
489. Order Directing the Lebanese Judicial Authority Seized with the Case of the Attack Against
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and Others to Defer to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Order, 2009, Case
No. CHPTJ/2009/01 (Mar. 27).
490. Order Regarding the Detention of Persons Detained in Lebanon in Connection with the Case
of the Attack Against Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and Others, Order, 2009, Case No. CHIPTJ/2009/06
(Apr. 29).
491. Decisions on the Disclosure Materials from the Criminal File of Mr. El Sayed, Decision 2011,
Case No. CHIPTJ/2011/08, Decision, § 1, art. I (May 12). See also Decision on Appeal of Pre-Trial
Judge's Order Regarding Jurisdiction and Standing, Decision, 2010 Case No. CH/AC/2010/02,
Decision on Appeal of Pre-Trial Judge's Order Regarding Jurisdiction and Standing (Nov. 10).
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and witnesses and in collecting evidence, the Prosecutor shall "as appropriate, be
assisted by the Lebanese authorities concerned., 492  The full scope of this
arrangement is being worked out in real time and is dependent on shifting political
winds. Although the UNSCRs addressed to the UNIIIC mandated all member
states to cooperate with the Commission's investigations, they are silent on this
point vis-A-vis the Tribunal itself, so evidence, witnesses, and suspects that are
outside Lebanon may not be within reach absent voluntary cooperation.493
The BiH War Crimes Chamber has concurrent jurisdiction over war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide with sixteen other courts-ten cantonal and
five district courts in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic
of Srpska, respectively, and the district court in Br~ko.494  The WCC could,
however, assume jurisdiction in particularly sensitive or complex cases or transfer
495
cases to the ordinary courts. Not surprisingly, this led to coordination issues as
well as complaints on the part of defendants. 496 In 2005, for example, a Pre-Trial
Chamber of the State Court took over the case of Boban Simi6 from the Isto~no
Sarajevo District Court on the ground that the local authorities had failed to arrest
the suspect despite the existence of an international arrest warrant against him.
49 7
He unsuccessfully challenged the transfer and his conviction before the European
Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR"). 49
8
It is envisioned that the jurisdiction of the ACJHR will be complementary to
national courts as well as the courts of the Regional Economic Communities
("REC"), such as the Economic Community of West African States ("ECOWAS"),
the Community of Sahel-Saharan States ("CENSAD"), the Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa ("COMESA"), and the South African Development
Community ("SADC"), even though these latter courts ordinarily do not mete out
individual criminal responsibility. 499 Accordingly, all national and regional courts
would have to have failed to move forward in order for the proposed ACJHR to
492. STL Statute, supra note 95, at art. 11(5).
493. Seeid. atart. 15(1).
494. Jasenka Ferizovi6, The Court System in Bosnia and Herzegovina, BOSNIAN BONES SPANISH
GHOSTS 8-10, 13-14, 17, 21-22, (Working Paper)
http://www.bosnianbonesspanishghosts.com/bbsg-userfiles/file/Working%2OPapers/The%20%2 / 0ourt
%20system%20in%2OBosnia%2Oand%2OHerzegovina.pdf.
495. Kazneni zakon Bosina i Herzegovia [Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina], SI. Glasnik
BiH [Official Gazette of BiH] 2009 No. 3/03,
http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/does/zakoni/en/Zakon o krivicnomjostupku - 3 03 - eng.pdf
[hereinafter Criminal Code of Bos. & Herz.].
496. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUSTICE FOR ATROCITY CRIMES: LESSONS OF INTERNATIONAL
SUPPORT FOR TRIALS BEFORE THE STATE COURT OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (Mar. 4, 2012),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bosnia0312 0.pdf [hereinafter HRW, State Court].
497. See Boban Simgi6 v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Judgment, App. No. 51552/10, [2012] ECHR
751, 32 (Apr. 10, 2012) (concluding "[s]ince the State Court decided to take over this case from an
Entity court on the basis of objective and reasonable criteria... there is no appearance of a breach" of
the ECHR's non-discrimination provision).
498. Id.
499. Ademola Abass, Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa: Rationale, Prospects and
Challenges, 24 EUR. J. INT'L L. 933, 945 (2013).
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have jurisdiction. The ACJHR Protocol's provision regarding this relationship
tracks Article 17 of the Rome Statute, which contains the ICC's complementarity
regime, but makes no mention of that Court itself500 Thirty-three AU member
states are also parties to the Rome Statute and some have adopted legislation
implementing their ICC obligations to cooperate with the Court; this may give rise
to conflicting obligations in those states and create overlapping jurisdiction.50 '
Although it regulates the relationship toward national courts, the Rome Statute is
silent as to its relationship to regional criminal courts, and so it is unclear if its
complementarity provisions would apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings before
the proposed African criminal chambers or if an amendment to the Rome Statute
or RPE would be required.50 2
IV. STAFFING
In terms of staffing hybrid or internationalized institutions, tribunal architects
must determine how to appoint domestic and international staff positions and in
what ratio. 50 3  If panels of judges are contemplated, ensuring a majority of
internationals generally lends international legitimacy to the process and
potentially enhances the fairness of proceedings. Such personnel can be phased
out over time. At the same time, the presence of domestic judges may lend the
institution legitimacy in the eyes of local actors. If the relevant system employs
single judges, foreign judicial advisers or clerks can be employed to inject
international expertise into the adjudicative process. A more comprehensive plan
to integrate foreign experts into prosecution and defense offices as well as the
courts' administrative body may also be necessary and useful. 504  Even in
circumstances in which international judges are contemplated, filling slots has
been difficult in some hardship posts in the past, a problem that a more fulsome
international roster might help to alleviate. 50 5 Such a roster could ensure that
candidates are vetted in advance so that only those with appropriate expertise and
of "high moral character, impartiality, and integrity" are chosen, as has been
required by the various tribunal statutes.
50 6
A central question turns on what role the international community, usually
acting through the U.N. Secretary-General, will play in appointing key personnel
and whether the state in question has an express or implied veto on nominations.
Although states often want their nationals in the top posts, international personnel
500. ACJHR Protocol, supra note 239, at art. 46.
501. Max du Plessis, A Case of Negative Regional Complementarity? Giving the African Court of
Justice and Human Rights Jurisdiction over International Crimes, EJIL: TALK!, Aug. 27, 2012,
http://www.ejiltalk.org/a-case-of-negative-regional-complementarity-giving-the-african-court-of-
justice-and-human-rights-jurisdiction-over-intemational-crimes/.
502. Abass, supra note 499, at 941-43.
503. See generally Harry Hobbs, Hybrid Tribunals and the Composition of the Court: In Search of
Sociological Legitimacy, 16 CHIc. J. INT'L L. 482 (2016).
504. For examples of a comprehensive plan, see Possible Options to Further the Aim of
Prosecuting Persons Responsible for Acts of Piracy, supra note 110, at 780-90.
505. Perriello & Wierda, supra note 124, at 16.
506. Hobbs, supra note 503, at 503-04.
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may be better positioned to withstand domestic political pressures, particularly
during the early phase of a justice process. 507 At the same time, many states may
resist the inclusion of foreign personnel in certain posts; resort to experts drawn
from the country's diaspora may mitigate these concerns. In any case, domestic
legislation and changes to local bar rules may be required to enable foreign
personnel to occupy certain positions. That said, some Commonwealth states
(such as the Seychelles) grant reciprocal rights to lawyers hailing from other
Commonwealth jurisdictions. 50 8  The interoperability of Commonwealth judges
could prove to be useful as the international community considers accountability
options for Sri Lanka.5 °9
The victorious allies convened and manned the two post-WWII tribunals,
although the patterns of staffing differed. The IMT itself was staffed by the four
founders with two judges (one primary and one alternate) hailing from each ally. 510
National prosecutorial teams divvied up the various counts and defendants at
trial.5 1' At Tokyo, by contrast, the lead prosecutor was from the United States.51 2
Eleven sitting judges and associated prosecutors were appointed from states that
had signed Japan's instrument of surrender, 513 along with India and the Philippines,
paving the way for Justice Radhabinod Pal of India to issue his famous dissent.
514
Although defendants had the right to counsel and to legal aid,515 no office for the
defense was built into either tribunal. In Nuremberg, German lawyers defended
the accused; in Tokyo, each defendant was eventually provided with an American
lawyer to help with his defense given that the procedures were quite novel from the
Japanese perspective.5 16
The use of the term "manned" above is quite deliberate. Most of the key
507. Caitlin Reiger & Marieke Wierda, The Serious Crimes Process in Timor-Leste: in Retrospect,
lntemational Center for Transitional Justice, Mar. 5, 2006, at 12 (noting in East Timor, "the
appointment of international judges was rejected on the basis that it would undermine local ownership
of the judges system," enhance the need for translation, and "encourage the participation of local jurists,
which would have political and symbolic significance").
508. Qualifying as a Seychelles Lawyer, BAR ASSOCIATION OF SEYCHELLES (Nov. 17, 2009),
http://www.bas.sc/qualifying-as-a-seychelles-lawyer.
509. Jason Burke, UN Calls for Sri Lanka War Crimes Court to Investigate Atrocities, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 16, 2015, 5:17 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/I 6/un-seeks-special-court-to-
investigate-sri-lanka-war-atrocities.
510. Kaufman, supra note 59, at 759.
511. Doug Linder, The Nuremberg Trials, FAMOUS WORLD TRIALS: NUREMBERG TRIALS 1945-
1949 (2000), http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/nuremberg/nurembergACCOUNT.html.
512. Kaufman, supra note 59, at 760.
513. Id. at 759-60.
514. The United States of America v. Akaki, Sadao et al., International Military Tribunal for the
Far East, Dissentient Judgment of Justice R.B. Pal, reprinted in 105 THE TOKYO MAJOR WAR CRIMES
TRIAL: THE RECORDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST (R. John
Pritchard, ed., 2002). See generally Elizabeth S. Kopelman, Ideology and International Law: The
Dissent of the Indian Justice at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 373 (1991).
515. See, e.g., Tokyo Charter, supra note 59, at art. 9(c).
516. The Tribunal-An Overview, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: A Digital Exhibit, Virginia Law,
http://lib.law.virginia.edu/imtfe/tribunal (last visited Nov. 15, 2015); Kauftman, supra note 59, at 761.
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players were, in fact, men, although there were important women involved in post-
WWII justice efforts.51 7 Many of the constitutive statutes of modem tribunal insist
on greater diversity and a fair representation of men and women when it comes to
judicial and other appointments. 5'8  Nonetheless, gender parity in international
tribunals remains elusive.
51 9
Turning to the modem tribunals, the Security Council assigned itself a role
appointing the Chief Prosecutors of the original ad hoc tribunals following
nomination by the U.N. Secretary-General.5 20 These personnel had the status of
Under-Secretary-Generals within the U.N. system.521 Judges-who must hail from
different states and represent the principal legal systems of the world-were
elected by the General Assembly from a list submitted by the Security Council,
and the Secretary-General appoints the Registrar. 522 By design, the two Statutes did
not mandate any senior roles for target-country nationals. 523 As a result, these
original ad hoc tribunals did not employ large numbers of local nationals, although
a number of defense counsel from the region did appear on behalf of defendants.
5 24
More recent hybrid tribunals reserve a greater role for the host state in
staffing. In principle, the SCSL was to have a mix of international and domestic
staff. A majority of the judges and the Chief Prosecutor were meant to be
appointed by the Secretary-General; the Government of Sierra Leone appointed a
Sierra Leonean Deputy Prosecutor. 525  In actuality, there were very few Sierra
Leoneans in professional positions at first given the lack of local capacity. This
asymmetry was accentuated by the fact that the government appointed some
internationals to fill posts that were designated for local personnel.526 In the early
days, many top posts went to lawyers from the United States, which was a major
supporter of the SCSL. It has been hypothesized that the United States was using
517. See Diane Marie Amann, Portraits of Women at Nuremberg, 2-4 UC Davis Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Research Paper no. 225, (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.roberthjackson.org/wp-
content/uploads/migrated-files/portraits-of-women-at-nuremberg.pdf.
518. See, e.g., ICTY Statute, supra note 64, at arts. 12ter, 13ter; SCSL Statute, supra note 170, at
art. 15.
519. Nienke Grossman, Sex on the Bench: Do Women Judges Matter to the Legitimacy of
International Courts?, 12 CHI. J. INT'L L. 647, 649, 652-54 (2012). This lack of parity has generated an
international campaign aimed at increasing the representation of women on the benches of all
international tribunals. See GQUAL, http://www.gqualcampaign.org/home/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2015).
520. See, e.g., ICTY Statute, supra note 64, at art. 16(4); S.C. Res. 1504, 1 4 (Sept. 4, 2003); S.C.
Res. 1786, 1 2 (Nov. 28, 2007).
521. ICTY Statute, supra note 64, at art. 16.
522. Id. at arts. 13, 17.
523. Jean-Marie Kamatali, From the JCTR to ICC: Learning From the ICTR Experience in
Bringing Justice to Rwandans, 12 NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 89, 93-94 (2005); Hobbs, supra note
503, at 501, 503-504 (noting that the lack of Yugoslavian or Rwandan judges on the ad hoc tribunals
may have undermined local legitimacy and increased perceptions of bias).
524. See ICTY Statute, supra note 64, at art. 16(4).
525. SCSL Statute, supra note 170, at art. 12. Nominations came from ECOWAS and
Commonwealth states. Hobbs, supra note 503, at 515.
526. Perriello & Wierda, The Special Court for Sierra Leone Under Scrutiny, supra note 176, at
21-22.
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the SCSL "to demonstrate the viability of alternatives" to the ICC.5 27
The STL's international prosecutor, head of the Defense Office, and all the
judges have been appointed by the U.N. Secretary-General; the judges were chosen
from among those recommended by the Lebanese government and member
states.528 Under the U.N. Agreement with Cambodia, the Supreme Council of the
Magistracy, which has strong ties to Cambodia's ruling party, selected the
Cambodian judges from amongst the local judicial ranks. 529  The Secretary-
General nominated potential international judges, but these too were subject to
approval by the Supreme Council of the Magistracy.53 ° A kickback scandal
involving alleged payments to Cambodian government officials for positions at the
ECCC contributed to criticism that the ECCC was riddled with corruption and the
object of political interference. 53 I Local ECCC staff members are not paid
according to U.N. pay grades, which has kept their salaries lower than at other
tribunals (although higher than comparable national positions). UNAKRT staffers
532are paid as project staff according to U.N. rates.
In Kosovo, hiring within UNMIK was through the standard U.N. recruitment
process or by way of recommendations (but not formal nominations) from states
and international organizations (e.g., the Council of Europe). 33 Internationals
were paid on the U.N. pay scale.5 34 Contracts were renewable every six months,
which created a degree of uncertainty among the staff and hindered the ability to
527. Wayne Sandholtz, Creating Authority by the Council: The International Criminal Tribunals,
in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY 131, 148 (Bruce
Cronin eds., 2008).
528. STL Statute, supra note 95, at art. 9.
529. ECCC Law, supra note 461, at art. 11.
530. Douglas Gillison, Cambodia Rejects UN Genocide Judge, THE INVESTIGATIVE FUND (Jan.
15,2012, 11:21 AM),
http://www.theinvestigativefund.org/blog/1601/cambodia rejects-un genocidejudge/Most/o20Emaile
d (noting potential rejection of U.N.-appointed CIJ Laurent Kasper-Ansermet). In this instance,
Cambodia initially refused to elevate a reserve CIJ to a vacant position. This was considered a breach
of the U.N. Agreement. Bridget Di Certo and Vong Sokheng, Judge rejection 'a breach', PHNOM PENH
POST (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/judge-rejection-%E2%80%98-
breach%E2%80%99.
531. Cat Barton, Kickback Claims Stain the KRT, PHNOM PENH POST (Feb. 23, 2007),
http://www.phnompenhpost.conf/national/kickback-claims-stain-krt. The United Nations Development
Program launched an intemal audit in response to the allegations involving leftover funds from a prior
U.N. mission, but the results were not released publicly. Cat Barton, UN Private Audit Draws Public
Ire, PHNOM PENH POST (June 1, 2007), http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/un-private-audit-
draws-public-ire. See also John D. Ciorciari, Justice & Judicial Corruption, SEARCHING FOR THE
TRUTH (Oct. 2007),
http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/assets/pdf/court-filings/Ciorciari-October-2007.pdf.
532. Stan Starygin, Judicial Officer Salaries at the ECCC for 2010-11, ECCC REPARATIONS BLOG
(May 19, 2010, 3:32 AM), http://ecccreparations.blogspot.com/2010/05/judicial-officer-salaries-at-
eccc-for.html; Memorandum to the Group of Interested States: Critical Issues Surrounding the
Fundraising Drive of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 3, 6-7 (Nov. 16, 2007),
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/cambodia_20071116.pdf.
533. Perriello & Wierda, supra note 124, at 15-16.
534. Id. at 16.
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recruit and retain qualified personnel.535 The early UNTAET regulations created
both an ordinary court system and a system of Special Panels to address the
commission of international crimes. 536 The UNTAET administrator appointed the
Special Panel judges upon the recommendation of a mixed Timorese-foreign
commission. 537 It was envisioned that the Dili District Court would house several
Special Panels, but hiring delays meant that it took years to establish a second
Panel.538 The Court of Appeals, which included two international judges, was to
assert jurisdiction over appeals from ordinary panels in the District Court in
addition to Special Panel cases.5 39  Other international positions within Timor-
Leste's Special Panels were identified through standard U.N. recruitment processes
for peacekeeping missions, 540 which was not entirely suitable since such missions
normally do not contain a judicial component. Staffing the Special Panels
remained a challenge given the lack of qualified international candidates for what
amounted to a hardship post and weak domestic capacity. In these institutions,
delays in the appointment of personnel, and especially international judges who
were subject to U.N. hiring procedures, slowed the judicial proceedings and left
many appeals pending.
54 1
International staff in BiH were deployed for a limited transition period.542 In
the early phases of the WCC, the High Representative for BiH appointed the
internationals. International donor states often seconded judges to the WCC, with
inconsistent results given that some secondees had no experience dealing with
international law, criminal law, or complex trials. Later, the Bosnian High Judicial
and Prosecutorial Council ("HJPC") and Registry began arranging these
appointments through a competitive hiring process.543 Internationals were paid out
of a pool of donor funds. 544 International judges began as a majority on each WCC
panel, but this ratio had flipped by 2008.545 The transitional period, which has
been facilitated by a Transition Council of local leaders representing BiH's various
judicial institutions, was to last for five years, but this proved to be too short to put
a fair and fully functioning system in place. 546 In 2009, and at the last minute, the
High Representative-who exercised considerable power in BiH--extended the
535. Id.
536. UNTAET Reg. No. 2000/I1, supra note 151, at 9-10.
537. Id. at 9-10, 15; U.N. Secretary-General, On the Establishment of a Public Service
Commission, I I U.N. Doe. UNTAET/REG/2000/3 (Jan. 20, 2000).
538. Reiger & Wierda, supra note 507, at 15.
539. Id. at 14, 25.
540. Id. at 14.
541. Reiger & Wierda, Timor-Leste, supra note 144, at 14-15.
542. lvani~evi6, supra note 345, at 41-42.
543. Tolbert & Kontid, supra note 344, at 30-34 (describing the court's record in transferring
knowledge from international to national judges as "mixed" and occurring "more by accident than
design").
544. Id. at 17-18.
545. Id. at 27. Uniquely, the Statute of the SCC envisions shifting majorities at trial and appeal
levels. See Loi Organique, supra note 195, Articles 1 -13.
546. Schwendiman, supra note 337, at 280.
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transition period after Serbian opposition parties blocked a legislative amendment
to this effect.5 47 This arrangement was not universally accepted; some Serbian
leaders repeatedly called for the expulsion of international staff from BiH. 5 48
Two-tiered salary structures and the unequal allocation of other emoluments
may generate tensions between international and domestic staff, particularly when
the international salaries or perquisites vastly exceed those of their local
counterparts.5 49 The presence of internationals-whose salaries ordinarily make
up a large percentage of the budget of any tribunal-has caused resentment and
also driven up demands on the part of national counterparts. 550  For example,
international personnel within the Special Panels in Timor-Leste were U.N.
employees entitled to all U.N. benefits, which generated resentment among their
Timorese counterparts. All the staff of the ad hoc international tribunals were
granted the privileges and immunities of other U.N. staff pursuant to the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. 551  By
contrast, CICIG provides certain privileges and immunities only to its international
staff, which has left the local staff vulnerable to intimidation.5 5 2 Because the even
the international staff are not considered U.N. employees, they do not enjoy all
U.N. benefits, such as diplomatic passports or pensions.5 5 3  This has made it
difficult to attract high-quality U.N. personnel, although it also contributes to
perceptions of independence.
5 5 4
V. VENUE
The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials were held in situ, notwithstanding the
devastation wrought by WWII. Although the Allied Control Council was
headquartered in Berlin, in part to appease the Soviets, the city of Nuremberg was
chosen for the trials because a courtroom with adjacent prison facilities had
survived Allied bombing.5 5 The fact that the city was also associated with the
odious Nuremberg laws and Nazi party rallies added a symbolic touch to this
547. Id. at 280-81 (noting delays in reappointing and extending the mandate of international staff
led to delays in cases and the loss of expertise).
548. See HRW, State Court, supra note 496, at 37; Ivanigevi6, supra note 345, at 27.
549. Perriello & Wierda, supra note 124, at 16, 24.
550. Milli Lake, Organizing Hypocrisy: Providing Legal Accountability for Human Rights
Violations in Areas of Limited Statehood, 58 INT'L STUD. Q. 515, 524 (2014).
551. The judges, Prosecutor, and Registrar, for example, were treated as diplomatic envoys. See
ICTY Statute, supra note 64, at art. 30. See Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, 90 U.N.T.S. 327.
552. CICIG Agreement, supra note 356, art. 10.
553. Hudson & Taylor, supra note 349, at 20; CICIG Report, supra note 353, at 7.
554. WOLA, supra note 352, at 25 (recommending that non-United Nations entities could enter
into agreements similar to that between the United Nations and the ICC). See Negotiated Relationship
Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations, approved by the General
Assembly, Resolution 58/318 (Sept. 20, 2004), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/916FC6A2-7846-
4177-A5EA-5AA9B6DIE96C/0/ICCASP3ReslEnglish.pdf. A separate treaty, which is open to state
party ratification, addresses the privileges and immunities of ICC personnel. See Agreement on the
Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court, S.C. Res. 2271, 113 (Sept. 9, 2002).
555. Linder, supra note 511.
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choice.556 In another emblematic selection, the Allies convened the Tokyo
Tribunal in the former Imperial Japanese Army Headquarters Building. Hundreds
of trials proceeded before military commissions and other panels in the various
zones of occupation.557
By contrast, the original ad hoc tribunals were not located in the situation
countries themselves, although each tribunal eventually established local satellite
offices and relationships with domestic counterparts. The war was still ongoing in
the former Yugoslavia as the ICTY was conceptualized, so the tribunal was
headquartered in the Netherlands, which was already playing host to a number of
international courts and institutions. Although the genocide had been halted by the
time the ICTR was under construction, there were ongoing ethnic tensions in
Rwanda and lingering concerns about the security of witnesses and court staff.
558
After considering proposals from potential host states, the Council eventually
located the ICTR in neighboring Tanzania. 559 This created a host of logistical
difficulties not the least of which that there were no established flights between
Kigali and Arusha, necessitating the procurement of a dedicated Beech craft. The
distance also enabled Rwanda to more easily withhold cooperation (by, for
example, refusing to facilitate the travel of witnesses and court staff and allegedly
harassing defense counsel in country) in an effort to influence the work of the
tribunal. 560 The distance between the two ad hoc tribunals and the affected
societies gave rise to a pressing need to develop more formal community-based
and media outreach programs, which often fell short of what was many observers
felt was needed to bring the judicial proceedings to the people.5 6' Although both
ad hocs were empowered to sit elsewhere if "necessary for the efficient exercise of
[their] functions," they did not avail themselves of this option.62
556. Id.
557. See generally Symposium, A New Paradigm of Customary International Criminal Law: The
UN War Crimes Commission of 1943-1948 and its Associated Courts and Tribunals, 25 CRIM. L. FOR.
17(2014).
558. For the same reasons, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is also located in The Hague.
559. S.C. Res. 977, M 3-5 (Nov. 8, 1994).
560. See generally Cedric Ryngaert, State Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, 13 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 125 (2013). Likewise, although there were no security issues
weighing against the establishment of the ECCC in Phnom Penh, the tribunal's proximity has no doubt
facilitated actual political interference and perceptions thereof. See Christopher Dearing, An Analysis of
Corruption, Bias, and the High Presumption of Impartiality in the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia, http://www.d.dccam.org/Abouts/lntern/ChrisDearingJudicialBias.pdf. At the
same time, thousands of Cambodians have been able to visit the Court. See Outreach, ECCC,
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/tags/topic/70.
561. Jenevieve Discar, Assessment of Outreach Programs Executed by the ICT, ICTR and ECCC,
ICC FORUM (Mar. 16, 2015, 8:56 AM), http://iccforum.com/forum/permalink/97/4412; Scharf& Kang,
supra note 322, at 916-18. See generally OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 18 (arguing for the importance of robust outreach).
562. S.C. Res. 827, 6, (May 25, 1993). The ICC is also empowered to hold hearings in situ (art.
62), although the ICC President recently declined to allow opening statements in the proceedings
against Bosco Ntaganda to be delivered in Bunia, in eastern DRC, notwithstanding a Trial Chamber
recommendation to this effect. Press Release, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-CPI-2010615-
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The international community has since endeavored to build hybrid tribunals
closer to the events in question. There are a number of obvious benefits to this
approach, particularly when it comes to the ease of accumulating information that
may become evidence in future proceedings and facilitating the meaningful
participation of victims and witnesses. Remaining close to the target country also
facilitates the integration of local jurists, lawyers, and other staff into the work of
the tribunal. This lends greater local ownership and thus legitimacy to the process
and also contributes to building domestic capacity. The initial decision to place the
SCSL in Freetown was aided by the fact that the war had just ended, and a large
U.N. peacekeeping force (the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL)
backed by a contingent of British Special Forces was on the ground to assist with
security.563 That said, many of the SCSL's international judges did not reside full-
time in the country, which limited their ability to interact with the local legal
community.
564
Notwithstanding this preference for in-country proceedings, evolving events
on the ground may necessitate adjustments, as revealed by the collective decision
that it was too risky to try Charles Taylor in Freetown. 565 Once Taylor was in
custody, the SCSL and newly-elected Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf
requested that Taylor be tried outside of Freetown for security reasons. 566  In
UNSCR 1688, also issued under Chapter VII, the Council-with Russia insisting
that the situation was unique and did not set a precedent for resolving similar
situations in the future-determined that Taylor's continued presence posed a
threat to peace in the sub-region.567  The resolution, coupled with a 2006
Memorandum of Understanding between the Special Court and the ICC, facilitated
the transfer of the legal proceedings against Taylor to a borrowed courtroom in the
ICC. 56 8 Resolution 1688 also made clear that the SCSL would retain jurisdiction
over Taylor so long as the Netherlands would facilitate the transfer of witnesses,
etc. The Netherlands, in turn, agreed to Taylor's transfer to its territory only if
another state committed to imprisoning him in the event he was convicted and
sentenced. 569 Taylor is now serving his sentence in the United Kingdom, after the
PR 1118, Ntaganda Case: Trial Opening Statements will be Held at the Seat of the ICC, in the
Netherlands, (June 15, 2015).
563. Perriello & Wierda, The Special Court for Sierra Leone Under Scrutiny, supra note 176, at
12.
564. Id. at 20.
565. Charles Taylor, Background, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE MONITOR,
http://www.ijmonitor.org/charles-taylor-background [hereinafter IJM, Taylor].
566. Id.
567. S.C. Res. 1688, IMl 2-5 (June 16, 2006).
568. Memorandum of Understanding regarding Administrative Arrangements between the
International Criminal Court and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Doc. No. ICC-PRES/03-01-06,
http://www.icc-epi.int/NR/rdonlyres/66184EF8-E 181-403A-85B8-
3D07487D1FFI/140161/ICCPRES030106 en.pdf. Proceedings outside of Sierra Leone were not
contemplated by the SCSL Statute itself but rather by Rule 4 of the RPE. The premises of the ICTR
were also considered as a potential venue, but that tribunal was deemed to be too busy with its own
proceedings to host the Taylor trial.
569. UM, Taylor, supra note 565.
VOL. 44:2
THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF HYBRID JUSTICE
SCSL rejected his motion to be transferred to a prison in Rwanda.57 °
An important innovation on venue can be found in the mobile courts
developed to bring justice to remote areas in eastern DRC that have been ravaged
by war but are far from any formal justice institutions.5 71  These courts are
creatures of domestic law and come in both civilian and military varieties. The
latter-which can assert jurisdiction over civilians under certain
circumstances 572-had exclusive jurisdiction over international crimes until the
2013 passage of a Law on the Organization, Functioning, and Jurisdiction of the
Courts, which appeared to shift jurisdiction to the civilian courtS. 57 3 The military
courts are technically governed by the Military Penal Code,574 which contains
provisions on genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity that, while
passable, depart from standard international law definitions in certain ways and
seem to conflate the latter two crimes.575 Given this confused legal framework, the
570. In the Matter of Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. RSCSL-03-01-ES, Decision on Charles
Ghankay Taylor's Motion for Termination of Enforcement of Sentence in the United Kingdom and for
the Transfer to Rwanda and on Defense Application for Leave to Appeal Decision on Motion for
Termination of Enforcement of Sentence in the United Kingdom and for Transfer to Rwanda (Special
Court for Sierra Leone May 21, 2015).
571. For a discussion of the high levels of violence in the DRC, see UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF
THE HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: 1993-2003. REPORT
OF THE MAPPING EXERCISE DOCUMENTING THE MOST SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW COMM11rED WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO BETWEEN MARCH 1993 AND JUNE 2003, 381, 383-85, 434 (August 2010),
http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/DRCl0 06-xxReportDraft Democratic Republic of the Co
ngo 1993-2003.pdf [hereinafter Mapping Report]. The mapping exercise was initiated in 2007, and a
first draft of the Mapping Report was submitted to the High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2009.
See also United Nations Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, DRC: Mapping Human Rights
Violations 1993-2003,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/AfricaRegion/Pages/RDCProjetMapping.aspx (last visited
February 29, 2016). The Mapping Report concluded that the weak capacity of the national justice
sector coupled with an entrenched culture of impunity "underline the urgency and necessity of adopting
an additional justice mechanism, if only to judge the most senior figures responsible for the most
serious violations committed." Mapping Report, supra, at 471. No comprehensive mapping has been
untaken for the crimes committed since 2003, although documentation efforts abound.
572. SOFIA CANDEIAS ET AL., supra note 367, at 8-9 (discussing circumstances).
573. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 13/011 -B, Apr. 11, 2013,
art. 91, (Dem. Rep. Congo),
www.leganet.cd/LegislationiDroit%20Judiciaire/LOI. 13.011.11.04.2013.htm. See generally HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, ETATS GENERAUX OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
CONGO: RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE FIGHT AGAINST IMPUNITY FOR GRAVE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
(April 2015),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/relatedmaterial/2015_DRCEtatsGeneraux of the Justice sys
tem(l ).pdf.
574. PORTANT CODE JUDICIAIRE MILITAIRE [MILITARY CODE], arts. 161-86 (Dem. Rep. Congo),
http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Judiciaire/Loi.023.2002.18.11.2002.pdf.
575. See Elude de Jurisprudence: L'Application du Statut de Rome de la Cour PAnale
Internationale par les Juridictions de la R~publique Democratique du Congo, AVOCATS SANS
FRONTIERES (Mar. 2009), 72-75, http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ASFrapportRomecsc light.pdf
(discussing idiosyncrasies of the Military Penal Code).
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mobile military courts directly applied the provisions of Rome Statute,576 which
the DRC had ratified but had not yet fully implemented until recently. 577 The
mobile courts have largely focused on sexual and gender-based violence
("SGBV").578 Controversially, the U.N. Development Program will only fund a
mobile court session if it includes SGBV charges; 579 as a result, cases involving
other serious crimes (murder, pillage, the use of child soldiers) have gone
unprosecuted. 8°
These trials rely heavily on international assistance. 581 The American Bar
Association's Rule of Law Initiative ("ABA ROLl") and other donors provide
training for court staff, help to secure lodging and transportation for witnesses
(which diminishes adjournment rates), and offer pro bono legal assistance to
victims and defendants.582 The mobile courts, which also work with MONUSCO
and other local partners, offer a high degree of local access and ownership while
helping to build legal capacity.5 83 They also coordinate with legal clinics to ensure
cases are trial-ready; provide appropriate referrals to non-legal organizations that
can offer medical, social, and economic assistance to victims; and engage in
community education and outreach. 4 So far, evaluations of the mobile courts
576. See supra note 482 and accompanying text.
577. See, e.g., Auditeur Militaire v. Kibibi, RP No. 043, RMP 1337/MTIJl 1 (2011); Kelly Askin,
Fizi Diary: Mobile Court Trials Landmark Rape Case, OPEN SOC'Y FOUNDATIONS (Feb. 17, 2011)
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/fizi-diary-mobile-court-tries-landmark-rape-case; Congo
Army Colonel Guilty of Ordering Mass Rape on New Year's Day, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 21, 2011,
11:44 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/society/2011/feb/21/congo-rape-trial. See generally
Antonietta Trapani, Complementarity in the Congo: The Direct Application of the Rome Statute in the
Military Courts of the DRC, DOMAC, 33-35 (Nov. 12, 2011); Baylis, supra note 22 (discussing three
exemplar trials).
578. ANTONIETTA TRAPANI, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE CONGO: THE DIRECT APPLICATION OF
THE ROME STATUTE IN THE MILITARY COURTS OF THE DRC 26-27 (DOMAC ed., 2011).
579. United Nations Development Programme, Evaluation of UNDP's Support to Mobile Courts 9,
6-20 (May 2014),
http://www.undp.org/eontent/dam/undp/library/crisis%/2Oprevention/UNDPROL Mobile%/20CourtsE
valuationNov2014.pdf [hereinafter UNDP, Mobile Courts].
580. SOFIA CANDEIAS ET AL., supra note 367, at 28.
581. American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative has received funds from the Dutch,
Norwegian, and United States Governments; the MacArthur Foundation; the Open Society Justice
Initiative for Southern Africa; and other donors. United States government funding has come from the
U.S. Department of State (its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement and its Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
See Michael Maya, Reflections on ABA ROLl's Efforts to Combat the Rape Crisis in War-Torn Eastern
Congo, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, June 2011, at 5,
http://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/rule of law/where we work/africa/democratic republic congo/
news/news drc reflections aba roli efforts to combat the rapecrisis_061 l.html.
582. Our Work & Research, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE,
http://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/rule of law/about/work research.html (last visited Nov. 6,
2015); ABA ROLl, PROMOTING JUSTICE, ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY AND HUMAN DIGNITY 26 (2013).
583. UNDP, Mobile Courts, supra note 579, at 10.
584. Tessa Khan & Jim Wormington, Mobile Courts in the DRC: Lessons from Development for
International Criminal Justice, OXFORD TRANSITIONAL JUST. RES.WORKING PAPER SERIES 19, 27.
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have been cautiously optimistic. 585 Similar mobile models have been deployed for
ordinary crimes in Sierra Leone, Somalia, Central Africa Republic (before the
recent crisis), and Timor-Leste. 86
Locating a mixed tribunal in the affected country depends heavily on the
existence of a functioning and secure judicial system and related institutions. The
Special Panels for Serious Crimes operated within the District Court of Dili in
Timor-Leste, but the lack of local capacity seriously hindered the ability of these
panels to function fairly and effectively.587 This will likely be an issue with respect
to the new Special Criminal Court for CAR, which will be located in Bangui,
although it is empowered to sit elsewhere under exceptional circumstances. 
588
VI. JURISDICTIONAL DECISIONS
Determining the scope of the particular justice mechanism involves several
major decisions concerning the tribunal's subject matter, temporal, geographic, and
personal jurisdiction. In particular, statute drafters must identify prosecutable
crimes with the option of drawing from international law (with prior statutes
incorporating both treaty and customary international law), domestic law, or a
combination of the above. Tinkering with the court's temporal and geographic
reach offers a way to focus the tribunal on particular incidents or episodes of mass
violence but also to exclude consideration of politically-contentious events for
which there may be no international consensus around the desirability of
prosecution. Architects generally also place limits on the court's personal
jurisdiction in the sense of the type or status of defendant who can be prosecuted.
In this regard, the availability vel non of status and functional immunities has
arisen as a point of contention.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Charters of the IMT and the Tokyo Tribunal established the original ICL
canon by allowing for the prosecution of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
crimes against the peace. 589 Although existing law-of-war treaties inspired the war
crimes provisions, the latter two crimes were novel and needed to be defined.
Drafters included a critical limiting principle in the definition of crimes against
humanity: while allowing for the prosecution of crimes against humanity
committed "before or during the war," such crimes would only be prosecuted if
they were committed "in execution of or in connection with any crime within the
585. See generally Lake, supra note 550 (arguing that the lack of state institutions in eastern DRC
has allowed for the diffusion of international norms and has enabled external actors to exert influence
over judicial processes); Michael Maya, Mobile Courts in the Democratic Republic of Congo:
Complementarity in Action?, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE (Dec. 3, 2012).
586. UNDP, Mobile Courts, supra note 579, at 4.
587. Passy Mubalama & Simon Jennings, Roving Courts in Eastern Congo, INST. FOR WAR &
PEACE REPORTING, Feb. 13, 2013, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/roving-courts-eastern-congo (last
visited: Nov. 7, 2015).
588. Loi Organique, supra note 195, at art. 2.
589. IMT Charter, supra note 428, at art. 6; Tokyo Charter, supra note 59.
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jurisdiction of the Tribunal," i.e., war crimes or crimes against the peace.590 This
formulation became known as the "war nexus," and it is apparent that the Charter's
drafters and the Nuremberg Tribunal itself considered the war nexus necessary to
justify the extension of international jurisdiction into what would otherwise be acts
within the domestic confines, and thus jurisdiction, of a state.591 As a result of the
war nexus in the Nuremberg Statute, most-but not all-of the crimes against
humanity adjudicated by the IMT occurred after the invasion of Poland and the
official start of WWII, effectively negating the phrase "before or during the
war., 592  That said, for some pre-invasion acts, the Tribunal was satisfied by
evidence of a rather tenuous connection between the alleged crimes against
humanity and the war. 59 3 As an example, the IMT prosecuted crimes committed in
connection with the Austrian Anschluss, effectuated in March 193 8.
594
By contrast, the Tokyo Tribunal, attesting to its focus on crimes against the
peace, asserted jurisdiction back to the 1931 invasion of Manchuria and up through
Japan's surrender in August 1945. 595 That said, the Tokyo Tribunal was subject to
its own limitations. According to Article 5 of its Charter, the Tribunal could only
prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity if the individual in question
would also be charged with initiating and waging wars of aggression.596 In the
end, both tribunals focused their attention on prosecuting individuals accused of
crimes against the peace. 597 Now denominated the crime of aggression, this crime
has not been the subject of international or domestic prosecution, although
amendments to the Rome Statute defining the crime and setting out a jurisdictional
framework could enter into force as early as 2017.598 The IHT Statute included a
domestic-law variant of the crime of aggression applicable to Iraqi armed forces,
which is unique among internationalized tribunals, and domestic statutes for that
matter.599 Had Saddam Hussein not been executed, this provision could have
590. IMT Charter, supra note 428.
591. See Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the
Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 787 (1999) (discussing origins and gradual demise of the
war nexus).
592. See Trial of German Major War Criminals, Judgment and Sentences, (Int'l Mil. Trib.-
Nuremburg Oct. 1, 1946), 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 249 (1947) [hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment].
593. Van Schaack, supra note 591, at 806.
594. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 592, at 310, 318-21.
595. See Tokyo War Crimes Trial, Judgment, (Int'l Mil. Trib. for the Far East Nov. 4, 1948),
http://werle.rewi.hu-berlin.de/tokio.pdf.
596. Tokyo Charter, supra note 59, at art. 5. A modem day linkage of crimes of this nature is
found in the Rome Statute, which allows for the crime of persecution to be prosecuted only in
connection with other enumerated crimes against humanity or Rome Statute crimes. See Rome Statute,
supra note 273, at art. 7(l)(h).
597. GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNALS 174 (2000).
598. Int'l Crim. Ct., RC/Res.6, art. 15.3 (June I1, 2010), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf.
599. IHT Statute, supra note 328, at art. 14(3) (penalizing the "abuse of position and the pursuit of
policies that may lead to the threat of war or the use of the Iraqi armed forces against an Arab country,
in accordance with Article I of Law 7 of 1958."). See generally Claus Kress, The Iraqi Special
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generated charges in connection with Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait and
potentially its war with Iran, 6°° although charges involving the former likely would
have complicated Kuwait's reparations claims. 6° 1
The statutes of the first ad hoc international tribunals incorporated by direct
reference, imitation, or implication the penal provisions of a number of multilateral
treaties, including the 1907 Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land, the 1949 Geneva Conventions governing international armed
conflicts ("IACs"), common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, Protocol II
(1977) governing non-international armed conflicts ("NIACs"), and the 1948
Genocide Convention. 60 2 An open-ended statutory provision ascribing jurisdiction
over "violations of the laws and customs of war" enabled the ICTY to develop the
prohibition on war crimes by expanding the law governing NIACs and
harmonizing it with the law governing IACs, thus minimizing the significance of
conflict classification in war crimes prosecutions. 6 03 In a formulation has not been
repeated elsewhere, the drafters of the ICTY Statute incorporated a version of the
crimes against humanity war nexus, which limited the temporal reach of the ICTY
when it came to crimes committed in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict. 6° 4 The
other tribunals' statutes contain slightly different formulations of the offense, but
crimes against humanity are now completely uncoupled from a state of armed
conflict in these instruments.
In addition to NIAC war crimes and crimes against humanity, Article 4 of the
SCSL Statute penalized crimes against international peacekeepers and
humanitarian personnel (reflecting the fact that the RUF took U.N. peacekeepers
hostage in 2000) as well as the conscription or enlistment of children into armed
groups, a pervasive practice during the war in Sierra Leone.6 °5 Reflecting the
Tribunal and the Crime ofAggression, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 347 (2004).
600. Michael A. Newton, Iraqi Special Tribunal, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L
(June 2010), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/ 10.1093/law:epi19780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e1703.
601. Kuwait Says Owed $11.2 Billion in Iraq War Reparations, AL ARABIYA NEWS, Apr. 30,
2013, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/04/30/Kuwait-says-owed- l1-2-billion-in-
Iraq-war-reparations-.html.
602. Direct incorporation of treaty language is expedient but can cause some confusion. For
example, drafters of the statutes of the original ad hocs borrowed both the definition of genocide and
prosecutable forms of responsibility from Articles 2 and 3 of the Genocide Convention. The latter
(which prohibited "complicity" in genocide) did not map perfectly onto statutory provisions on
individual criminal responsibility in the ICTY/R statutes (e.g., Article 7(1) goveming "aiding and
abetting"). This led to convoluted efforts to reconcile this terminology. Many internationalized entities
do not allow for jurisdiction over the inchoate crime of incitement except with respect to the crime
genocide, given the treaty reference in Article 2(c) of the Convention. The new SCC in CAR, for
example, will be able to assert jurisdiction over direct and public incitement to genocide (Article 55(e))
but not to crimes against humanity or war crimes. See Loi Organique, supra note 195, at art. 55(e).
603. ICTY Statute, supra note 64, at art. 3. See generally Allison Marston Danner, When Courts
Make Law: How the International Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1
(2006).
604. Id. at art. 7. See text accompanying note 123.
605. See SCSL Statute, supra note 170, at art. 4; Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Case No.
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nature of abuses in Chad under the Habrd dictatorship, the EAC in Senegal will
adjudicate war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and torture.6 °6 To
guarantee compliance with the principle of legality, the statute provides for
jurisdiction over violations of international treaties ratified by Chad.60 7
Internationalized tribunal statutes often include reference to the relevant
domestic law as well, either exclusively or in connection with international crimes.
Setting it apart from other hybrid institutions, the law being applied by the STL is
drawn exclusively from the Lebanese Penal Code and concerns terrorism and
related crimes against personal integrity and involving illicit associations. 60 8 The
STL is thus the first international tribunal to assert jurisdiction over purely
domestic crimes and crimes of terrorism stricto sensu,60 9 although the ICTY did
adjudicate as war crimes acts of violence the primary purpose of which was to
spread terror among the civilian population as is prohibited by Article 51(2) of
Additional Protocol I and Article 13(2) of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.610 During the formation of the STL, there was some
discussion about including crimes against humanity as a prosecutable offense, but
this proposal was ultimately rejected by Russia and the United States, likely for
fear of lowering the threshold for the crime.611 A proposal to incorporate by
reference the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, which contains a
regional definition of terrorism, was also rejected.612
The STL was inspired by a single event: the February 14, 2005, assassination
of former Prime Minister Hariri. A similar model is under consideration for the
downing of Malaysian Air Flight 17 (MH-17). 613 Following the event, the Security
Council authorized the creation of a Joint Investigation Team-which was
eventually composed of representatives from Australia, Belgium, Malaysia, the
SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction, 9 (Special
Ct. for Sierra Leone May 31, 2004) (convicting defendant for using child soldiers),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/CDF/Appeal/131/SCSL-04-14-AR72%28E%29-131 .pdf.
606. EAC Statute, supra note 225, at art. 4. See generally ROMESH SILVA ET AL., STATE
VIOLENCE IN CHAD: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF REPORTED PRISON MORTALITY IN CHAD'S DDS
PRISONS AND COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY OF HISStNE HABRE, 1982-1990 (2010),
https://www.hrdag.org/content/chad/State-Violence-in-Chad.pdf (discussing how the security
directorate in Chad during Habr6's reign implemented a systematic program of political killings,
arbitrary detention, and torture).
607. EAC Statute, supra note 225, at art. 3.
608. STL Statute, supra note 95, at art. 2.
609. See Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide,
Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, Case No. STL-11-01/I/AC/R76bis (Feb. 16, 2011),
https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/stl-1 I -01/case-law/534-t0936.
610. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stanislav Gali6, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj03l205e.pdf
611. Nidal Nabil Jurdi, The Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUSTICE 1125, 1128 (2007).
612. Id.
613. Patrick Wintour, David Cameron Pushes for MH1 7 Inquiry After Russia Blocks UN Tribunal,
THE GUARDIAN, July 30, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/30/david-cameron-mhl7-
inquiry-russia-blocks-un-tribunal.
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Netherlands, the United States, Great Britain, and Ukraine-and called on all
States and actors in the region to give their full cooperation to the investigation.6 14
A notional statute would allow for the assertion of jurisdiction over a select set of
war crimes (the willful killing of civilians, attacks on the civilian population and
civilian objects, violence to life and person, and the murder of persons taking no
active part in armed hostilities), crimes against the safety of civil aviation (as
defined by Malaysian law), and murder and other violent crimes under Ukrainian
law. It reflected elements drawn from the ICC Statute as well as other ad hoc and
hybrid tribunals. 6 15 This planned mix of Ukrainian and Malaysian law is a novel
feature in light of the transnational nature of the incident. The Lockerbie tribunal
by contrast relied exclusively on Scots law governing murder, conspiracy to
murder, and violations of the Aviation Security Act of 1982.616
The direct incorporation of domestic law provides familiarity and local
legitimacy. It may also, however, import retrograde elements into an
internationalized process, provoke resentment if the law was previously deployed
as a tool for discrimination, cause confusion when paired with international law, or
make it difficult to fully integrate and utilize international staff unless they are
provided with adequate training. For example, UNMIK Regulation 1999/1
originally provided that the Kosovar judiciary would apply the Yugoslav law in
force in 1999 unless it was deemed incompatible with international human rights
standards. 6 17 The still extant 1976 Criminal Code of the former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia contained the crimes of genocide and war crimes, although
the applicable definitions departed slightly from CIL. 6 1t  These crimes carried
penalties of up to fifteen years' imprisonment or the death penalty.619 There was
no provision on crimes against humanity. 62  During the UNMIK period, Albanian
jurists expressed resentment toward the retention of Yugoslav law. Instead, they
often applied an iteration of the law that predated Milogevi's elimination of
614. S.C. Res. 2166, supranote 13.
615. For the proposed creation of a tribunal and statute for Flight MH-17, see S.C. Res. 562 (July
29, 2015), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/ /7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s 2015_562.pdf [hereinafter MH-17 Draft Statute]. However, the MH-1 7 Draft
Statute was not adopted by the Security Council following a Russian veto. See U.N. SCOR, 701h Sess.,
7498 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.7498 (July 29, 2015), http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/scl1990.doc.htm.
See generally Alex Whiting, How to Prosecute the Perpetrators of the Malaysian Jet Downing, JUST
SECURITY, July 25, 2014, https://www.justsecurity.org/13269/prosecute-perpetrators-malaysian-jet-
downing/; Aaron Matta & Anda Scarlat, Malaysia Airlines Flight MH-17-Possible Legal Avenues for
Redress (Part 1), OPINIOJURIS (Aug. 27, 2015), http://opiniojuris.org/2015/08/27/guest-post-malaysia-
airlines-flight-mh 17-possible-legal-avenues-for-redress-part-1/.
616. Her Majesty's Advocate v. Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi & Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah,
Case No: 1475/99, Verdict (High Court Of Justiciary At Camp Zeist Dec. 21, 1988),
http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/search-judgments/lockerbie-trial (convicting one defendant of 270 counts
of murder; acquitting second defendant).
617. UNMIKReg. No. 1999/1 (25 July, 1999),
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/regO 1-99.htm.
618. Cerone & Baldwin, supra note 142, at 29-30.
619. Id.
620. Id.
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Kosovo's autonomy in 1989, at times to the detriment of Serbian parties.62'
UNMIK later revised its regulations to reflect this practice and also incorporated a
host of human rights treaties, only some of which had been ratified by the former
Yugoslavia. 622 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR") is also deemed to be directly applicable in
Kosovo and has been applied by international judges and prosecutors.623
The WCC in the State Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina are entirely domestic
structures that are staffed with international personnel charged with adjudicating
domestic law, which has incorporated elements of international law as a result of
2003 amendments to the penal code.624 Their creation followed the enactment of
new penal and procedural codes in 2003, which introduced some adversarial
elements (e.g., plea agreements) into what had been a civil law domestic system.625
At that time, the Office of the High Representative to BiH exercised his so-called
"Bonn Powers" and updated BiH's penal law to include crimes against humanity
and to augment the sentences applicable to international crimes; the death penalty,
however, had been abolished during the Dayton peace process by virtue of the
incorporation of the ECHR.6 26 The WCC generally applied the body of law that
was deemed most lenient to the defendant (pursuant the principle of lex mitior),
although the abolition of the death penalty complicated this determination and led
to a somewhat fragmented jurisprudence. 627  The legislative framework also
allowed for the use of ICTY evidence, judicial notice of adjudicated facts, etc.628
621. Day, supra note 130, at 186.
622. UNM1KReg. No. 1999/24, at 1 (Dec. 12, 1999),
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1 999/reg24-99.htm (designating the law in force in Kosovo on
March 22, 1989, as the applicable law). See also UNMLK Reg. No. 2000/59 (Oct. 27, 2000)
(identifying four sources of law in Kosovo--SRSG regulations, the law in force in 1989, the law
applied under Regulation 1999/24, and international human rights-without reference to any hierarchy
among them).
623. See UNMIK Reg. No. 1999/24, supra note 622, §1.3 (mandating that persons undertaking
public duties adhere to the ECHR among other human rights instruments). See generally Fisnik
Korenica & Dren Doli, Taking Care of Strasbourg: The Status of the European Convention on Human
Rights and the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights in Kosovo 's Domestic Legal System,
32 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 209 (2011) (noting the incorporation of the ECHR and related jurisprudence into
the domestic legal order).
624. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NARROWING THE IMPUNITY GAP: TRIALS BEFORE BOSNIA'S
WAR CRIMES CHAMBER 11-12 (2007), https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/02/1 1/narrowing-impunity-
gap/trials-bosnias-war-crimes-chamber. Indeed, the some WCC judges treated ICTY jurisprudence as
all but precedential.
625. The High Representative first imposed the new codes on Bosnia & Herzegovina, which were
later adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly. See Criminal Code of Bos. & Herz., supra note 495.
Chapter 17 of the Code incorporates definitions of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity
that are largely consistent with the Rome Statute. See Schwendiman, supra note 337, at 296.
626. Dayton Peace Accords, supra note 341, at Annex 6, art. 1.
627. European Commission for Democracy Through Law, Opinion on Legal Certainty and the
Independence of Judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 648/2011 (June 18, 2012).
628. Case of Maktouf and Damjanovi6 v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eur. Ct. H.R., Appl. No.
2312/08 & 34179/08, Judgment (2013) [ 37-40 [hereinafter Maktouf & Damjanovid]; Ivanigevid,
supra note 345, at 7.
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Because the WCC are wholly domestic entities, they are subject to supervision by
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in light of Bosnia-Herzegovina's
ratification of the ECHR. In response to a challenge by WCC defendants
convicted of war crimes under the new provisions, the ECtHR's Grand Chamber
found that the WCC had violated Article 7 of the European Convention, which
protects against the retroactive application of the penal law. 62 9 The Constitutional
Court then overturned several other judgments in response and ordered the WCC
to henceforth apply the earlier law and penalties. 630 Relying upon the state of CIL
at the time the defendant acted, the ECtHR let stand a conviction for crimes against
humanity in a different case, even though this was an entirely new offense under
BiH law.
63 1
Judicial mechanisms formed simultaneously with, or after, the promulgation
of the Rome Statute often borrow from its substantive provisions, even before the
treaty has been signed or has entered into force for the state in question. The
Regulations governing proceedings before the Timor-Leste Special Panels, for
example, mirrored many Rome Statute provisions, including with respect to
substantive law, general principles of criminal law, and defenses.632 The law
establishing the SCC in CAR makes reference to the crimes of genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes, which are defined in 2010 revisions to the Penal
Code that followed upon CAR's 2001 ratification of the Rome Statute.633 CAR
has not yet fully incorporated the Rome Statute, however. The IHT Statute
borrowed heavily from the Rome Statute for the definitions of international crimes,
notwithstanding that the United States' involvement in that effort came at a time
when the United States-ICC relationship was less constructive than it is today. The
IHT could resort to the decisions of the international criminal tribunals to interpret
629. Maktouf & Damjanovid, supra note 628, O 67-76 (finding that defendants should have been
sentenced under the prior sentencing framework, even though the sentence itself was within the range
of the original legislation). Article 7 prohibits the imposition of a heavier penalty than what was
applicable at the time the offense was committed. See European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 7, Sept. 3, 1953, ETS 5,
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/ConventionENG.pdf. However, it does allow for the prosecution
of an act or omission that while uncodified was criminal "according to the general principles of law as
recognised by the community civilized nations." Maktouf& Damjanovid, supra note 628, [ 10.
630. See Francesco De Sanctis, The Impact of the ECtHR's Judgment in Maktouf-Damjanovi& on
Accountability and Punishment for War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, EJIL TALK! (Nov. 12, 2013),
http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-impact-of-the-ecthrs-judgment-in-maktouf-damjanovic-on-accountability-
and-punishment-for-war-crimes-crimes-in-bosnia-herzegovina/.
631. Simi6, supra note 497, 11 25 (holding "the applicant's acts, at the time when they were
committed, constituted an offence defined with sufficient accessibility and foreseeability by
international law").
632. UNTAET Reg. No. 2000/15, supra note 150, § 7. The crime of torture was defined along the
lines of the CAT. East Timor acceded to the Rome Statute in 2002.
633. See Loi No. 10.001 du 06 Janvier 2010 Portant Code Penal Centrafricain, at arts. 152-62,
(Cent. Afr. Rep.), http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/SERIAL88116/100661/Fl881819351/CAF-
88116.pdf [hereinafter Cent. Afr. Rep. Code Penal]; see also Central African Republic, Loi No. 10.001
portant Code pnal centrafricain, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (WIPO),
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file-id=195085 (last visited Mar. 28, 2016).
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the definitions of international crimes,634 although gaining access to Arabic
translations proved difficult and required funding from USAID among others.
635
In keeping with their hybrid nature, many of these institutions-including the
SCSL, the IHT, the Timor-Leste Special Panels, and the ECCC-can assert
pendant jurisdiction over relevant domestic crimes.636 For example, the SCSL
could have prosecuted arson and crimes involving the abuse of girls per Article 5
of its Statute, although these crimes did not appear in any indictments. Likewise,
the IHT per Article 14 of its Statute could assert jurisdiction over the wastage of
national resources and interfering with the judicial process. The ECCC has
jurisdiction over certain domestic crimes-homicide, torture and religious
persecution-drawn from the 1956 Penal Code, which went unenforced during and
after the Khmer Rouge era, effectively rendering it a form of "dead law., 6 37 These
ordinary crimes were included in part out of concerns that a strict fealty to the
principle of legality might eliminate some international charges.638 For example, it
was not clear if crimes against humanity were still subject to a war nexus during
the Khmer Rouge period,639 if war crimes committed in NIACs were justiciable,
and if the crime of genocide would capture the Khmer Rouge's violence. That
said, allowing for the prosecution of domestic crimes required an extension of the
standard ten-year statute of limitations,640 which raised its own legality concerns. 64 1
More contemporary justice efforts may not present the same legality and statute of
limitations challenges as experienced by the ECCC, which are engaged in a rather
extreme case of historical justice. 42
Similarly, the Timor-Leste Special Panels could adjudicate elements of
634. IHT Statute, supra note 328, at art. 17(2).
635. Newton, supra note 600, at 400.
636. See generally Suzannah Linton, Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone: Experiments in
International Justice, 12 CRIM. L. FOR. 185 (2001).
637. See generally Scott Worden, An Anatomy of the Extraordinary Chambers, in BRINGING THE
KHMER ROUGE TO JUSTICE: PROSECUTING MASS VIOLENCE BEFORE THE CAMBODIAN COURTS (Jaya
Ramji & Beth Van Schaack eds., 2005).
638. See Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, Nuon Chea's Consolidated Preliminary Objections,
(Extraordinary Chambers in the Cts. of Cambodia Feb. 25, 2011) (arguing that crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and genocide were not part of Cambodian law during the Khmer Rouge era).
639. Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgment, 292 (Extraordinary Chambers in the Cts of
Cambodia Jul. 26 2010); Case No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, Decision on Co-Prosecutors' Request to
Exclude Armed Conflict Nexus Requirement from the Definition of Crimes Against Humanity, I I
(Extraordinary Chambers in the Cts of Cambodia Oct. 26, 2011).
640. See ECCC Statute, supra note 190, at art. 3 (extending statute of limitations).
641. Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/TC, Decision on the Defence Preliminary Objection
Concerning the Statute of Limitations of Domestic Crimes, 1[ 1 (Extraordinary Chambers in the Cts. of
Cambodia July 26, 2010). The Trial Chamber split on this issue: the three Cambodian judges
determined that the domestic law charges were not time-barred because the statute of limitations tolled
until the holding of free elections and the promulgation of the Constitution in 1993; the two
international judges reached the opposite conclusion. See generally id. Because the Chamber could not
achieve a super-majority, the domestic crime charges were dropped. Id. 56.
642. Beth Van Schaack, International Crimes and Statutes of Limitation, INTLAWGRRLS (Oct. 30,
2008), http://www.intlawgrrls.com/2008/10/international-crimes-and-statutes-of.html.
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domestic law 643 and were first governed by Transitional Rules of Criminal
Procedure introduced by UNTAET in 2001. 644  These blended aspects of
Indonesian law, which had been imposed during the long occupation, with a mix of
civil law and common law elements. International penal definitions were drawn
from the Rome Statute.645  The Special Panels' Court of Appeal caused
considerable confusion when it ruled that Panels should apply Portuguese law
because the application of Indonesian law was proscribed in light of Indonesia's
unlawful occupation. 646 The same ruling invalidated the international criminal law
charges on the ground that they were impermissibly retroactive. 647 Subsequent
legislation and jurisprudence overrode this decision on the grounds that
international crimes were already prohibited by customary international law during
the referendum period.648 Judges hailing from common law and civil law systems
regularly applied different procedural rules during Panel proceedings, generating
confusion and precedential inconsistencies.
649
The nascent ACJHR will assert jurisdiction over the ICL canon (including a
more expansive crime of aggression), but also over crimes of particular interest to
the African continent: piracy, terrorism, mercenarism, corruption, money
laundering, trafficking (in persons, drugs, and hazardous waste), and the illicit
exploitation of natural resources. 650  Most controversial has been the crime of
"unconstitutional change of government." 651 The African Charter on Democracy,
Elections and Governance ("ACDEG") has as a stated objective the prohibition of
unconstitutional changes of government in member states, considering such
circumstances to pose "a serious threat to stability, peace, security and
government., 652  Article 25(5) of the ACDEG also envisions the criminal
prosecution of the perpetrators of such acts "before the competent court of the
Union," effectively requiring the AU to define the crime and create a court for its
643. See, e.g., UNTAET Reg. No. 2000/15, supra note 150, §§ 8-9 (enabling the prosecution of
murder and sexual offenses under the applicable Penal Code of Timor-Leste). The definition of some
forms of sexual violence in Indonesian law contained retrograde elements. Reiger & Wierda, Timor-
Leste, supra note 144, at 24.
644. UNTAET Reg. No. 2000/30, supra note 454.
645. Id.
646. MOHAMED C. OTHMAN, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
VIOLATIONS: THE CASE OF RWANDA AND EAST TIMOR 91 (2005).
647. Prosecutor v. Armando dos Santos, Case No. 16/2001, Decision, (Ct of Appeal for East Timor
July 15, 2003); Sylvia de Bertodano, Current Developments in Internationalized Courts: East Timor-
Justice Denied, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 910, 916 (2004).
648. Prosecutor v. Mateus Lap a.k.a Ena Poto, Case No. 10/2003, (D. Ct. of Dili Dec. 3, 2003); de
Bertodano, supra note 647, at 921.
649. The Special Panels for Serious Crimes - Justice for East Timor?, supra note 146, at 3, 5.
650. ACJHR Protocol, supra note 239, at art. 28.
651. ISSAKA K. SOUARE, THE AU AND THE CHALLENGE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES OF
GOVERNMENT IN AFRICA (2009).
652. African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance art. 2(4), Feb. 15, 2012,
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/AFRICANCHARTERONDEMOCRACYELECTIONSA
NDGOVERNANCE.pdf.
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prosecution.653 The difficulty in reaching definitional consensus partially explains
the delay in finalizing the constitutive documents for the new regional court. This
crime has now been defined in Article 28E of the Protocol to include coups or
other interventions to replace democratically-elected governments and any changes
to the state's constitution by an incumbent to maintain power.
654
B. Temporal & Geographic Jurisdiction
Being largely ad hoc in nature, many hybrid justice mechanisms have had
express or implied limits placed on their temporal and geographic jurisdiction.
Since several prior tribunals were created in the midst of ongoing conflicts
(notably the ICTY and SCSL), they did not have a prescribed end date for their
temporal jurisdiction or their lifespan. This has necessitated the development by
the Security Council of Completion Strategies for the ad hoc tribunals and certain
655transitional administrations. For conflicts that have subsided, it might be
reasonable to put an end date on an ad hoc mechanism, with some prospects of a
residual capacity, in order to encourage efficiency in proceedings and control cost
overruns. Another temporal jurisdictional angle stems from the fact that several
such mechanisms have been designed to exercise jurisdiction over crimes
committed before their establishment. This has necessitated consideration of how
the ex post facto prohibition applies in international criminal law.6 56 Generally, the
principle of legality is deemed satisfied when the conduct in question was criminal
under international law, even if relevant domestic law was lacking.657 Issues of ex
post facto may be more salient, however, when it comes to novel international
crimes.
The ICTY's temporal jurisdiction was open-ended, since the wars launched
by the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia were ongoing when the tribunal was
established.658 As such, the ICTY was in a position to address crimes committed
across the territory of the former Yugoslavia, including the republics and
autonomous provinces of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-
Montenegro, Kosovo, and what became awkwardly known as the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Although the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Croatia had wound down by 1995, the tribunal was still in operation in 1998 when
653. Id. at art. 25(5).
654. Abass, supra note 499, at 939-41.
655. Completion Strategy, U.N. INT'L. CRIM, TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/completion-strategy (last visited Nov. 28, 2015) (conveying the
ICTY's completion strategy).
656. See Beth Van Schaack, Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the Intersection of Law and
Morals, 97 GEO. L. J. 119 (2008).
657. ICCPR, supra note 222, at art. 15(2).
658. ICTY Statute, supra 64, at arts. 1, 8 (allowing for jurisdiction over serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991). This is
also the case with respect to the SCC in CAR, which can assert jurisdiction over crimes committed
since 2003 (an earlier bill would have limited jurisdiction to crimes committed since the 2012 Sdldka
rebellion); Loi Organique, supra note 195, at art. 3.
VOL. 44:2
THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF HYBRID JUSTICE
the Kosovo conflict first flared. The Prosecutor
659 and the Security Council 6 °
confirmed that the ICTY retained jurisdiction over events there. Because the
ICTY Statute did not limit jurisdiction to any particular nationality, the war in
Kosovo also presented the possibility that citizens of NATO member states might
come before the tribunal in connection with Operation Allied Force. Nevertheless,
the Prosecutor-and not without controversy-ultimately declined to move
forward with any investigations on the basis of recommendations of her staff.661
Because the ICTY Statute required a war nexus, it excluded certain crimes
committed in the aftermath of the war in Kosovo, thus necessitating a separate
accountability mechanism to address the organ-trafficking and other allegations in
662the Marty Report. The new Kosovo court will address crimes committed from
January 1, 1998, to December 31, 2000, thus encompassing Operation Allied Force
(which ended on June 10, 1999) and periods of time when the territory was under
UNMIK administration. 663 It remains to be seen to what extent allegations that the
international community turned a blind eye to KLA abuses will feature in the
proceedings. 664 This court will be able to adjudicate crimes allegedly committed in
detention centers located in neighboring Albania as well.
665
The geographic jurisdiction of the ICTR was slightly broader than that of the
ICTY, allowing for the prosecution of all crimes committed on the territory of
Rwanda and all crimes committed by Rwandan nationals on the territory of
neighboring states, a feature that would have encompassed revenge crimes against
Hutu refugees committed in the Democratic Republic of Congo, although this
latter authority was never invoked.666  The ICTR's temporal jurisdiction was
narrower, by contrast; the Security Council limited the tribunal to considering
crimes committed in 1994, even though the downing of President Habyarimana's
plane, which sparked the genocide, occurred in April 1994.667 This restraint ran
counter to Rwanda's preferences that the temporal jurisdiction extend backwards
in time to 1990 but halt at July 1994, when the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front
659. ICTY Press Release PR/P.I.S./437-E, supra note 123, 1.
660. S.C. Res. 1160, 17 (Mar. 31, 1998) (urging the Prosecutor to begin gathering information
related to the violence in Kosovo, reiterating the obligation of the authorities in Yugoslavia to
cooperate, and indicating that the Contact Group would share information with the tribunal).
661. See Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (2000) (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia), http://www.icty.org/sid/10052.
662. See generally Marty Report, supra note 259.
663. MH-17 Draft Statute, supra note 615, at art. 4.
664. Aidan Hehir, A New War Crime Court is Born, but Who is Responsible in Kosovo?, JUST.
CONFLICT (Aug. 10, 2015), http://justiceinconflict.org/2015/08/10/a-new-war-crimes-court-is-bom-but-
who-is-responsible-in-kosovo/#more-6147.
665. Kosovo/Albania: Investigate Alleged KLA Crimes, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 15, 2010),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/12/1 5/kosovo/albania-investigate-alleged-kla-crimes.
666. ICTR Statute, supra note 2, at art. 1.
667. ICTR Statute, supra note 2, at art. 7; CNN Wire Staff, Rebels Cleared in Plane Crash that
Sparked Rwandan Genocide, CNN (Jan. 11, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/1 1/world/africa/rwanda-president-plane/.
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("RPF") captured Kigali.668 This alternative time frame would have enabled the
Prosecutor to charge pre-genocide violence ("pilot projects" in Rwanda's rhetoric
before the Council) 669 and individuals involved in preparatory conspiracies. At the
same time, it would have reduced the risk that retribution crimes committed by the
RPF against members of the deposed Hutu Power movement would come before
the tribunal.670 This temporal limitation led to somewhat convoluted rulings on
continuing crimes in the so-called Media Case, among others, which involved
charges of conspiracy and incitement to genocide deriving from publications that
antedated 1994.671
A limited time frame works well for discrete incidents of mass violence or if a
particular regime is essentially on trial. For example, the ECCC has jurisdiction
starting on April 17, 1975, when the Khmer Rouge invaded Phnom Penh, and
ending on January 6, 1979, when a Vietnamese force drove the Khmer Rouge from
the city.672 The EAC's temporal jurisdiction corresponds to Habrd's rule (1982-
1990).673 The temporal jurisdiction of the Special Panels was split in a unique
way: they could assert jurisdiction over ordinary crimes of murder and sexual
offenses committed in Timor-Leste in the immediate post-referendum period
(between January 1, 1999, and October 25, 1999), but had unrestricted temporal
jurisdiction over international crimes.674 In practice, however, the Special Panels
did not consider the crimes committed during the extended Indonesian occupation
for lack of personal jurisdiction over any Indonesian suspects.675
A discrete cabining of jurisdiction works less well for ongoing incidents of
violence or violence with long historical tails. Indeed, the placing of limits on a
court's temporal jurisdiction can feel artificial, particularly to victimized
communities. Although the Khmer Rouge's tenure presented a convenient limiting
principle for the ECCC, it does not reflect the experiences of many Cambodian
victims who suffered under both the predecessor and successor regimes. Likewise,
the SCSL's jurisdiction did not begin until the 1996 signing of the Abidjan Peace
Accord.676 This effectively granted an amnesty for prior crimes given that the civil
war had begun in the provinces as early as 1991 with the arrival of the
668. 100 Days of Slaughter: A Chronology of U.S./U.N. Actions, PBS, (last visited Nov. 9, 2015),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/etc/slaughter.html.
669. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Does. S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994).
670. Lilian A. Barria & Steven D. Roper, How Effective are International Criminal Tribunals? An
Analysis of the ICTY and the ICTR, 9 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 349, 355 (2005).
671. Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment, 299-320 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for Rwanda Nov. 28, 2007) (disallowing convictions based on criminal conduct prior to 1994, but
allowing evidence of such acts to be admitted for certain purposes, such as for background, for proof of
intent, or to demonstrate a deliberate pattern of conduct).
672. Timeline: The History of Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge, PBS, (Nov. 11, 2015, 7:18 PM),
http://www.pbs.org/pov/enemies/photo gallery timeline.php#.Vhu6aZVdHko.
673. EAC Statute, supra note 225, at art. 3.
674. UNTAET Reg. No. 2000/15, supra note 150, at arts. 2.3-2.4.
675. Sandholtz, supra note 527, at 146.
676. SCSL Statute, supra note 170, at art. 1.
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Revolutionary United Front ("RUF") from neighboring Liberia. 67 In the end, this
temporal limitation did not necessarily affect those in the Court's dock, since most
potential defendants remained active after 1996.678 It did, however, focus the
Court's attention on crimes committed in and around Freetown, which began to
feel the effects of war in 1997.679 Geographically, the SCSL was limited to crimes
committed within Sierra Leone. 6 80 This provision was interpreted, however, to
include those crimes planned or instigated abroad, an extension that proved critical
to the prosecution of President Charles Taylor of Liberia who apparently never
stepped foot in Sierra Leone.
68 1
The drafters of the IHT Statute took a different tack, extending jurisdiction
backwards to July 17, 1968, the date of the Ba'ath party coup d' tat, up to May 1,
2003, the date of President George W. Bush's speech (premature as it turns out)
aboard the U.S.S. Lincoln declaring an end to major combat activities in Iraq. 682
The IHT could prosecute any Iraqi national or resident accused of committing
crimes inside or outside of Iraq during this timeframe. 683 These parameters would
have enabled the IHT to theoretically reach crimes committed in connection with
the wars in and against the Islamic Republic of Iran and Kuwait, although such
charges would have been politically unpalatable. In the end, Saddam Hussein was
executed before he could be tried for any extraterritorial activity or for other
potential crimes, such as the AI-Anfal genocidal campaign against the Kurds.684
The original model for the mixed chambers in the DRC would have limited
jurisdiction to the period covered by the influential U.N. Mapping Report (1993-
2003), but the draft legislation later extended jurisdiction from 1990 onward to
reflect the continuing nature of atrocities in eastern DRC.685 Jurisdiction before the
proposed ACJHR will be prospective only. As a result, if it is ever formed, the
ACJHR should not impact ongoing cases before the ICC involving African
situations (Central African Republic, C6te d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Libya, Kenya (if those cases are refiled), and Sudan).
C. Personal Jurisdiction
The classic Nuremberg/Tokyo model reserves international prosecutions for
the "big fish." The two post-WWII tribunals thus concentrated their indictments
677. Nicholas Cook, Sierra Leone: Transition to Peace, in SIERRA LEONE: CURRENT ISSUES AND
BACKGROUND 17, 20 (Brett Sillinger ed., 2003).
678. See Perriello & Wierda, The Special Court for Sierra Leone Under Scrutiny, supra note 176,
at 16.
679. Id.
680. SCSL Statute, supra note 170, at art. 1(1).
681. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Judgment, 480 (Special Court for Sierra
Leone Sept. 26, 2013).
682. IHT Statute, supra note 328, at art. 1(2).
683. Id.
684. For more on the AI-Anfal genocide, see Dave Johns, The Crimes of Saddam Hussein: 1988
The Anfal Campaign, PBS (Jan. 24, 2006),
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iraq 50 1/events anfal.html.
685. Labuda, supra note 482, at 4; see supra note 568.
2016
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
on "major war criminals"-heads of government, the military, and industry whose
crimes had no geographic limitations-while occupation, military, and national
courts prosecuted lower-level defendants. 686  Article 7 of the IMT Charter
established the important precedent that heads of state and other officials would
enjoy no immunity from prosecution. 687  Neither of the two original ad hoc
international tribunals contained any such statutory limitation as to seniority, but as
a practical matter, these two tribunals tended to focus their efforts on more senior
officials, eventually referring lower-level prosecutions to national courts pursuant
to Rule I Ibis.688 Indeed, as part of the Completion Strategies, the Council
instructed the ICTY to focus on "the most senior leaders suspected of being most
responsible for crimes" within the jurisdiction of the tribunal.689
The framers of the statutes of subsequent tribunals have expressly limited the
court's jurisdiction to senior officials or those deemed "most responsible" for
abuses. For example, per the SCSL Statute, the Court had jurisdiction over
persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of
international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the
territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996, including those
leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the
establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra
Leone.
690
Jurisdiction over peacekeepers was reserved for the sending state, unless that
state was unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate or prosecute. 691 The ECCC
can assert jurisdiction over "senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea [the Khmer
Rouge] and those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations
of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and custom, and
international conventions recognized by Cambodia., 692  Line drawing exercises
have led to disputes between the Cambodian and international CIJs over how far
down the Khmer Rouge hierarchy to investigate.
693
686. Milestones: 1945-1953, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nuremberg.
687. IMT Charter, supra note 428, at art. 7 ("The official position of defendants, whether as Heads
of State or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them
from responsibility or mitigating punishment.").
688. See supra note 77.
689. S.C. Res. 1534, 5 (Mar. 26, 2004).
690. SCSL Statute, supra note 170, at art. 1(1).
691. Id. atarts. 1(2) and 1(3).
692. ECCC Statute, supra note 190, at art. 1.
693. See Randal C. DeFalco, Cases 003 and 004 at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal: The Definition of
"Most Responsible" Individuals According to International Criminal Law, 8 GENOCIDE STUDIES &
PREVENTION: AN INT'L JOURNAL 45 (2014) (arguing that from a legal perspective, the jurispmdence on
personal jurisdiction and relative culpability mandate that the ECCC move forward on Cases 003 and
004). There may be a decision forthcoming on personal jurisdiction with respect to one Cambodian
suspect. See Conclusion of judicial investigation against Im Chaem (Dec. 18, 2016),
http://eccc.gov.kh/en/artices/co-investigating-judges-today-notifed-all-parties-they-consider-judicial-
investigation-aga.
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It can be useful to not limit the nationality of defendants given the possibility
of transnational criminal activity and dual nationalities. For example, the fact that
the SCSL Statute did not limit the Court's personal jurisdiction to Sierra Leonean
nationals enabled the prosecution of Charles Taylor, former President of Liberia. 
694
This was by design given that important states had decided that Taylor was an
impediment to peace in the region.695 Contemplating the prosecution of different
nationalities does complicate the availability of state consent, however, given that
the nationality state may attempt to block the territorial state from proceeding
against its nationals, as was seen in connection with the East Timor Special
Panels.696 The drafters of the Statute of the SCSL made another important decision
to allow for the indictment of child soldiers (between the ages of 15-18), such as
those involved in the ubiquitous "small boy units," so long as any sentence was
rehabilitation-oriented. 697 The Court had no jurisdiction over children under 15.698
Notwithstanding these provisions, the first Chief Prosecutor made a policy
decision that he would not pursue any charges involving crimes committed by
juveniles. 699
Many tribunals have also endeavored to investigate "all sides" of a conflict in
order to avoid the charge of victor's justice. The SCSL, for example, ultimately
staged three trials of three defendants each from the three warring parties: the
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council ("AFRC"), the Revolutionary United Front
("RUF"), and the Civil Defense Forces ("CDF").7 °° This approach can create an
illusion of equivalency that is not borne out by the patterns of violence. In Sierra
Leone, for example, members of the public objected to the decision to indict
members of the CDF, who were perceived as war heroes endeavoring to preserve
the constitutional order.7 0 Once hailed as a courageous and important exercise in
historical justice, the BICT has become an object lesson for how international
criminal law can be manipulated for political ends. All prosecutions, convictions,
and executions to date have been of individuals associated with two political
parties-Jamaat-e-Islami ("Jel") and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party ("BNP")-
694. Prosecutor v. Taylor, supra note 681.
695. BIRD, supra note 177, at 92.
696. See supra text accompanying notes 145, 399.
697. SCSL Statute, supra note 170, at art. 7(l) ("Should any person who was at the time of the
alleged commission of the crime between 15 and 18 years of age come before the Court, he or she shall
be treated with dignity and a sense of worth, taking into account his or her young age and the
desirability of promoting his or her rehabilitation, reintegration into and assumption of a constructive
role in society, and in accordance with international human rights standards, in particular the rights of
the child").
698. Id.
699. David M. Crane, Prosecuting Children in Times of Conflict: The West African Experience, 15
HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF 11, 14-15 (2008),
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1029&context=hrbrief.
700. See SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE & RESIDUAL SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE,
http://www.rscsl.org/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2015).
701. Lansana Gberie, The Special Court for Sierra Leone Rests-For Good, AFRICA RENEWAL
(Apr. 2014), http://www.un.orglafricarenewal/magazine/april-2014/special-court-sierra-leone-rests-
%E2%80%93-good.
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who are opposed to the governing Awami League. 70 2 Not a single so-called
freedom fighter (mukti bahani) or Pakistani national has been prosecuted,
suggesting that the BICT is at the service of a byzantine political vendetta rather
than a genuine, and long-overdue, effort at historical justice.70 3 Likewise, the
ICTR only prosecuted individuals associated with the Hutu Power movement,
although its jurisdiction could easily have encompassed crimes committed by the
Tutsi-led RPF. When the Chief Prosecutor began signaling that she was
investigating "all sides," Rwanda shut down cooperation. 704 As a result, the ICTR
basically meted out its own form of victors justice.
As a court's personal jurisdiction becomes narrower and narrower, it can
begin to feel like the international community has issued a bill of attainder. The
STL is unique in that it is largely focusing on a single set of discrete incidents
rather than a large and varied crime base. Concern was expressed that limiting
jurisdiction to Hariri's assassination alone would give the impression of selective
justice.70 5 So, the STL Statute does contemplate the prosecution of individuals
responsible for
other attacks that occurred in Lebanon between 1 October 2004 and 12
December 2005, or any later date decided by the Parties and with the
consent of the Security Council, [that] are connected in accordance with
the principles of criminal justice and are of a nature and gravity similar
to the attack of 14 February 2005.706
The Statute indicates that "connected" acts will be determined through a
consideration of "criminal intent (motive), the purpose behind the attacks, the
nature of the victims targeted, the pattern of the attacks (modus operandi) and the
perpetrators." 70 7 This could include a number of contemporaneous attacks against
high-profile political figures and journalists as well as the targeting of public
places.70 8
The Regulation 64 Special Panels could in principle exercise "universal
jurisdiction" over international crimes (in the sense that they could exercise
jurisdiction regardless of where the crime was committed and whether it was
committed by or against a Timorese citizen). 70 9  The Panels originally issued
indictments against almost 400 persons; however, over 300 individuals remained
outside of Timor-Leste and thus beyond the reach of the Special Crimes Unit,
including the most important perpetrators, such as General Wiranto who as
702. GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES TRIBUNAL FOR
BANGLADESH 10-12 (2015).
703. Id. at 70.
704. See supra notes 440, 560.
705. Omar Nashabe, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL): Selective Justice & Political
Maneuvers, I INT'L J. CRIMINOLOGY & SOc. 247, 248 (2012).
706. STL Statute, supra note 95, at art. 1. Presumably, the "Parties" refers to the Government of
Lebanon and the United Nations represented by the Secretary-General.
707. Id.
708. Aptel,supra note 101, at 1109.
709. UNTAET Reg. No. 2000/15, supra note 150, at art. 2.1.
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commander-in-chief was widely considered to be the architect of the post-
referendum violence. 710 Notwithstanding both a Memorandum of Understanding
between UNTAET and the Attorney General of Indonesia (which was never
ratified by the Indonesian Parliament) 71' and UNSCR 1410 (2002) (which
"stresse[d] the critical importance of cooperation ' 712 between the two
governments), Indonesia provided little in the way of concrete assistance to the
Special Panels. 713  Ultimately, the SCU focused its limited resources on the
prosecution of a small set of priority cases, many involving a pattern of serious
crimes.714 Meanwhile, the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court in Indonesia was
supposed to assert jurisdiction over extraterritorial violations of international
human rights perpetrated by Indonesian citizens, but in the end, it did little to fill
the conspicuous gaps in the Special Panels' docket.71 5
The EAC are empowered to prosecute "the person or persons most
responsible for crimes and serious violations of international law, customary
international law and international conventions ratified by Chad, committed in the
territory of Chad during the period from 7 June 1982 and 1 December 1990.,
"7 16
They may also "choose to prosecute the most serious crimes within their
jurisdiction " 717  Five other individuals are under indictment before the EAC,
although they are at large and only Habrd himself is currently on trial. 718 As a
minimally internationalized domestic court, the EAC can be conceptualized as
exercising universal jurisdiction over Habrd and his henchmen given that the
perpetrators and victims are predominantly Chadian. 71 9 The exercise of universal
jurisdiction by an internationalized court, with a multilateral imprimatur provided
by the AU, may raise fewer concerns than the exercise of universal jurisdiction by
a single state against the citizens of another co-equal sovereign. Chadian consent
to the EAC process also mitigates any objections to the assertion of universal
710. Reiger & Wierda, Timor-Leste, supra note 144, at 3, 20; Timor-Leste COE Report, supra note
147, at 4 (noting pending charges in 2005).
711. Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of Indonesia and the United Nations
Transitional Administration in East Timor Regarding Cooperation in Legal, Judicial and Human
Rights Related Matters, JORNAL DA REPUPLICA (April 5, 2000), http://www.jomal.gov.ti/lawsTJOther-
Docs/mou-id-untaet.htm. See Reiger & Wierda, Timor-Leste, supra note 144, at 21.
712. S.C. Res. 1410, 12 (May 17, 2002).
713. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUSTICE DENIED FOR EAST TIMOR: INDONESIA'S SHAM
PROSECUTIONS, THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE TRIAL PROCESS IN EAST TIMOR, AND THE IMPERATIVE
OF U.N. ACTION, (Dec. 20, 2002),
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/asia/timor/etimorl202bg.htm# ftnrefl5 [hereinafter HRW,
Justice Denied].
714. Reiger & Wierda, Timor-Leste, supra note 144, at 19.
715. COHEN, supra note 403, at 62.
716. EAC Statute, supra note 225, at art. 3.1.
717. Id. at art. 3.2.
718. Chad: Time for Justice for Victims of Hissne Habri 's Regime, AMNESTY INT'L (July 20,
2015), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/07/chadtimeforjustice/. Chad has prosecuted
some of these individuals domestically and has so far refused to extradite them to Senegal. Q&A: The
Case of Hiss~ne Habr6, supra note 232.
719. WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at 182-85.
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jurisdiction that might be raised by some officials from AU member states who
have been critical of European universal jurisdiction indictments.
The Nuremberg Tribunal was unique in that it could declare certain groups
and organizations to be criminal; the Tokyo Tribunal had no parallel
competency. 720 This experiment in collective liability has not been replicated in
modem times. Most ad hoc tribunals are thus empowered to prosecute natural
persons only. 721 The proposed ACJHR is unique in that it will be expressly
empowered to assert jurisdiction over "legal persons," including corporations.722
The current proposal for mixed chambers in the DRC also contemplates
jurisdiction over legal persons as well as the ability to mete out a range of relevant
penalties, including dissolution, judicial surveillance, exclusion from public
markets and access to capital, confiscation of property, and fines.723 With the
passage of the International Crimes (Tribunals) (Amendment) Act of 2013, the
BICT can, in theory, assert jurisdiction over "organizations" involved in the
commission of crimes during Bangladeshi War of Liberation.72 4 This text is aimed
directly at two opposition parties, notwithstanding that any continuity with their
liberation-era predecessors is questionable. Although the STL Statute suggests
that it has primary jurisdiction over natural persons only, the STL brought charges
against media outfits on the basis of allegations that journalists interfered with the
administration of justice by leaking information about protected witnesses.725
These cases have not been successfil, so far, given requirements of corporate
attribution under Lebanese law. 726 Jurisdiction over corporations was considered,
but rejected, during the building of the ICC. 727
720. IMT Charter, supra note 428, at arts. 9-10.
721. See, e.g., ICTR Statute, supra note 2, at art. 5; ICTY Statute, supra note 64, at art. 6.
722. See Draft Protocol on Amendments, supra note 244. The Draft Protocol states:
Corporate intention to commit an offence may be established by proof that it was the policy
of the corporation to do the act which constituted the offence ... Corporate knowledge of the
commission of an offence may be established by proof that the relevant knowledge was
possessed within the corporation and that the culture of the corporation caused or encouraged
the commission of the offence.
Id. at arts. 46C(2), 46C(4).
723. See Human Rights Watch, Commentary, DR Congo: Commentary on Draft Legislation to
Establish Specialized Chambers for Prosecution of International Crimes, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Mar. 11, 2011), https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/1 l/dr-congo-commentary-draft-legislation-
establish-specialized-chambers-prosecution.
724. See Amendment of International Crimes Tribunal Act of 1973, BANGLADESH TRIAL
OBSERVER (Mar. 7, 2013), http://bangladeshtrialobserver.org/2013/03/07/amendment-of-intemational-
crimes-tribunal-act-of-1973/. There is some talk that the law may need to be amended anew to enable
the prosecution of "parties" in addition to "organizations" if it is to serve its apparent intended purpose
of targeting the Jel and BNP.
725. See Special Tribunal for Lebanon Issues Summons to Appear in Contempt Cases, SPECIAL
TRIB. FOR LEBANON, (Apr. 24, 2014), https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/special-tribunal-for-lebanon-issues-
summons-to-appear-in-contempt-cases-st-press-release.
726. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Al Jadeed [Co.] S.A.L., et al, Case No. STL-14-05/T/CJ (Sept. 18,
2015) (acquitting corporate defendant).
727. Julia Graff, Corporate War Criminals and the International Criminal Court: Blood and
Profits in the Democratic Republic of Congo, I1 HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF 23, 23 (2004),
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One element that sets the ACJHR apart from other international tribunals
concerns the availability of immunity defenses. A newly-minted Article 46Abis
reads:
No charges shall be commenced or continued before the Court against
any serving African Union Head of State or Government, or anybody
acting or entitled to act in such capacity, or other senior state officials
based on their functions, during their tenure of office. 
728
The term "senior state officials" is not defined by the Protocol, and records of
the deliberations indicate that it has been left to the future Court to determine the
reach of the term. 729  In the negotiations around this provision (which were
described in the record as "exhaustive"), it seems that the enigmatic reference to
immunity "based on their functions" is meant to incorporate immunity ralione
materiae, or functional immunity. The proposal to grant immunity to African
government officials before the new Court can be traced to the hostility of some
AU members toward the ICC's efforts to prosecute two sitting heads of state-
Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya and Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan-for international crimes
(as manifested in, among other things, an AU resolution calling for non-
cooperation by African ICC member states in the arrest of al-Bashir) and to efforts
led by Kenya to introduce an analogous amendment to the Rome Statute at the 1 21h
session of the Assembly of States Parties held in November 2013.730
If this provision is ever brought into force, it would set the new African Court
apart from all of the other international criminal tribunals when it comes to the
availability of immunities from criminal prosecution.7 3 1 Indeed, almost all73 2 other
https://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/1 1/2graff.pdf.
728. African Union Approves Immunity for Government Officials in Amendment to African Court
of Justice and Human Rights' Statute, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE RESOURCE CENTER (July 2, 2014),
http://www.ijrcenter.org/2014/07/02/african-union-approves-immunity-for-heads-of-state-in-
amendment-to-african-court-of-justice-and-human-rights-statute/.
729. Afr. Union, The Report, the Draft Legal Instruments and Recommendations of the Specialized
Technical Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, at 6, EX.CL/846(XXV) (June 24, 2014),
https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Legal-lnstruments-Adopted-in-Malabo-July-
2014.pdf.
730. Beth Van Schaack, African Heads of State Before the International Criminal Court, INT'L
CRIM. JUST. TODAY, June 21, 2015, http://www.intemational-criminal-justice-
today.org/arguendo/article/aflican-heads-of-state-before-the-intemational-criminal-court/.
73 1. For example, art. 7(2) of the ICTY Statute, supra note 64, states: "[t]he official position of
any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official,
shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment." Likewise, art. 29 of
the ECCC Statute, supra note 190, states: "[t]he position or rank of any Suspect shall not relieve such
person of criminal responsibility or mitigate punishment." See generally Beth Van Schaack, Immunity
Before the African Court of Justice & Human & Peoples Rights-The Potential Outlier, JUST
SECURITY, July 10, 2014, http://justsecurity.org/12732/immunity-african-court-justice-human-peoples-
rights-the-potential-outlier/.
732. The STL Statute is silent as to the availability of immunities for state officials. A draft
version of the legislation establishing the SCC in CAR contained a provision eschewing all immunities;
this was later deleted from the final version of the law. However, the CAR Penal Code removes any
immunity for international crimes, so that provision would have been redundant. See Cent. Afr. Rep.
Code Penal, supra note 633, at art. 162. CPA Order Number 17 gave coalition forces immunity before
2016
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
constitutive instruments expressly disclaim all immunities, and every international
court to consider the question has denied immunity to official defendants, even
sitting heads of state who might otherwise enjoy robust customary international
law immunities before domestic courts.733 Most relevant by way of comparison
with the ACJHR, perhaps, is the AU's EAC Statute, which also eschews all
immunities at Article 10(3).734  Not surprisingly, NGOs across the region and
beyond have objected to the proposed immunity provision in the ACJHR
Protocol.735 A particular source of criticism stems from the fact that the draft
Protocol runs contrary to the AU's Constitutive Act, which contains broad and
inspiring language obliging AU members to "[p]romote and protect human and
peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights and other relevant human rights instruments" and allowing the Union "to
intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of
grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against
humanity[..], 73
6
VII. RULES OF PROCEDURE
Any international or hybrid body needs a source of procedural law. If rules
are to be drafted anew rather than adopted from a host state or another tribunal, a
fundamental decision concerns whether the tribunal will be governed by rules that
resemble the adversarial and common law system versus its inquisitorial/civil law
(Romano Germanic) counterpart. The ICC and many of the ad hocs are essentially
adversarial in nature, although rules drafters have adopted inquisitorial elements in
some important respects (particularly when it comes to the non-technical
admission of evidence and the constitution of victims as parties civiles). The result
is a sui generis set of procedural rules that blends aspects from both traditions.
737
The procedures of the ICTY and ICTR more closely mirrored the common law and
yet the judges became increasingly comfortable over the years with civil law
practices, such as a greater reliance on written evidence, more relaxed rules of
evidence, and the taking of judicial notice of adjudicated facts.73 8 The STL system
the IHT. See Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 17 Status of the Coalition, Foreign Liaison
Missions, Their Personnel and Contractors, sec. 5, CPA/ORD/26 (June 2003),
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/COALITION PROVISIONAL.pdf.
733. The Special Court for Sierra Leone in a decision with respect to Charles Taylor, ex-President
of Liberia, explained that immunities that may apply in a domestic court are inapplicable before an
international court: "the principle seems now established that the sovereign equality of states does not
prevent a Head of State from being prosecuted before an international criminal tribunal or court."
Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from
Jurisdiction, I 52 (Special Ct. for Sierra Leone 31 May 2004).
734. EAC Statute, supra note 225, at art. 10(3).
735. See e.g., Dan Kuwali, Article 46Abis: A Step Backward in Ending Impunity in Africa,
KUJENGA AMANI (Sept. 22, 2014), http://forums.ssrc.org/kujenga-amani/2014/09/22/article-46a-bis-a-
step-backward-in-ending-impunity-in-africa/#.Vj rmBNViko.
736. AU Constitutive Act, supra note 238, at arts. 3(h), 4(h).
737. Alex Whiting, The ICTY as a Laboratory of International Criminal Procedure, LEGACY OF
THE INT'L. CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 345, 363-365 (Bert Swart et al. eds., 2011).
738. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Karad~id, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Accused's Motion for
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envisions a strong role for the judge in controlling the proceedings and the
presentation of proof (e.g., the judge is to begin questioning the witnesses rather
than the parties), 739 although there is no express provision for the compilation of a
formal "dossier" such as one would see in a purely inquisitorial system.740  It is
already apparent that the STL has placed a greater reliance on testimonial evidence
in written, rather than vive voce, form..74 1 The only international tribunal to really
stay true to a civil law structure is the ECCC, given the central roles of the CIlJs in
the adjudicative process, although even that tribunal has some common law
elements.742
Like the IMT before it, 74 3 the judges of the original ad hocs were empowered
to promulgate and amend their own rules of procedure and evidence ("RPE").74
Although the ICTR's rules were originally based on the ICTY's, the two sets of
rules later diverged on some important matters.745 The SCSL Statute at Article 14
adopted the ICTR's RPE by reference, but allowed the judges to amend those rules
and also consider Sierra Leonean procedural law (in the form of the 1965 Criminal
746Procedure Act) as appropriate. The SCSL judges made some amendments as
needed over the course of the life of the Court, most of which were aimed at
streamlining the proceedings.747 From the outset, Article 21 of the STL Statute
emphasized the goal of holding expeditious trials, 74 8 reflecting escalating concerns
with the length of proceedings before other ICL tribunals.749
Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts Related to Count One (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Jan. 21, 2014).
739. See, e.g., STL Statute, supra note 95, at art. 20(2) ("[u]nless otherwise decided by the Trial
Chamber in the interests of justice, examination of witnesses shall commence with questions posed by
the presiding judge, followed by questions posed by other members of the Trial Chamber, the
Prosecutor and the Defence."). Other international tribunals gave primacy to the parties in questioning
witnesses. See, e.g., ICTY RPE, supra note 77, at Rule 85.
740. Aptel, supra note 101, at 1119.
741. See RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, Special Tribunal for Lebanon, at 155 [hereinafter
STL RPE].
742. Ciorciari & Heindel, supra note 25, at 375.
743. See IMT Charter, supra note 428, at art. 13.
744. See, e.g., ICTY Statute, supra note 64, at art. 15 ("The judges of the International Tribunal
shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings,
trials and appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and other
appropriate matters.").
745. See Katrin 016f Einarsd6ttir, Comparing the Rules of Evidence Applicable Before the ICTY,
ICTR and the ICC, 12 (Feb. 2010) (thesis, University of Iceland),
http://skemman.is/streamlget/1946/4226/12225/1 /1_fixed.pdf.
746. SCSL Statute, supra note 170, at art. 14(2).
747. Perriello & Wierda, The Special Court for Sierra Leone Under Scrutiny, supra note 176, at
17.
748. STL Statute, supra note 95, at art. 21(1) ('The Special Tribunal shall confine the trial,
appellate and review proceedings strictly to an expeditious hearing of the issues raised by the charges,
or the grounds for appeal or review, respectively. It shall take strict measures to prevent any action that
may cause unreasonable delay.").
749. See Jean Galbraith, The Pace of International Criminal Justice, 31 MICH. J. INT'L L. 79
(2009).
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Other hybrid tribunals have adopted the local procedural law in whole or in
part, often with the caveat that it must be consistent with international law. 750 For
example, the STL judges are to be "guided, as appropriate, by the Lebanese Code
of Criminal Procedure, as well as by other reference materials reflecting the
highest standards of international criminal procedure, with a view to ensuring a fair
and expeditious trial. 751 One significant departure from Lebanese law concerns
the availability of certain penalties, namely the death penalty and forced labor.752
Consistent with Lebanese law, the STL allows in absentia proceedings 753 and is
currently hearing evidence against four suspects connected to Hezbollah who
remain at large. 754  In order for a full-scale in absentia trial before the STL to
proceed, there must be adequate notice of the indictment (publication or
notification to the nationality state suffice), defense counsel must be assigned to
represent the rights and interests of the accused, and defendants must retain an
unconditional right to a retrial in their presence. 755 Presumably, this retrial could
happen before Lebanese courts in the event that the accused resurfaces after the
STL has concluded its work, although one commentator has suggested that any
retrial would have to occur before a reconstituted STL or its residual
mechanism.
756
The STL is the first international tribunal since Nuremberg 757 to allow for this
750. For example, the SCC in CAR will apply the Code de Procedure Penale de a! Rtpublique
Centrafricaine, but can also refer to international procedural rules where there are gaps, uncertainties, or
inconsistencies in domestic law. See Loi Organique, supra note 195, at arts 3, 5. A similar
arrangement is in place with respect to the EAC, which will be governed by Senegalese criminal
procedure. Likewise, per Article 16 of its Statute, the IHT was to be guided by the rules of procedure
provided for in the 1971 Criminal Procedure Law, but the legislature also promulgated a special set of
RPE. See IHT RPE, supra note 330.
751. STL Statute, supra note 95, at art. 28(2).
752. Id. at art. 24.
753. See id. at art. 22; STL RPE, supra 741, at 105-9; Maggie Gardner, Reconsidering Trials in
Absentia at the Special Tribunalfor Lebanon: An Application of the Tribunal's Early Jurisprudence, 43
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 91, 91 (2011); Paola Gaeta, Trial in Absentia Before the Special Tribunal
for Lebanon, in THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON: LAW & PRACTICE 229, 229 (Amal Alamuddin
et al. eds. 2014).
754. Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case No. STL-I 1-01/PT/AC/AR126.1, Decision on Defence
Appeals Against Trial Chamber's Decision on Reconsideration of the Trial In Absentia Decision
(Special Trib. for Leb. Nov. 1,2012).
755. See Chris Jenks, Notice Otherwise Given: Will in Absentia Trials at the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon Violate Human Rights? 33 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 57, 67 (2009).
756. Gaeta, supra note 753, at 246-48.
757. IMT Charter, supra note 428, at art. 12. Article 12 of the IMT Charter contemplated in
absentia trials:
The Tribunal shall have the right to take proceedings against a person charged with crimes
set out in Article 6 of this Charter in his absence, if he has not been found or if the Tribunal,
for any reason, finds it necessary, in the interests of justice, to conduct the hearing in his
absence.
Id. This provision was invoked with respect to Martin Bormann, who disappeared after WWII, but not
Gustave Krupp von Bohlen, who was declared mentally unfit for trial. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF
DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION, at 3, U.N. Sales No. E.03.V.10 (2003). There was no
analogous provision in the Tokyo Charter.
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758
option, even though such trials are not necessarily contrary to international
human rights law so long as certain conditions are met. 759 That said, proceedings
before other international tribunals have continued when the defendant has refused
to attend trial or has become disruptive on the interlinked theories that once a
defendant is present, he or she is always present (semel praesens, semper
praesens), and the defendant can waive his or her confrontation and other rights.76 °
So, for example, when Jean Bosco Barayagwiza refused to attend his trial, the
ICTR invoked its Rule 82bis, which allowed for a trial to proceed in the
defendant's absence so long as certain conditions as to initial appearance, notice,
and adequate representation were satisfied.7 6 ' The ICTY had no analogous rule.
Early in its life, however, the ICTY did adopt Rule 61, which controversially
allowed the tribunal to reconfirm an unexecuted indictment and issue an
international arrest warrant through the presentation of evidence and witness
testimony in a public hearing. 762 This rule was sparingly used by the ICTY at a
time when the former Yugoslav republics were refusing to hand over high-profile
763fugitives. Later, the ICTY abandoned this practice and began issuing
indictments under seal with respect to at-large defendants. The ICTR never made
use of its version of Rule 61, but a new Rule 7 Ibis allows the tribunal to preserve
witness testimony with respect to then nine Rwandan indictees who remained at
758. See generally Anne Klerks, Trials in Absentia in International (Criminal) Law (June 2008)
(thesis, Tilburg University), http://amo.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=81103. UNMIK Regulation 2001/1 seemed
to prohibit in all circumstances trials in absentia for "serious violations of international humanitarian
law, as defined in Chapter XVI of the applicable Yugoslav Criminal Code or in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court." U.N. Interim Admin. Mission in Kosovo, Regulation 2001/1 on the
Prohibition of Trials in Absentia of Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law,
UNMIK/REG/2001/1 (Jan. 12, 2001). Likewise, the new Criminal Code of BiH which governs the
WCC indicates that "an accused may never be tried in absentia." Criminal Code of Bos. & Herz.,
supra note 495, at art. 247.
759. U.N. H. C. R. Comm., 21' Sess., U.N. Doe. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.I, General Comment 13, art.
14(11) (1994), https://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/hrcoml3.htm ("When exceptionally for
justified reasons trials in absentia are held, strict observance of the rights of the defence is all the more
necessary"); Sejdovic v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 56581/00, Judgment (Mar. 1, 2006).
760. Prosecutor v. Gbao, Ruling on the Refusal of the Third Accused, Augustine Gbao to Attend a
Hearing of the Special Court for Sierra Leone on 7 July 2004 and Succeeding Days, Case No. SCSL-
04-15-T (July 12, 2004). This is the approach taken by the ICC. See Rome Statute, supra note 273, at
art. 63 (requiring trial in the presence of the accused, but allowing proceedings to continue of the
defendant is disruptive). See also Jenks, supra note 755, at 69-71 (noting that many modern tribunals
allowed for partial in absentia proceedings when the defendant was unwilling or unable to participate
after an initial appearance).
761. See Nahimana et. al., v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 99-52-A, Judgment, IM 88, 94, 100, 109
(Int. Crim. Trib. Rwanda Nov. 28, 2007) (explaining ICTR's Appeals Chamber analysis of the trial
court's use of Rule 82bis).
762. Alexsandra B. Stankovic, Guilty Until Proven Guilty: Rule 61 of the ICTY, SELECTED
WORKS, at 22,
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=l 001 &context-aleksandra stankovic. The
judges of the East Timor Special Panels rejected efforts to employ a similar procedure to deal with
unexecuted warrants. See Reiger & Wierda, Timor-Leste, supra note 144, at 22.
763. See Stankovic, supra note 762, at 37-38.
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large.764 The notional MH-17 Statute would allow for in absentia proceedings if a
state did not turn over a suspect.76 5 The defendant would be entitled to a retrial
unless he or she accepts the judgment or waives the right to be present.766
The applicable procedural law before the ECCC has been plagued by
ambiguity. The Cambodian Constitution cryptically provides that the
"prosecution, arrest, or detention of any person shall not be done except in
accordance with the law," and any subsequent trial shall be conducted "in
accordance with the legal procedures and laws in force. 767  The ECCC
Agreement, in turn, provides at Article 12 that the procedure to be applied by the
ECCC "shall be in accordance with Cambodian law." 768 At the time, however,
Cambodia had only a rudimentary criminal procedure code (a more comprehensive
code was finally drafted in 2007), so these incorporations by references largely led
to a dead end.76 9 The ECCC Law directs the Chambers to consider international
law when Cambodian law is silent, when there is some uncertainty in the law, or
when the existing law would be inconsistent with international standards.77 ° In
particular, Chambers are to exercise their jurisdiction "in accordance international
standards of justice, fairness and due process of law, as set out in Articles 14 and
15 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which
Cambodia is a party ' 771 and which is directly enforceable in the domestic legal
order (thus rendering this express incorporation somewhat redundant).772
Eventually, in 2007, the ECCC-in a plenary session and not without difficulty-
promulgated Internal Rules on procedure and evidence in order to consolidate
applicable domestic and international law, even though neither the UN Agreement
nor the ECCC Law empowered the judges to do so.773 These rules depart in some
764. Michael Haggerson, ICTR Prosecutor Uses New Rule to Preserve Evidence Against Fugitive
Genocide Financier, JURIST, May 24, 2011.
765. MH-17 Draft Statute, supra note 615, at art. 38.
766. Id.
767. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA, Sept. 21, 1993, arts. 38, 129,
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/caml 17198.pdf.
768. ECCC Agreement, supra note 179, at art. 12.
769. Worden, supra note 637.
770. ECCC Law, supra note 461, at arts. 20new, 23new, 33new; Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav,
Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Summary of Judgment, 1 35 (Extraordinary Chambers in the Ct.
of Cambodia July 26, 2010); see generally Lily O'Neill & G6ran Sluiter, The Right to Appeal a
Judgment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 10 MELBOURNE J. INT'L L. 596
(2009).
771. ECCC Agreement, supra note 179, art. 12(2); see also ECCC Law, supra note 461, at arts.
33new, 35new.
772. Goran Sluiter, Due Process and Criminal Procedure in the Cambodian Extraordinary
Chambers, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUSTICE 314, 315 (2006) (citing art. 31 of the 1993 Constitution).
773. See generally Internal Rules (Rev.9), Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
Internal Rules (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-
documents/InternalRules Rev 9_Eng.pdf [hereinafter ECCC Internal Rules]. Goran Sluiter, Due
Process and Criminal Procedure in the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUSTICE
314, 320 (2006) ("[T]he current legal framework does not provide the judges any power to legislate on
procedural issues."); Prosecutor v. Nuon, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, Nuon Chea's
Consolidated Preliminary Objections (Extraordinary Chambers in the Ct. of Cambodia Feb. 25, 2011)
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important ways from Cambodian law. 7
The ECCC and STL are unique among hybrid institutions in that they, like the
ICC,775 allow victims to constitute themselves as civil parties, be independently
represented at court, call witnesses, etc.7 76 Victims before the ECCC can pursue
civil remedies in the form of collective and moral, but not individualized,
reparations.777 The ECCC's interpretation of "victim" has been challenged,
however, 778 and the overwhelming number of civil party trial interventions in Case
001 led to rulings and rules' amendments that significantly limit the direct
involvement of civil parties. 779 Most importantly, before the ECCC, victims must
now be represented by lead co-lawyers designated by the Court,7 8° similar to the
appointment of class counsel in U.S. mass claims litigation. In light of this
experience, victim participation regimes have become controversial. 78 1 Victims
have appeared before other international and hybrid tribunals primarily as
(arguing that the Internal Rules are an unconstitutional arrogation of legislative power and without
binding legal effect); Prosecutor v. Nuon, Case No. 002/19-0902007/ECCC/TC, Decision on Nuon
Chea's Preliminary Objections Alleging the Unconstitutional Character of the ECCC Internal Rules
(Extraordinary Chambers in the Ct. of Cambodia Aug. 8, 2011).
774. See Stan Starygin, Internal Rules of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
(ECCC): Setting an Example of the Rule of Law by Breaking the Law? 3 J. OF L. & CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 20 (2011) (arguing that many of the ECCC's Internal Rules are ultra vires in light of
extant law).
775. Rome Statute, supra note 273, at art. 68. The judges of the various Chambers are entitled to
promulgate rules on participation. See Melanie Vianney-Liaud, Emerging Voices: Victim Participation
in ICC and ECCC "s Proceedings, OPINIOJURIS, Aug. 20, 2015,
http://opiniojuris.org/2015/08/20/emerging-voices-victim-participation-in-ice-and-ecccs-proceedings/.
776. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 773, at Rule 23; STL Statute, supra note 95, at art. 17
("Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Special Tribunal shall permit their views
and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate
by the Pre-Trial Judge or the Chamber and in a manner that is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the
rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial"). On the STL, see generally Howard Morrison &
Emma Pountney, Victim Participation at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, in THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
FOR LEBANON: LAW & PRACTICE 153 (Amal Alamuddin et al., eds. (2014)).
777. Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Case File 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC, Appeal
Judgment, IM 643, 659 (Extraordinary Chambers in the Ct. of Cambodia Feb. 3, 2012) [hereinafter
Duch Appeals Judgment]. Rule 23(11) of the ECCC's Internal Rules departs from ordinary Cambodian
criminal procedure and provides that such collective and moral reparations can only be ordered against
convicted persons. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 773, at 23(11). The ICC has a similar system of
victim participation. See Rome Statute, supra note 273, at art. 75.
778. Duch Appeals Judgment, supra note 777, 1406-21.
779. Michelle Stagg et al., Lessons Learned from the Duch Trial: A Comprehensive Review of the
First Case before the ECCC, ASIAN INT'L JUST. INITIATIVE'S KRT TRIAL MONITORING GROUP 28
(2009), http://wcsc.berkeley.edu/wp-
content/uploads/documents/Lessons%20Learned%20from%20the%2ODuch%2OTria_ MRSK FINAL.p
df. See Prosecutor v. Duch, Decision on Motion for a Ruling on the Standing of Civil Party Lawyers to
Make Submissions on Sentencing and Directions concerning the Questioning of the Accused, Experts
and Witnesses Testifying on Character, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC (Extraordinary Chambers
in the Ct. of Cambodia Oct. 8, 2009).
780. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 773, at Rule 23(3).
781. Vianney-Liaud, supra note 775.
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witnesses.782 Their extreme vulnerability has required the establishment of victims
and witnesses units and various forms of protection measures.783
The proceedings before the BICT are widely believed to be fundamentally
unfair. 784 Some of this unfairness can be traced to the very genetic code of the
BICT's legal framework; the rest is attributable to the practice of the tribunal.
Among other retrograde elements, amendments to the Constitution protect the
1973 Act from legal attack and withdrew certain procedural rights from criminal
defendants (including the right to challenge the court's jurisdiction and the
prohibition of ex post facto prosecutions).785 Further legislation invalidated
additional rights, including the right against self-incrimination (the statute provides
that defendants shall not be excused from answering any question on the ground
that the response will incriminate the suspect).786 Long pre-trial and "executive"
detentions have led the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to declare that
several defendants have been subjected to arbitrary detention in violation of
international law, including the ICCPR, which Bangladesh has ratified. 787  In
addition, idiosyncratic RPE govern the Tribunal, so any protections contained in
the normal criminal procedure code, including rights of appeal, are inapplicable
before the BICT.7 88 Although the accused ostensibly enjoy the right to counsel of
their choice, in practice the Bangladesh government and Bar Association have
made it virtually impossible for outside counsel to adequately represent their
clients by, among other things, restricting their travel to the country and their
presence in interrogations. 789 Several trials-including that of Abdul Kalam Azad,
the first case to go to verdict-have proceeded in absentia.
790
After the BICT sentenced Abdul Quadar Mollah, the assistant secretary-
general of Jamaat-e-Islami, to life imprisonment for crimes against humanity in
February 2013, the 1973 Act was amended to allow the prosecution to appeal a
782. John Ciorciari & Anne Heindel, Victim Testimony in International and Hybrid Criminal
Courts: Narrative Opportunities, Challenges, and Fair Trial Demands, 56(2) VA. J. INT'L L 8 (2016).
783. See generally A.M. de Brouwer & M. Heikkila, Victim Issues: Participation, Protection,
Reparation, and Assistance, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES AND RULES 1299
(Goran Sluiter et al., eds. 2013).
784. See ROBERTSON, supra note 702.
785. Id.
786. 1973 Act, supra note 408, at art. 18.
787. Steven Kay QC, UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Condemns Detention of
Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal Suspects, INT'L CRIM. L. BUREAU, Feb. 7, 2012,
http://www.internationallawbureau.com/index.php/un-working-group-on-arbitrary-detention-condemns-
detention-of-bangladesh-intemational-crimes-tribunal-suspects/.
788. 1973 Act, supra note 408, at art. 23 ("The provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code ... and
the Evidence Act... shall not apply in any proceedings under this Act").
789. Owen Bowcott, & Jason Burke, British Lawyers Criticise Bangladeshi War Crimes Tribunal,
THE GUARDIAN (June 13, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/13/lawyer-criticises-
bangladeshi-tribunal.
790. Elizabeth Herath, Trials in Absentia: Jurisprudence and Commentary on the Judgment in
Chief Prosecutor v. Abul Kalam Azad in the Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal, 55 HARV.
INT'L L. J. ONLINE 1 (June 4, 2014).
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sentence or a verdict of acquittal.7 9 ' The amendments were made retroactive. On
the prosecutor's appeal, the Supreme Court augmented Mollah's sentence from life
imprisonment to death, a final sentence that does not admit the right of judicial
appeal.792 Despite calls on December 11, 2013, from U.S. Secretary of State John
Kerry and United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon to Sheikh Hasina
herself, Mollah became the first BICT defendant to be executed.793 He was hanged
on December 12, 2013, after a last minute stay of execution was lifted, on the eve
of the upcoming Victory Day celebrations. 9 Indeed, trials and appeals proceeded
at a breakneck pace in 2013, apparently in an effort to achieve results in advance of
the January 2014 elections. The BICT has been criticized for, among other things,
administering the death penalty, particularly when coupled with these other
procedural infirmities.
795
In terms of penalties, the two post-war ad hoc tribunals both administered
capital punishment.796 One of the only modem internationalized bodies to follow
suit was the IHT,797 even though the CPA had suspended the death penalty in
2003.798 The availability of the death penalty ultimately prevented many states and
the United Nations from assisting with the trials. In other ad hoc institutions,
further conditions and terms of incarceration may be governed by the prevailing
local law and subject to host nations' ability to adhere to international standards. 799
Pardons and the commutation of sentences are also partially governed by local law,
although these adjustments often require the concurrence of the Tribunal's
791. 1973 Act, supra note 408, at art. 21.
792. Bangladesh Islamist's War Crimes Life Sentence Revised To Death, ASHARQ AL-AWSAT
(Sept. 17, 2013), http://english.aawsat.com/2013/09/article55317091/bangladesh-islamists-war-crimes-
life-sentence-revised-to-death.
793. See Beth Van Schaack, Precipitating Politics Around The Revival of Prosecutions
in Bangladesh, INTLAWGRRLS (Oct. 10, 2014), http://ilg2.org/2014/1 0/10/precipitating-politics-around-
the-revival-of-prosecutions-in-bangladesh/.
794. Amy Kazmin & Joseph Allchin, Bangladesh Hangs Islamist Leader Abdul Quader Mollah,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/18 3eae4-61c4-1 e3-aaO2-
00144feabdc.html#axzz3oNcggxkF.
795. Bangladesh: Death Penalty Will not Bring Justice for Crimes During Independence War,
AMNESTY INT'L (Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/10/bangladesh--death-
penalty-will-not-bring-justice-crimes-during-independence-war/.
796. Kaufman, supra note 59, at 755, 768. Twelve IMT defendants were sentenced to death, but
only ten were actually executed. Seven Tokyo defendants were sentenced and put to death. Kaufman,
supra note 59, at 762-63.
797. IHT Statute, supra note 328, at art. 24. See Michael Bohlander, Can the Iraqi Special
Tribunal Sentence Saddam Hussein to Death? 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUSTICE 463 (2005) (arguing that the
reinstatement of capital punishment was unlawful). Saddam Hussein was executed following the Dujail
trial, preventing his prosecution for genocide in the AI-Anfal case, which was already underway, or for
crimes committed in neighboring states. Chatham House, supra note 332.
798. Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 7, Penal Code, § 3, CPA/ORD/9 (June 9,
2003), http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030610_CPAORD_7_PenalCode.pdf.
799. ICTY Statute, supra note 64, at art. 27 ("Imprisonment shall be served in a State designated
by the International Tribunal from a list of States which have indicated to the Security Council their
willingness to accept convicted persons. Such imprisonment shall be in accordance with the applicable
law of the State concerned, subject to the supervision of the International Tribunal.").
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President. 800 The MICT will manage any parole or other post-conviction issues
that arise with respect to ICTY or ICTR defendant. The SCSL could also order
"the forfeiture of the property, proceeds and any assets acquired unlawfully or by
criminal conduct, and their return to their rightful owner or to the State of Sierra
Leone." 80 1 This procedure was not invoked in any proceeding.
The need for adequate translation and interpretation facilities and resources
presents a procedural issue in the administration of hybrid justice that receives
insufficient attention, particularly given that the some portion of the judges often
do not speak the same languages as the accused.80 2 The Nuremberg Tribunal set a
precedent for extensive translations into multiple languages (English, Russian,
French, and German).80 3 Although multiple states were involved in the Tokyo
Tribunal, Japanese and English were the only official languages. 8°4 Translation
costs and delays have hindered many of the ad hoc hybrid institutions. 80 5 The
ECCC, for example, translates-at great expense, particularly in light of perennial
budgetary shortfalls-all the proceedings and many filings into French, even
though very few of the personnel speak only French. 80 6 This was an even greater
issue before the East Timor Special Panels, where many defendants and witnesses
spoke vernacular languages.80 7
VIII. FUNDING
Not surprisingly, the funding of hybrid courts has been a challenge, and every
ad hoc and hybrid tribunal to date has gone over budget.808 There is no question
that the costs of international justice appear high, 80 9 although not necessarily when
compared to the gravity of the events at issue and the cost of other international
800. ICTY Statute, supra note 64, at art. 28; ICTR Statute, supra note 2, at art. 27; SCSL Statute,
supra note 170, at art. 23.
801. SCSL Statute, supra note 170, at art. 19(3).
802. Joshua Karton, Lost in Translation: International Criminal Tribunals and the Legal
Implications ofinterpreted Testimony, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 8 (2008); Hobbs, supra note 503,
at 517-518 (noting the importance of participants speaking a common language and the problem of
language barriers).
803. Kaufman, supra note 59, at 759.
804. Id.
805. Jarinde Temminck Tuinstra, The ICTY's Continuing Struggle with the Right to Self-
Representation, in THE LEGACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA 345, 363-65 (Bert Swart et al. eds. 2011).
806. ECCC Law, supra note 460, at art. 45. See Sadie Blanchard, An Assessment of the ECCC
Order on Translation Rights and Obligations, SEARCHING FOR THE TRUTH (Oct. 2008).
807. Reiger & Wierda, Timor-Leste, supra note 144, at 17 n.70, 29.
808. For example, the ECCC was slated to cost $56M total. As of January 2015, its expenses had
exceeded $230M. See ECCC Financial Outlook, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
(Jan. 31. 2015),
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/Financial-Outlook_31 %20_January_%202015.pdf (last
visited Feb. 29, 2016).
809. See generally Daniel McLaughlin, International Criminal Tribunals: A Visual Overview,
LEITNER CENTER http://www.leitnercenter.org/files/News/lntemational%20Criminal%20Tribunals.pdf
[hereinafter LErrNER]_(compiling statistics on the ad hoc tribunals); Rupert Skilbeck, Funding Justice:
The Price of War Crimes Trials, at 6-8, https://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/1 5/3skilbeck.pdf.
VOL. 44:2
THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF HYBRID JUSTICE
interventions in atrocity situations, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian relief
missions, and military action. Over the years, the various tribunals and special
chambers have been governed by different funding mechanisms.8 1° While U.N.
assessed contributions, which enable burden-sharing and forward planning, are the
most stable source of funding available, most previous hybrid tribunals have
depended on voluntary contributions. 81  This scheme has proven to be
unsustainable in the long run and has required tribunal principals to engage in
incessant and unseemly fundraising efforts.812 Hybrid institutions often depend on
hybrid sources of funding. The various hybrid tribunals have thus entered into
different budgetary arrangements with host states, although the latter have
occasionally faced difficulty replenishing their side of the ledger.
813
Per Article 30 of the IMT Charter, the Nuremberg Tribunal was funded out of
the budget for the maintenance of the Allied Control Council, the governing body
of the Allied occupation zones in Germany.8 14 Most of IMT staff were seconded
from national governments.8 1 5 Similarly, the United States originally funded the
IHT out of the total Iraqi occupation budget to the tune of $75 million. 816 Later,
however, the Tribunal was funded from the regular Iraqi budget, although the
United States continued to support the work of international advisers via the
RCLO.8 17
The original ad hoc tribunals, as subsidiary organs of the Security Council
within the meaning of Article 29 of the U.N. Charter, have been funded from the
United Nations' general budget,81 8 surpluses in the budget of the United Nations
Protection Force (ICTY), and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
(ICTR). 819 As such, they are subject to U.N. hiring, personnel, finance, and other
rules. At their peak, they were consuming in excess of 10% of the United Nation's
annual budget.8 20 None of the other ad hoc tribunals has been deemed entitled to
assessed U.N. funds on the theory that they are either independent international
810. See generally Stuart Ford, How Leadership in International Criminal Law is Shifting From
the United States to Europe and Asia: An Analysis Of Spending On And Contributions To International
Criminal Courts, 55 SAINT LOUIS UNIV. L. J. 953 (2011).
811. INT'L. CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, CLOSING THE INTERNATIONAL AND HYBRID
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: MECHANISMS TO ADDRESS RESIDUAL ISSUES 13, Briefing Paper (2010),
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Global-Tribunal-Residual-2010-English.pdf.
812. Id. at 14.
813. Skilbeck, supra note 809, at 7.
814. See Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, Nov. 14, 1944, 5 U.S.T. 2062, T.I.A.S.
No. 3070, http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box32/t298f04.html.
815. See supra notes 510-513.
816. Newton, supra note 322, at 404; Scharf, Critique, supra note 322.
817. IHT Statute, supra note 328, at art. 33.
818. See, e.g., ICTR Statute, supra note 2, at art. 30 (declaring that the expenses of the ICTR are
expenses of the United Nations within the meaning of Article 17(2) of the Charter). Article 17(2) of the
Charter states: "The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the
General Assembly." U.N. Charter, art. 17112.
819. Ford, supra note 810, at 991-92.
820. Zacklin, supra note 67, at 543.
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entities or are, in essence, domestic courts. 82 1 This outcome was not inevitable,
however. As the SCSL was under construction, for example, the U.N. Secretary-
General argued that the tribunal should also be financed through assessed
contributions to ensure its independence and uninterrupted funding. 82 2 In calling
for the establishment of the Special Court, however, the Security Council
expressed its view that the Court would be the product of a treaty, rather than a
Council resolution, and that it would be funded through voluntary contributions. 
823
As a result, the SCSL (and other ad hoe tribunals following in its wake) was
dependent on bequests from donor states, foundations, and other external sources,
which necessitated donor conferences, almost continuous fund-raising campaigns
by tribunal principals, advances against pledges, and controversial subvention
grants from the General Assembly to top-off its budget.
824
In the case of the SCSL, most of the costs were bome by a few donors
(Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States), although
other states gave a range of gits. 825  A principal donor-led Management
Committee, which eventually included Sierra Leone, provided oversight and policy
direction on non-judicial issues.82 6 A process that was originally projected to cost
$75 million ultimately cost closer to $300 million, with a large percentage going to
the salaries of foreign nationals.827  Although the SCSL received some
administrative and related support ("without prejudice to its capabilities to perform
its specified mandate") from the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone ("UNAMSIL"), this
was provided on a cost-reimbursable basis. 828  Given the difficulties of
administering a system of voluntary contributions, more time must be devoted to
thinking through how and when assessed U.N. contributions can be applied toward
hybrid institutions that act with U.N.-imprimatur. It was assumed that the RSCSL
would be premised on the same funding model as its parent organization, although
this is not inevitable, particularly given the difficulty of attracting voluntary
821. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory
Opinion, 1962 ICJ Rep. at 151 (finding that certain expenses for U.N. in-country missions authorized
by the General Assembly for the maintenance of international peace and security constitute "expenses
of the Organization" within the meaning of the Charter).
822. Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,
supra note 174, 68-71.
823. S.C. Res. 1315 (Aug. 14, 2000).
824. See Press Release, General Assembly, in Fifth Committee, Regular Budget Financing
Requested for Sierra Leone Court to Bridge Voluntary Contribution Shortfall, U.N. Press Release
GA/AB/3610 (Mar. 23, 2004), http://www.un.org/press/en/2004/gaab3610.doc.htm. The international
side of the ECCC also depended on such subventions.
825. See generally Giorgia Tortora, The Financing of the Special Tribunals for Sierra Leone,
Cambodia and Lebanon, in THE REALITIES OF INT'L CRIM. JUST. 93 (Dawn L. Rothe, et al., eds. 2013);
Ford, supra note 810, at 976-77.
826. SCSL Agreement, supra note 168, at art. 7.
827. LEITNER, supra note 809, at 39; Gberie, supra note 701. By way of comparison,
UNAMSIL's budget ranged from $200M to $600M per year. See Sierra Leone-UNAMSIL-Facts
and Figures, U.N Mission in Sierra Leone,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/facts.html (last visited Nov. 26).
828. S.C. Res. 1400 (Mar. 28, 2002).
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funding for a residual mechanism undertaking important, but not necessarily
headline-grabbing, work.
Sierra Leone, being one of the poorest nations on earth, was not expected to
make significant out-of-pocket contributions toward the SCSL, but this has not
been the case with respect to other tribunals whose host states have been expected
to share the costs of justice. Pursuant to the combined funding mechanism of the
STL, roughly half (49%) of the tribunal's budget comes from Lebanon.829
Voluntary contributions from the international community make up the other half,
with significant backing from the United States, whose strong support reflected its
opposition to the influence of Syria and Iran in the region. 830 Although there have
been instances of extreme delays, Lebanon has always managed to deliver its share
(often in the waning days of the payment period), notwithstanding ongoing
security threats, a coalition government that includes Hezbollah, internal political
dissension, and an economic crisis made worse by the influx of Syrian refugees.83'
Like the STL, the ECCC is meant to be financed through two independent
funding streams: voluntary donations from the international community support-
the ECCC's international "side" (with Japan in the lead after having donated 35%.
of the total international budget) and in-kind gifts and payments from the
government of Cambodia for the Cambodian "side," including the salaries for
Cambodian staff and the physical infrastructure.832 In practice, donor countries
have helped to cover the Cambodian financial contribution through their bilateral
development assistance programs, potentially diverting funds from other
development priorities. In addition, leftover funds from the post-war United
Nations Transitional Administration for Cambodia ("UNTAC") also went toward
the Cambodian side of the ECCC via the UNDP. 833 The international community,
acting in part through a "Friends of the ECCC" and a Principal Donors Group
("PDG"), exercises little oversight over the Cambodian side of the budget, which
has been plagued by allegations of mismanagement, nepotism in hiring, and
graft. 834 All told, more than thirty-five states have contributed to the ECCC thanks
to the tireless fundraising efforts of Ambassador David Scheffer, the U.N.
829. STL Statute, supra note 95, at art. 5; Jenks, supra note 755, at 65. If Lebanon is unable to
come up with its contribution, the Secretary-General is allowed to accept voluntary contributions to
make up the shortfall. STL Statute, supra note 95, at art. 5(l)(c).
830. Press Statement, Marie Haf, U.S. Dep't of State, Funding for the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon (Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/219182.htm.
831. Press Release, Ali Baradeh, Tribunal Expects Lebanese Funding Before the End of the Month
(Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.sti-tsl.org/en/news-and-press/selected-interviews/registrar/1295-tribunal-
expects-lebanese-funding-before-the-end-of-the-month-annahar.
832. G.A Res. 57/228 (May 22, 2003) (approving the draft Agreement between the United Nations
and the Royal Government of Cambodia and deciding that any expenses in implementation would be
borne by voluntary contributions from the international community); ECCC Statute, supra note 190, at
art. 44new (setting forth bifurcated scheme). See generally Ford, supra note 810, at 979.
833. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, AUDIT OF HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT AT THE
EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA (ECCC), Report No. RCM0172, 9 (June
4, 2007), http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/assets/pdf/reports/OAPR-audit report eng.pdf.
834. See Dearing, supra note 560.
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Secretary-General's Special Expert to the ECCC, and other ECCC supporters.835
Still, over the years, staff have worked without pay and gone on strike following
severe funding shortfalls. 836  In response to this funding insecurity, the Fifth
(Budget) Committee of the U.N. General Assembly has on several occasions taken
the exceptional step of granting commitment authority for a subvention grant from
the United Nations' assessed budget to stabilize the ECCC's funding and, in turn,
enable the execution of employment contracts and other long-term planning.
837
The legislation creating the CAR Special Criminal Court for CAR envisions
that it too will be funded through international donations as well as by way of the
involvement of the U.N. Mission, MINUSCA. 838 Although CAR may be in a
position to make some modest in-kind and other contributions, it is one of the
poorest states on earth and so the balance of the SCC's budget will have to be
borne by the international community, either via the United Nations or individual
donations. Given past practice, reliance upon voluntary funding is untenable.
Inevitably, donors dry up over time, requiring tribunal personnel to take time away
from their work to panhandle within the international community for operating
funds. In addition to being time consuming, this can open the tribunal up to real or
perceived manipulation by interested states.839 It also makes hiring and retention
of staff difficult and is unfair to staff members, who enjoy little job security if they
must depend on iterative short-term contracts.
Anti-piracy justice initiatives also depend on voluntary contributions. 840 In
2010, the Contact Group's Working Group on Legal Issues drew up detailed terms
of reference for an International Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States
Countering Piracy to defray the expenses associated with the prosecution and
detention of suspected pirates (e.g., witness fees, the domestication of evidence,
etc.), as well as other activities related to implementing the Contact Group's anti-
piracy objectives. 841 The Fund includes an Expedited Facility ("ExFac") that
enables the quick reimbursement of short-term and urgent prosecution-related
835. See David Scheffer, What Has Been 'Extraordinary' About International Justice in
Cambodia, U.N. ASSISTANCE TO THE KHMER ROUGE TRIALS (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.unakrt-
online.org/articles/speech-un-special-expert-david-scheffer-what-has-been-
%E2%80%98extraordinary,/oE2%80%99-about-intemational.
836. Senior UN Official Urges Donor Support for Cambodia War Crimes Tribunal, UN NEWS
CENTRE (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID-46444#.VaIM4XJRHtQ.
837. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary General, Request for a Subvention to the Extraordinary Chambers in
the Courts of Cambodia, U.N. Doc. A/69/536 (Oct. 20, 2014); GA Res. 69/274 (April 24, 2015)
(authorizing subvention grant).
838. Loi Organique, supra note 195, at art. 53. See Ford, supra note 810, at 985 (discussing
peacekeeping assessments).
839. Kersten, supra note 5.
840. The expenses of ITLOS are borne by the states parties; when non-state parties appear before
the ITLOS, the tribunal will fix a contribution amount. UNCLOS, supra note 114, at annex VI, art. 19,
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documentsibasic texts/statute en.pdf.
841. U.N. Piracy Brochure, The Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off
the Coast of Somalia, CONTACT GROUP ON PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA (Apr. 2011),
http://www.un.org/undpa/sites/www.un.org.undpa/files/ckfiles/files/UN%20Piracy/ 2OBrochure.pdf.
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expenses. 842 Although the UNODC and other international programs are open to
voluntary contributions from any source, historically most funding has come from
the European Union and the national fiscs of those states that have regularly
apprehended pirates but do not want to prosecute them directly. Given piracy's
economic impact, the international community is also encouraging contributions
from the shipping, insurance, and other pertinent industries. 843 The Trust Fund to
date has received about $20 million in donations. 844 No comparable fund has been
established for judicial action around atrocity crimes, although the ICC's Trust
Fund does support work in victims' communities and will administer any
reparations post-trial that are received.845
There is no question that hybrid and internationalized efforts require a smaller
budget than standalone international tribunals. For example, while the ICTY cost
$124 million euros per year, the WCC consume in the range of $13 million euros
per year, although some of these cases benefited from ICTY investigations and
adjudicated facts.846  Originally, funding for the WCC in BiH came from the
European Commission and other sources within the international community via
the WCC Registry. Eventually, the Chambers began being funded entirely from
the national budget.847 When they were not seconded from their national systems,
international staff were employees of the Registry. Other justice efforts have been
financed through the budget of an existing U.N. mission. Being part of U.N.
transitional authorities, the UNTAET Special Panels and the UNMIK Regulation
sixty-four panels were funded through U.N. assessed contributions to the tune of
about $7 million per annum.84 8 UNMIK generally covered the international staff
salaries; other expenses were paid for from traditional domestic revenue sources.
In Timor-Leste, many of the problems identified with the Special Panels relate to
insufficient resources. 849 CICIG (which receives funds from some European
States, the United States, and Argentina among other sources) is dependent on
development aid and other sources of voluntary funding. CICIG now operates on
quite a shoestring budget, after experiencing several budget and staff reductions. 850
Transitional justice efforts in the DRC have been funded by a variety of
842. Id.
843. Trust Fund to Support the Initiative of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia,
MULTI-PARTNER TRUST FUND OFFICE, http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/APFOO, (last visited Nov.
28, 2015).
844. Id.
845. Rome Statute, supra note 273, at art. 79. See generally THE TRUST FUND FOR VICTIMS, ICC,
http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2015).
846. Ivanigevid, supra note 345, at 24.
847. Id. at 22.
848. See G.A. Res. 55/227B, 15 (July 18, 2001); G.A. Res. 59/13, 11, 15-20 (Jan. 24, 2005).
849. HRW, Justice Denied, supra note 713; David Cohen, "Justice on the Cheap" Revisited. The
Failure of the Serious Crimes Trials in East Timor, EAST-WEST CENTER 4 (May 2006),
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/api08O.pdf.
850. Geoffrey Ramsey, Guatemala's UN-Backed Justice Commission Faces Budget Cuts, INSIGHT
CRIME (Nov. 29, 2011) (noting annual budget reduction from $20 million to $15 million due to a drop
in donations).
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sources, including funds allocated to peacekeeping missions. The PSCs in the
DRC, for example, receive funding from the general MONUSCO budget as well as
from the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, private foundations, and other
sources. 8 5 1 Donor countries (such as Canada and the United States) helped to
recruit and fund experts to fill PSC positions. ABA ROLl has estimated that one
mobile court session-which can involve up to 15 hearings-costs approximately
$45,000 to $60,000,852 which is considerably cheaper than the cost of a single trial
before one of the international tribunals. 853 To date, the majority of these costs
have been bome by a mix of bilateral, multilateral, governmental, and civil society
donors, given that only a small portion of the Congolese national budget goes
toward the judicial sector.854  MONUSCO also provides assistance with
transportation and security.855 This diversification of funding-much of which is
earmarked or project-based rather than undifferentiated-has caused sustainability
and coordination problems, which could be partially alleviated by the better
utilization of basket funds.
The EAC are projected to cost in the range of $11 million, although it is not
anticipated that it will host more than a handful of trials. These costs will be bome
primarily by donor countries (including the Netherlands, the United States, 856
Belgium, Germany, and France); regional bodies (the AU and EU); and Chad
itself.857 Senegal essentially demanded funding guarantees up front before it
would agree to host the trials. 858 The necessary assurances emerged during a 2010
donor's conference.859 In theory, the proposed ACJHR would be funded out of the
ordinary budget of the African Union. At the moment, the combined budget of the
African Court of Human and Peoples Rights and its Commission stands at a mere
$10 million per year-about 15% of the AU's annual budget (much of which is
bome by international partners).86 ° Insufficient thinking has gone into how to fund
851. UN Police, Justice and Corrections Programming in the Democratic Republic of The Congo:
A Compact Case Study, STIMSON 5 (2010), http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-
pdfs/UN PJC Programming in DR Congo.pdf.
852. Maya, supra note 585, at 34; UNDP, Mobile Courts, supra note 579, at 11.
853. Maya, supra note 585, at 34.
854. The Military Justice Component of ROL Section, MONUSCO, UNITED NATIONS
ORGANIZATION STABILIZATION MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO,
https://monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=10806&language=en-US (last visited Nov. 28,
2015).
855. UNDP, Mobile Courts, supra note 579, at 9.
856. Senegal: US to Give US$ I Million to Habrg Court, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 1, 2013),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/01/senegal-us-give-us-I -million-habre-court.
857. Id.
858. Williams, supra note 213, at 1143, n.15.
859. U.S DEP'T OF STATE, OFF. OF GLOBAL CRIM. JUST., REPORT TO CONGRESS: REPORT ON
STEPS TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SENEGAL TO BRING HISSENE HABR6 TO JUSTICE (June 6,
2012), http://www.state.gov/j/gcj/usreleases/reports/2012/193222.htm.
860. Max du Plessis, A Case of Negative Regional Complementarity? Giving the African Court of
Justice and Human Rights Jurisdiction over International Crimes, EJIL: TALK! (Aug. 27, 2012),
http://www.ejiltalk.org/a-case-of-negative-regional-complementarity-giving-the-african-court-of-
justice-and-human-rights-jurisdiction-over-intemational-crimes/.
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the new criminal chamber, whose proceedings are likely to be more expensive than
civil cases.
The perennial budget shortfalls of hybrid and international justice institutions
suggest that the international community needs to think creatively about how to
better fund the provision of justice. One option that has not been fully explored
involves proceeding against the financial enablers of violations8 61 and the use of
civil forfeiture 862 to fund the costs of justice, a model employed in part in the
antebellum mixed commissions dedicated to adjudicating vessels involved in the
slave trade.863 To the extent that the statutes of modern tribunals address the issue,
any assets obtained from convicted defendants would escheat to the state or go to
victims in the form of restitution or reparations. 864 The STL requires victims to
pursue civil remedies in national court, with the STL's final judgment exerting a
resjudicata effect on the question of individual criminal responsibility. 865 So far,
most defendants before international tribunals have been declared indigent or have
not had appreciable or freezable assets; as such, no international tribunal has
authorized monetary reparations to victims from defendants' property.
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IX. CONCLUSION
The establishment of a global system of international justice reveals that the
promises made during the Nuremberg era are not mere history. Over the past two
decades, the international community has undertaken a considerable investment in
enforcing international criminal law in conflict and post-conflict situations through
the establishment of a network international, hybrid, and internationalized criminal
tribunals. Indeed, some measure of accountability is now an expected component
of any multilateral response to the commission of atrocities, and calls for
prosecutions accompany international responses to the situations in Sri Lanka,
South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Syria, among others. And yet, the
strength of this commitment and the prospects for justice across conflict situations
vary depending on the state of international relations, the existence of competing
equities within the international community and key state actors, the involvement
of powerful states in the events on the ground, and the manifestations of the
violence itself.
861. See, e.g., JAMES G. STEWART, CORPORATE WAR CRIMES: PROSECUTING THE PILLAGE OF
NATURAL RESOURCES §§ 148-49 (2011); Michael J. Kelly, Prosecuting Corporations for Genocide
Under International Law, 6 HARV. L & POL'Y Rev. 339 (2012).
862. See Rome Statute, supra note 273, at art. 79 (contemplating forfeiture).
863. See supra text accompanying note 285.
864. See, e.g., SCSL Statute, supra note 170, at art. 19(3) ("In addition to imprisonment, the Trial
Chamber may order the forfeiture of the property, proceeds and any assets acquired unlawfully or by
criminal conduct, and their retum to their rightful owner or to the State of Sierra Leone"). Similar
provisions govern the ECCC. See ECCC Statute, supra note 190, at art. 39 (indicating the same).
865. STL Statute, supra note 95, at art. 25 ("Based on the decision of the Special Tribunal and
pursuant to the relevant national legislation, a victim... may bring an action in a national court or other
competent body to obtain compensation"). Before the ICC, reparations are administered by a Trust
Fund. See Rome Statute, supra note 273, at arts 75(2), 79.
866. See, e.g., Duch Appeals Judgment, supra note 777, 666-68.
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Since the establishment of the first ad hoc tribunals, the international
community has become more realistic about its objectives in creating justice
mechanisms. Originally, this community of courts was expected to promote
accountability, strengthen the rule of law, reconcile warring communities, repair
victims, and prevent further atrocities by exerting a deterrent effect on would-be
gnocidaires.867 Recent evaluations and the experience of the past two decades,
however, have tempered these expectations considerably. We now know that
matching expectations to realistic assessments of the different types of institutional
and judicial responses is vital for deploying limited financial and human resources
in the most effective manner. Today, the emphasis is placed on ensuring a
measure of justice by meting out individual accountability in fair and transparent
processes, rather than prioritizing these other, more inchoate or second order goals.
Since courts cannot do everything in societies emerging from mass violence and
repression, it is often necessary to consider deploying elements from the entire
continuum of transitional justice mechanisms-either in tandem or through careful
sequencing-if the multifarious and at times contradictory goals of peace, justice,
memorialization, and reconciliation are to be achieved to any degree. That said,
the expectation of criminal justice remains compelling, and the necessary building
blocks exist to creating effective and fair hybrid and internationalized courts. It is
hoped that the taxonomy developed herein will advance global thinking on the
ways in which the hybrid model can be deployed as a powerful and flexible tool
for policymakers to respond to the worst crimes known to humankind.
867. ICTR Statute, supra note 2 (anticipating that the ICTR would contribute to the maintenance
of peace, the cessation of violations, the provision of redress, and the process of reconciliation).
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